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Janet Halley*
INTRODUCTION
What is the place of the family in legal scholarship  and teaching, and in
deep, implicit ideas about how our legal order is arranged?  How did it get
to be that way?  Published in two separate Parts, this Article tells a story of
American  family  law:  how the  law of Domestic  Relations  emerged  as  a
distinct  legal  topic  in  late-nineteenth-century  legal  treatises,  and  what
ideological  conditions  facilitated  its  renaming  and  reconstruction  as
Family Law in the Family Courts and casebooks of the twentieth century.
Almost  without  exception,  throughout  this  account  Domestic
Relations/Family  Law  are  what  they  are  by  virtue  of their  categorical
distinction  from  the  law  of contract  and,  more  broadly,  the  law  of the
market.  This  distinction  did not  always  seem  natural:  this  Article  tells
how  it was  invented.  The  resulting  market/family  distinction  remains  a
latent  but  structural  element  of the  legal  curriculum  and  the  legal order
more generally  today. This Article calls that distinction  into question and
suggests that  family law  should be restructured  to connect it for the first
time  to domains  of law more  readily  understood to relate  directly  to  the
market:  economically  significant  productivity,  social  security  provision,
and the fair or unfair distribution of economic resources.
My  story  comes  in  three  time  periods,  corresponding  with  Duncan
Kennedy's three globalizations of legal thought.'  The first is the classical
* Royall Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks  to lain Frame,  Duncan Kennedy,  Benjamin
Levin and  James  Q. Whitman  for substantive contributions  and  criticism;  to Janet Katz  and David
Warrington  for superb librarianship;  to Lesley  Schoenfeld  and  Steve Chapman  at the  Harvard Law
Library,  Michael  Widener  at  the  Lilian  Goldman  Law  Library,  Yale  Law  School,  Stephen
Wasserstein  and  Karen  Lee  at  Gale,  and  the  Harvard  College  Library  Imaging  Service  for  help
securing  the appendix  images and for granting the permissions to reproduce  them; to the Up Against
Family Law Exceptionalism  conference for the context for this work; and to Cary Mayberger  for top-
notch  research  assistance.  Thanks to  Lama Abu-Odeh  and  Philomila  Tsoukala  for alerting  me  to a
question  on  which  this piece is based:  "When  is Family Law?"  If one could  dedicate an  article, I
would dedicate this one to Duncan Kennedy. All  errors of  fact and judgment are mine alone.
1.  Duncan Kennedy,  Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000,  in THE NEW
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era, roughly the last half of the nineteenth  century.  The second is the  era
of "the  social"  -characterized  by the sociological jurisprudes'  and legal
realists'  attack  on  the  classical  legal  order  and  restructuring  of  legal
taxonomy-spanning  roughly the first half of the  twentieth  century. And
the last is the era of conflicting considerations, roughly the last half of the
twentieth century.
In the  early  nineteenth  century,  there  was  no family  law.  The  law  of
husband  and wife and the law of parent and child were separate, parallel,
and  closely  related  legal  topics, but  they were  equally  proximate  to the
law of guardian and  ward and-most significantly,  for my purposes-the
law of master and  servant. This pattern corresponded  with a  social order
in  which  cohabitation,  legitimate  sexual  relations,  reproduction,  and
productive  labor were assumed to belong in  one place:  the  household. A
single figure was assumed to serve  as husband, father, and master. He was
not one but three  legal persons. The wife, the child,  and the servant were
not just subordinate; they were similarly subordinate. By mid-century  and
for various  reasons,  some  of them  quite  conspicuously  legal  and  others
social,  this  ordering  came  to  seem  inopportune.  A  pressure  to  divide
marriage  from  the  law  of an  emerging  capitalist market  order  began  to
build.  Meanwhile,  inside  legal  thought,  the  critical  category  became
marriage  (not  husband  and wife), and  the  question  of whether marriage
"was contract" became salient.
In the  early  decades  of the nineteenth  century,  it was  easy to answer
that question affirmatively:  marriage was a civil contract (like many other
types  of contract).  But  with  the  rise  of classical  legal  thought,  of free
labor,  and  of  separate  spheres  ideology,  the  answer  to  that  question
increasingly  had  to  be  "no."  By  the  1860s,  the  consensus  view,  even
among  early  opponents  of the idea, was  that marriage  was not contract.
Instead it became status.
This  double transformation-of  the  law of husband  and wife  into the
law  of marriage,  and  of marriage  from  contract  to  status-marked  the
separation  of the  law  of familial  intimacy  from  the  law  of productive
labor.  It coincided  with  the  emancipation  of the  servant  from  indenture
and slavery  and with  the emergence  of the laborer  and  employee  selling
his work for a wage. Socially, it coincided with the emergence  of a market
LAW AND  ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT.  A CRrIcAL APPRAISAL  19 (David  M.  Trubek & Alvaro Santos
eds.,  2006)  [hereinafter  Kennedy,  Three  Globalizations].  The  same  basic  periodization  receives
different  explanations  in Ugo  Mattei,  Why  the  Wind  Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western
Law, 42 AM. J.  COMP. L. 195 (1994).
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for labor,  an ideology of laissez faire for the market,  and an ideology  of
domestic  intimacy that could be articulated  as the opposite of the market.
The linkage between the  law of husband  and wife and that of master  and
servant was not merely dissolved;  transformed into marriage  and contract,
the  linkage  became  an  opposition.  Contract  law  housed  the  will  of the
parties, while  the law of marriage,  the law of quasi-contract (invented  to
segregate  unintended  contractual  obligations  from  those  based  on  an
exercise  of will)  and tort  provided the  legal channels  for the will  of the
state.  Contract, quasi-contract,  and tort became the law of everyone-the
faceless  individual  of liberalism-while  the law of marriage  became  the
law of special persons, incapacitated to varying  degrees from contract:  the
wife  and the  child across the  board or nearly  so, and the husband in  his
role  as  a husband.  Whereas  Blackstone's  rights  of persons  embraced
everyone,  the new  legal persons became  deviants, "abnormal  persons"  -
abnormal because they lacked the capacity to contract.  The wife became
detached from the husband and began to appear in lists alongside children
and the insane.
In the corresponding ideology, the husband, wife,  and child constituted
"the  family"  and lived in an  affective,  sentimental,  altruistic,  ascriptive,
and morally saturated legal and social space. The market was the family's
opposite:  rational,  individualistic,  free,  and  morally  neutral.  In  my
genealogy,  each  side  of this  market-family  pair got its  legal,  social,  and
ideological clarification from the idea that the other was its opposite. With
Kerry  Rittich,  I  call  this  "family  law  exceptionalism"  ("FLE"),  the
construction of the legal  order to render the family and its law distinctive,
special,  other, exceptional.2
Because  of the  developments  detailed  in  this  Article,  FLE  was  an
intrinsic,  not  merely  an  accidental,  part of the emerging  classical  legal
order  that American jurists  constructed  over the course  of the nineteenth
century.  I give  an  account  here  of how Americans  received  the  global
diffusion  of  the  idea  that  law  was  a  system  and  needed  systematic
structure,  and  the  subsidiary  idea  that  the  law of  family  was  radically
distinct from that of contract.  This  idea-set  emanated  from German  legal
thought of the  mid-nineteenth-century  and was  carried around  the world
not  only  through  the  sheer  prestige  of German  legal  ideas  but  in  the
formation  of the  colonial  legal  order  and the  rise  of global  capitalism.
2.  Janet Halley  & Kerry  Rittich,  Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law:  Genealogies
and  Contemporary Studies ofFamily Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753 (2010).
3 2011]
3
Halley: What is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
America  was  no  longer  a  colony,  but  it  followed  a  path  into  the
market/family  distinction that  is strikingly parallel  to what  scholars  have
detected  in the colonial  experience  of Egypt,  Algeria,  West  Africa,  and
Taiwan, as well  as in the rise of nationalist legal  thought  in West Africa,
India and  Greece.  Connecting  the  American  version  of this  story  to  its
global counterparts is a long-term aim of this project.
While this transformation was taking place, marriage  and divorce were
the  ruling  preoccupations  of  the  treatise  writers,  tracking  legislative
changes  to  the  wife's  coverture and the  introduction  of judicial  divorce.
Both of these reforms had the character of contract: the wife's contractual
capacity was expanded, and marriage,  now that it could be terminated for
breach, more closely resembled other contracts. Proponents of marriage as
status,  however,  insisted  on the  enduring  investment  of the  state  in  the
ascriptive  character  of  ongoing  marriages.  The  nomenclature  for  this
change  revived the  old legal  idea that husband and  wife  were bound  by
legal  relations.  The  term  chosen  to  describe  those  relations  was
"domestic":  the  law  of  "Domestic  Relations"  was  born.  The  term
"domestic  relations" had been in common use among  lawyers in the early
decades of the nineteenth century but did not become the official name for
the  field,  in  the  United  States,  until  1870.  This  shift  in nomenclature
coincided  with the dawning  perception  among jurists that  the field could
not  coherently  retain  the  master  and  servant  or  the  guardian  and ward:
husband  and  wife, parent  and  child remained  in  the  new  legal  category
Domestic  Relations,  corresponding  with  the  emergence  of "family"  as  a
tiny  nuclear  unit  housing  only  the  intimacies  that  we  often  call  the
bourgeois  or affective  family.  In  the  concluding  sections  of this  Part,  I
show how this development coincided with the emergence of contract law
as the law of labor and the evanescence of the law of master and servant.
Part  II  tells  what  happened  when  the  proponents  of  sociological
jurisprudence  and  the  legal  realists  set  out  to  destroy  and  replace  the
3.  On FLE in colonization, see, for example,  Lama Abu Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law:
The Case of Egypt, 37 VAND.  J. TRANSNAT'L  L. 1043  (2004); Judith Surkis, Civilization and  the Civil
Code:  The  Scandal of  "Child Marriage" in  French Algeria,  in  JUDITH  SURKIS,  SCANDALOUS
SUBJECTS:  INTIMACY  AND  INDECENCY  IN FRANCE  AND  FRENCH  ALGERIA  (forthcoming);  Hedeyat
Heikal, Family as Jurisdiction: from Dispossession to the Family in Colonial Algeria  (on file with  the
author);  Yun-Ru Chen, Maneuvering Modernity: Family Law as a Battlefield in Colonial  Taiwan (on
file with  the author);  and  Sylvia Kang'ara,  Western Legal Ideas in African Family Law (on file with
the author).  On FLE in anti-colonial,  postcolonial,  and nationalist  projects,  see,  for example,  Partha
Chatterjee,  "The  Nation  and  its  Women,"  in  PARTHA  CHATTERJEE,  THE  NATION  AND  ITS
FRAGMENTS:  COLONIAL  AND  POSTCOLoNIAL  HISTORIES  113  (1993);  Philomila  Tsoukala, Marrying
Family Law to the Nation, 58 AM. J. COMP. L.873 (2010); and Sylvia Kang'ara, Western Legal Ideas.
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classical  legal  edifice.  At  first  they  understood  that  FLE  was  an
impediment  to their  work  and sought  to  reunite  domestic  relations  with
the law of the market;  but it was too hard for them to do it and they gave
up.  FLE retained  its  grip as  the  classical  order disintegrated,  eventually
emerging as modem Family Law.
Family Law remains our topic  in law schools today. It houses  the entry
rules  of  marriage,  divorce,  and  some  of  the  above  for  marriage
alternatives (cohabitation and civil union). It includes the law of parentage
(who  is  a  parent?),  including  adoption.  Constitutionally-driven  rights  in
reproduction  and parenthood take up a big segment of the course. But the
course  is  mostly about the formation of the core  relationships,  which are
paradigmatically  marital  and  parental,  and  about  the  dissolution  of
marriage  and  its  consequences  for  adults  and  children.  Throughout  the
successive  waves  of change  that  I limn  in  Part  II, what  has  remained
constant is the division of intellectual  labor between the law of the market
and the law of the family, introduced in the  1850s for long-gone reasons.
The property  rules of ongoing marriage  are  almost never taught;  the  law
of inheritance  lives  in another course;  and the  course  omits welfare  law,
the law of poor families. The actual ways  in which marital partners  share
their wealth (or don't) are completely  off the agenda.  The ways in which
marriage and "infancy"  condition the availability of credit and liability for
joint and separate debts are similarly overlooked (the sole exception being
the  doctrine  of necessaries).  A  lot  of  explicit  rules  about  marital  and
parental  wealth  and  obligation  are  parked  in  other  courses  and
acknowledged  in Family  Law  only  fleetingly:  employment  benefits  like
health  insurance  and  retirement  savings  with  rights  of survivorship,  for
instance,  are taught  if at all  in employment  and health  law;  marital  and
parent-child  eligibility  for  public  assistance,  immigration,  and  intestate
succession  are  taught  in  welfare  law,  immigration  law,  and  trusts  and
estates. These omissions track the old family/market distinction.
What happens  to family law if we  rigorously suspend that distinction?
Should  we  do  that?  In  collaboration  with  colleagues,  my  hope  is  to
reconstruct family law so that it becomes possible  to teach  the family and
its law as distributive.  We posit that the family and family law are hidden
but crucial mechanisms for the distribution of social goods of an immense
variety  of kinds:  material  resources like money, jobs, nutrition;  symbolic
resources like prestige and degradation; psychic  resources  like affectional
ties,  erotic  attraction  and  repulsion,  the  very  conditions  of  access  to
human  personality.  We  seek  to  study  the  ways  in  which  it  serves  as  a
5
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legally  regulated  private  welfare  system,  as  a  site  of legally  regulated
productive  labor, as a crucial unit of production and  consumption.  Many
of the  "culture  wars"  fights  that  now  occupy  the  field  obscure  these
distributional  consequences  and  make  it impossible to  have descriptively
adequate  discussions of the  stakes of various policy  choices. We  seek to
change  that, and to usher in a new  range of work and  new approaches  to
teaching that could expose the distributional stakes of rules that affect the
family, whether they are housed in family law or elsewhere.
To  conclude:  this  Article  is  divided  into  two  Parts.  Part I, published
here,  addresses  the  first phase  of my  story,  in  the  rise  and triumph  of
classical  legal  thought among American jurists of the nineteenth  century.
It addresses legal treatises primarily,  spanning from  1765 to  1896.  It tells
the  story  of  the  status/contract  distinction  and  of  the  emergence  of
Domestic  Relations  as  the  opposite  of  Contract.  Part  II  addresses  the
second  and third  phases  of my  story,  in  the  legal  realist  assault  on the
classical  structure  of the  legal field during  the  first half of the twentieth
century  and  politicization  of  it  in  the  postwar  era.  This  narrative  thus
spans  from  the  1920s  through  the  1990s.  Because,  as  Morton  Horwitz
observes,  the  treatise  ceased  after  about  1920  to  be  the  modal  form  in
which  legal  professionals  produced  and  shared  large  changes  in  legal
thought,'  Part  II  considers  law  review  articles,  curricular  reforms,
conference  programs, casebooks,  and book reviews of casebooks.  It tells
the story of the struggle  to introduce Family Law into the American legal
vocabulary,  and  shows  how  wave  after  wave  of  change  left  the
status/contract distinction in place.
I. THE LEGAL RELATIONS:  BLACKSTONE AND  REEVE
Is marriage  contract  or  status?  Should it be contract  or status?  These
questions  loom  large  in  U.S.  legal  discussions  of the  institution.5  What
4.  Morton Horwitz, Part III-Treatise  Literature,  69 LAW  LIBR. J. 460 (1976).
5.  At  least  five  contemporary  family  law casebooks  address  the  question  whether  marriage  is
status or contract  (though they  often then  supplant that question by  others, typically  the question  of
the  enforceability  of  an  antenuptial  contract).  See  DOUGLAS  E.  ABRAMS,  NAOMI  R.  CAHN,
CATHERINE  J. Ross & DAVID  D.  MEYER, CONTEMPORARY  FAMILY  LAW 819-20 (2006);  HARRY  D.
KRAUSE,  LINDA  D.  ELROD,  MARSHA  GARRISON  & J. THOMAS  OLDHAM,  FAMILY  LAW:  CASES,
COMMENTS  AND  QUESTIONS  175-77  (5th ed.  2003);  PETER  N.  SWISHER,  ANTHONY  MILLER  & JANA
B.  SINGER,  FAMILY  LAW:  CASES,  MATERIALS  AND  PROBLEMS  2-3  (1998);  WALTER  0.  WAYRAUCH,
SANFORD  N. KATZ &  FRANCES  OLSEN,  CASES  AND  MATERIALS ON  FAMILY  LAW:  LEGAL CONCEPTS
AND  CHANGING  HUMAN  RELATIONSHIPS 89-90  (1994);  D. KELLY  WEISBERG, MODERN FAMILY  LAW:
CASES  AND  MATERIALS  114-15 (2006).  The holding of Maynard  v. Hill, committing contracts-clause
doctrine to the  idea that marriage  is status-not-contract,  is often invoked in conservative  interventions
6 [Vol.  23:1
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seems  oddly absent from considerations  of this question  is  an awareness
of  how  ideological it  was  when  it  was  first  asked  and,  eventually,
answered.  As  Duncan  Kennedy  explains  in  his  account  of the  rise  of
classical  legal  thought  and  in  particular  of  the  "Transformation  of
Contract"  by jurists and judges  in the last half of the nineteenth  century,
the reclassification of marriage as status was unknown to American  legal
minds  before  1852.6  But as  he  also notes, by  1890  the  Supreme  Court
could intone that  marriage was  status without offering  a citation.7  It had
become  legal  common sense. It took several  decades of work to produce
this obviousness.
In the first three parts of this essay,  I want to ascertain as precisely as I
can what the classical  legal  thinkers meant by the word  status, and  what
they  meant  by  invoking  it  to  define  marriage.  To  do  that  I will  retell
Kennedy's story of the emergence  of the status/contract  distinction inside
the emergence  of classical legal thought, though with a stronger focus  on
marriage.  Kennedy  once  said:  "Marriage  went  from  contract  to  status."
He was right. What did this mean to those who made it happen?
Really to get it, we have to go back to William Blackstone and Tapping
Reeve.
Blackstone  classified  the  laws  governing  marriage  in  Book  I of his
Commentaries, where  they  appear  in  a  series  of  topics  as  "Rights  of
Persons."
8  Appendix I shows the Table of Contents of Book I.
Many things could be said of a legal mind in which Blackstone's Rights
of Persons have a  lot in common. The law created not only "individuals"
who have general rights, but also distinct "persons"  with highly particular
social beings. It provided the rules by which one could become one or the
other  kind  of person.  Once  one  was  one  or  another  type  of  person,
into  US  marriage  politics.  See,  for  instance,  the  epigraph  to  INSTITUTE  FOR  AMERICAN  VALUES,
MARRIAGE  AND  THE LAW 6 (2006).  For a very savvy  explosion of the  status/contract distinction  for
describing modem  marriage  and  developing a normative view of the place of prenuptial  contracts  in
it, see  Katharine  B.  Silbaugh, Marriage  Contracts and the Family Economy, 93  Nw.  U.  L. REV.  65,
111-20  (1998).  For  my own  critique  of the  status/contract  distinction  in  contemporary  American
family  law thinking, see Janet Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage,  Part  I: From Status/Contract to
the Marriage  System,  - UNBOUND:  HARVARD  J. OF  THE L.  LEFT  - (forthcoming  2011); and Behind
the Law of Marriage,  Part II:  Travelling Marriage,  - UNBOUND:  HARVARD  J.  OF  THE L. LEFT  -
(forthcoming  2011).
6.  DUNCAN  KENNEDY,  The Transformation of Contract, in THE RISE  AND  FALL  OF  CLASSICAL
LEGAL THOUGHT  195-96 (1975)  [herinafter KENNEDY,  RISE AND  FALL].
7.  U.S.  v. Grimley,  137  U.S.  147,  151  (1890);  KENNEDY,  RISE  AND  FALL, supra note 6,  at 203-
04.
8.  1 WILLIAM  BLACKSTONE,  COMMENTARIES  ON  THE  LAWS  OF  ENGLAND,  Table  of Contents,
(photo. reprint 1979) (1765).
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furthermore,  the  law  set  forth  the  rules  governing  one's  relations  with
other persons.  The rights of the king  and of corporations were equally the
rights  of persons;  the  reciprocal  rights  and duties  of master and  servant
were equivalent to those of the husband and wife.
The  rights  of  persons  cut  sweepingly  across  Blackstone's  own
private/public  distinction.  Chapters  II  through  XII  contain  the  "public
relations  of magistrates  and  people"';  then  Blackstone  sets  forth  "their
rights and duties in private oeconomical  relations."'o  "[M]arriage"  is his
second "private  . . . relation of persons";  master and servant come first. "
The  "private oeconomical  relations"  house  what  we  would  now  call
employment  (master/servant),  marriage  (husband/wife),  parentage
(parent/child),  and  wardship  (guardian  and  ward).  It  also  houses
corporations.
Blackstone's  term oeconomical derives  from  the  ancient  Greek  word
oiicoq  and  is  our  etymological  root  for  the  term  economy.  At  the  time
Blackstone  used  the  term,  it  meant  "of  or  relating  to  household
management,  or to the  ordering  of private  affairs;  domestic[.]"l
2  In that
legal  space,  husband  and  wife,  parent  and  child,  guardian  and  ward,
master  and  servant  (and  where  slavery  was  recognized,  though  not  in
Blackstone's England, master and slave) lived out their hierarchical lives;
reciprocal,  not  equal,  rights  prevailed.  These  legal  relations  were,
moreover,  no  more  or  less  economical  than  corporations.  Beyond  the
world of legal concepts,  considered as an architectural  space and a  social
form,  this  classification  invokes  not  the  home  or  the  family  but  the
household, a  space  for  both  human  and  material  production,  for  the
making, consumption, and  distribution of wealth  and material goods.  The
legal distinction between the family and the market finds no expression  in
this legal  or social  order;  the future  trajectory of the word "economy"  is
one index of the  gradual, as-yet-unforeseen  emergence  of that distinction
as a structural element of Classical Legal Thought.
Finally,  there  is no  suggestion  that marriage  is  a "status";  the  closest
Blackstone  seems to come to that term is when he discusses  the "military
9.  Id. at 410.
10.  Id..
11.  Id. at 421.
12.  Economic  Definition  B.I.a,  OXFORD  ENGLISH  DICTIONARY  ONLINE,
http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryenty/Entry/59385  (last visited Dec.  20, 2010). The OED declares
that this sense of the word "economic" is obsolete and gives a final example dated 1791.  Id.
8 [Vol. 23:1
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and maritime states" l3-a  usage closer to the medieval concept of estates
as ranks  in the social order (which of course Blackstone retained) than to
status as the term was to enter into American legal language.
Blackstone  was  a  crucial  authority  for  nineteenth-century  American
jurists,  but  he  was  joined  by  distinctly  American  sources.  Tapping
Reeve's  1816  The  Law  of Baron and Femmel4  tracks  Blackstone's
classification  with  some  key  modifications.  Reeve's  full  title  page  is
included here as Appendix  2.
By omitting all  of the "public relations" and  corporations,  Reeve takes
Blackstone's  "private  oeconomical  relations"  one  step further:  this book
collects  the  law of the household.  And Reeve  puts  its  legal relations  in
their  conventional  nineteenth-century  order:  husband  and  wife,  then
parent and  child,  then  guardian  and ward, and  then  master  and  servant.
The social hierarchies  are now graphically  represented.  These shifts  also
intensify  the  boundedness  of  this  legal  space  to  the  architectural  and
social household. Reeve introduces  into Anglo-American  law, perhaps for
the  first  time,  a  legal  classification  that  can  meaningfully  be  tied,
genealogically, to modem family law.
By  the time Reeve  published  his  treatise,  the modem  uses of the word
"economic,"  turning  it from  the  household  to  the  market,  were  just
beginning  to  emerge-and  as  a  result,  he  avoided  it.  To  Reeve,  an
"oeconomical  relation"  could  still  have  been  one  "relating  to  the
management  of domestic  or private  income  and  expenditure[.]""s  But in
newly  emerging  meanings,  it  could  also  have  been  "of, relating  to,  or
concerned  with the science of economics or with the economy  in general;
relating  to the development  and regulation of the material  resources  of a
community  or  state[."l 6  Reeve  dropped  Blackstone's  term,  silently
rejecting  the  new  meanings  of  "economic"  as  inapt  to  his  topic.  His
omission  tacitly  anticipates  what  will  become  the  family/market
distinction.
Before that  distinction  could take  its classical  form, the  association  of
marriage  with contract had to be effaced. The chief literary impediment to
this process  was  Blackstone's  famous  insistence that  "our  law  considers
13.  BLACKSTONE, supra note 8,  at 395.
14.  TAPPING  REEVE,  THE LAW  OF  BARON  AND  FEMME;  OF PARENT  AND  CHILD; OF  GUARDIAN
AND  WARD;  OF  MASTER  AND  SERVANT;  AND  OF  THE POWERS  OF  COURTS  OF  CHANCERY,  WITH  AN
ESSAY  ON THE TERMS, HEIR, HEIRS,  AND  HEIRS OF THE  BODY (New Haven, Oliver Steele  1816).
15.  OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY  ONLINE, supra note  12, at B.La.
16.  Id. at  B.Lb and  B.4.a.  The OED's first  example of "economic"  used  to describe  a national
economic system dates from 1815. Id.
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marriage  in  no  other  light  than  as  a  civil  contract.""  What  did
Blackstone's  equation of marriage with contract mean  to him? I think  it's
perfectly  clear that, if he were to hear jurists of the mid-nineteenth century
insist that "marriage  is a civil contract,"  he would have thought they were
putting  the  accent  on  the  wrong  syllable.  For him,  the  point  was  that
marriage  was a civil contract.  Up  until the passage  of Lord Hardwicke's
Act in 1753-a mere twelve years before the publication of Blackstone's
volume on the Rights of Persons-the validity of particular marriages had
been  subject  to  ecclesiastical  law  and  was  most  finally  determined  in
ecclesiastical courts.  Blackstone's locution registers the important change
wrought by the Act:  civil law  took upon itself the authority  to determine
the  rules  of marital  validity.  Though  ecclesiastical  courts  persisted,  the
ultimate power to  determine marital validity had  shifted from religious to
civil control.'"
Moreover,  though  contracts  come  up  constantly  in  his  discussion  of
almost every major topic except Public Wrongs in Volume IV, Blackstone
was  completely  innocent  of any  idea  that contract  constituted  a distinct
legal  topic.  As  the  great  contractarian  Theophilus  Parsons  would
complain in the opening  lines of his  1853 treatise  The Law of Contracts,
17.  BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 421.
18.  The  shift from sacrament  to contract  was  an effect of the  Protestant revolution:  none of the
Protestant  sects carried  forth  the  Roman  Catholic  idea that marriage  was  a  sacrament, but  they  all
emphasized  the  religious  significance  of the  relationship  and  the  contract  that commenced  it. See
JOHN  WITTE,  JR.,  FROM  SACRAMENT  TO  CONTRACT:  MARRIAGE,  RELIGION  AND  LAW  IN  THE
WESTERN  TRADITION  (1997).  It  is against  this backdrop  that Blackstone  repeatedly  emphasizes  the
civil character of the marriage  contract. After defining  marriage  as  a civil contract,  as quoted  in the
text, he  alludes  to  some  marital  matters  that remained  within  the jurisdiction  of the  ecclesiastical
courts  and then  concludes:  "Thus  taking  it  in this  civil  light,  the  law  treats  it  as  it  does  all  other
contracts; allowing it to be good and valid in all cases where the parties at the time of making it were,
in the first place, willing to contract;  secondly, able to contract;  and lastly, actually did contract, in the
proper  forms  and  solemnities  required  by  law."  BLACKSTONE,  supra note  8,  at  421.  It's  almost  a
given  that marriage is a contract:  what call  for italics are  the specific  requirements  for its  formation.
It  is applicability of civil law  and its various requirements  of contract  that impress him here, not the
fact that marriage is formed  by (is)  contract.  Indeed, it is not formed by contract alone:  as he goes on
to explain, Lord Hardwicke's  Act put the  kibosh on all of that, so that the verbal  contracts of canon
law "are  now of no force, to compel a future  marriage."  Id.  at 427 (footnote omitted). Instead, the Act
requires  celebration  in  church  or a  public  chapel  by an  authorized  person;  Blackstone  looks  for  a
precursor  to this requirement and reports "it being  said that Pope Innocent  the Third was the first who
ordained  the  celebration of marriage  in the  church:  before which  it was totally  a civil  contract."  Id.
Again, Blackstone is tracking the civil or religious  character of the marriage contract.
Joel  Prentiss  Bishop,  who as  we will see  was the  chief exponent if not the inventor of the  idea that
marriage  was status-not-contract,  read Blackstone in just this way:  "To distinguish, . . . it is presumed,
marriage  as  the  law  views  it  from  marriage  as  a  religious  rite,  the  courts  and  text-writers  almost
uniformly  speak  of and  describe  it  as  a  'contract,'  a  'civil  contract."'  JOEL PRENTISS  BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES  ON THE  LAW OF  MARRIAGE AND  DIVORCE,  AND  EVIDENCE  IN MATRIMONIAL  SUITS
26-27 [hereinafter  BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND  DIVORCE]  (l  ed., Boston, Little, Brown  1852)].
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"The  title  of the  thirtieth  chapter  of the  Second  Book  of Blackstone's
Commentaries  is,  'Of title  by  gift, grant, and contract.'  And  in no other
chapter  does  he  treat  the  law of contracts  under  that name."' 9  Contract
pervaded Blackstone's  legal universe  without provoking in his mind  any
need to attribute  to  it any taxonomic  or conceptual  coherence,  or  indeed
any  particular  importance.  Marriage  was  a  contract  because,  as  in  all
contracts,  it  could  be  formed  only  by  willing  parties,  capable  of
contracting  marriage,  who did actually  contract marriage  according to the
procedures  required by law (another reference  to Lord Hardwicke's  Act).
Full  stop.  As  we  will  see,  the  emergence  of contract  as a  distinct  legal
topic was produced in part through the gradual  exile of marriage  from its
domain. Blackstone shows no indication that he saw it coming.
One of the marks of this process will be the gradual separation between
the law of husband and wife and of parent and child, on one hand, and the
law of master and servant on the other;  in the process the law of guardian
and ward will morph into trusts and estates and evolve down a third path
of legal  development.  Early  in  the  nineteenth  century,  American  legal
minds  saw  no  big  differences  between  these  topics.  Users  of Reeve's
treatise  almost  immediately  dubbed  it  Reeve's  Domestic Relations-
perhaps they found "baron  and femme"  too aristocratic  in flavor for their
actual clients-and they  did so  in cases  involving  all four  of these  legal
relations  indifferently.20  But by  1843  one  court  could  shorten  the list to
two, "the  domestic relations  of husband and  wife, parent and child[.]" 21
And another judge, writing  in  1893  to reject two  servants'  claim  that a
miserly decedent had made a will bequeathing his property  to them rather
than  die  intestate,  did  so  in  language  that decisively  ejected them  from
this now narrower, more hallowed domestic sphere:
The relations between  Mr. Chappell  [the decedent]  and him  [Ned
Trent, one of the claimants]  were those of employer and employd,
or, more  strictly  speaking,  that of principal  and agent,  or master
and  servant;  nothing  more,  nothing  less.  Eliza  Trent  [the  other
19.  1 THEOPHILUS  PARSONS,  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS  vii  (photo.  reprint  1980)  (Buffalo,
William S.  Hein 1853)  [hereinafter  1 PARSONS].
20.  Four cases citing Reeve  as an authority turned up on  a Westlaw search for "Reeve  & "Baron
and Femme."  Edwards v. Davis,  16 Johns.  281,  285 (N.Y. Supp.  1819) (discussing the  duty of a child
to  support  its  parents);  Welborn  v.  Little,  10  S.C.L.  (1 Nott  & McC.)  159,  161  (S.C.L.  1818)
(discussing the  rights and duties of parties to an  indenture); Cusack  v.White, 9  S.C.L.  (2  Mill)  279,
281  (S.C.L.  1818)  (discussing the husband's  rights in his wife's chattels); Snook ex rel. Coursen v.
Sutton,  10 N.J.L.  133,  136 (1828)  (discussing the rights of a ward when he comes of age).
21.  Paine v. Paine, 23 Tenn. (4 Hum.) 523,  533 (1843).
2011] 11I
11
Halley: What is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
claimant],  on the death of her mother, succeeded  to the duties and
obligations  of  housekeeper.  She  did,  unaided,  the  milking,
cooking,  washing,  and  other drudgery  incident to  housekeeping.
Such were  the social and  domestic relations  existing between Mr.
Chappell, on the one hand, and Ned and Eliza Trent, on the other.
22
As  we  will  see,  in  1893  it  was  not  at  all  clear  whether  the  legal
relationship  between  Mr.  Chappell  and  the Trents would turn  out to  be
employment,  principal/agent,  or  master/servant.  The  Court  was
appropriately  circumspect  about  the  correct  term  to  use:  it  hadn't  been
decided. But it was quite  certain  that the only  "domestic  relations"  Eliza
Trent  shared  with  her  employer/principal/master  were  those  of
degradingly  necessitous  and  hierarchical  co-residence  in  the  household.
Domestic  labor  and  domestic  love  were  taking  divergent  ideological
paths.  Both were  domestic, but they were  starkly  opposed in law;  there,
only the latter  deserved  the term.  We see emerging  here the mark of the
modern legal family.
II. CONTRACT ...  AND  A CIVIL INSTITUTION:
STORY AND PARSONS  ...  AND  STORY
For  American  jurists  of  the  mid-nineteenth  century,  the  idea  that
marriage  is  contract  did  some  important  work.  Our  examples  can  be
Justice  Joseph Story and Theophilus  Parsons. Story  is  a pivotal  figure  in
this  chapter:  he  first  insisted  that  marriage  was  contract,  with  strong
constitutional  consequences,  and  later  repented.  His  change  of  mind
signals  the  defeat  of Parsons's  articulation  of marriage  as  contract,  and
contract  as  virtually  coterminous  with  the  legal  order  tout  court. The
mutual  segregation  of marriage  and  contract  is  the overall  theme of this
chapter in our story.
While  Story  was  a  sitting  Justice  on  the  Supreme  Court,  he  was
presented with  an opportunity  to classify  marriage. Dartmouth College v.
Woodward was the challenge  of Dartmouth  College  trustees to  an act  of
the  New  Hampshire  legislature  that  voided  the  College's  precolonial
charter and enacted  a new  one.  23  The new  charter  replaced the trustees,
reclassified  the  College  as  a  university,  and  substantially  changed  the
22.  Chappell v. Trent,  19 S.E. 314, 338 (1893).
23.  Dartmouth College v. Woodward,  17 U.S.  518 (1819).
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rules  of  governance.
24   A  key  question  in  the  case  was  whether  the
Legislature  had violated  the Contracts  Clause  of the  Constitution,  which
requires  that states not "impair[]  . ..  the Obligation of Contracts."
2 5  Was
the original  charter a contract, and did the legislative overhaul impair  it?
Lawyers  for New  Hampshire argued  that  the charter  was  a "matter  of
civil  institution"  and thus subject  to legislative  control-like marriage.26
Just as the legislature could determine the obligations of husband and wife
by  providing  a  means  for  divorce,  it  could  devise  new  terms  for  the
operation  of the  College.27  Justice  Marshall  writing  the  opinion  of the
Court, and  Justice  Story writing  a  long  concurrence,  thought otherwise.
We will concentrate  here on Story's thinking because his change of heart
fifteen years later marks the turning point in our story.
Story classified the charter as a contract.  This was not easy to do. It cost
him  hard  legal  work,  spanning  many  pages,  to  construe  a  charter
establishing a purely charitable  institution, to be run by persons other than
the  recipient  of the  original  grant,  as  a contract.  In  the  course  of those
pages,  Justice  Story  depended  on rules of contract-especially  a web  of
implied contracts to supply consideration-which  would seem completely
archaic  by the  end of the  status-not-contract  genealogy  we  are  pursuing
here.
28  Much  more swiftly, he went  on to  find that the  imposition of the
24.  Id.
25.  The Contracts  Clause  stipulates  that "No state  shall  ...  pass  any ...  law  . . . impairing  the
Obligation of Contracts."  U.S.  CONST. art. I, §  10, cl.  1.
26.  Dartmouth  College, 17 U.S.  at 600.
27.  Id. at 600-01  ("Thus, marriage  is  a contract,  and a private  contract; but relating  merely to a
matter of civil  institution, which  every  society  has an  inherent  right to  regulate  as its own  wisdom
may  dictate,  it  cannot  be  considered  as  within  the  spirit  of  this  prohibitory  clause.  Divorces
unquestionably  impair the obligation of the nuptial  contract; they change the relations of the marriage
state, without the consent of both the parties, and thus come clearly within the letter of the prohibition.
But surely,  no  one will contend,  that there  is locked up  in this mystical  clause of the constitution  a
prohibition to the states to grant divorces, a power peculiarly  appropriate  to domestic legislation,  and
which has been exercised  in every age  and nation  where civilization has produced that corruption  of
manners, which, unfortunately, requires  this remedy.").
28.  If executory,  Story argued,  the  grant once performed  was a contract,  id. at 683-84,  and  if it
were  deemed  to be  executory  but not  performed  and thus  to  require consideration  to  be  classed a
contract  - "which  I utterly  deny,"  said  Story,  id. at  690 - consideration  could be  found  in  the
implied agreements of the original grantor to relinquish his own funds and funds he held in trust to the
new trustees, to agree  to the  removal of the  College from his home  to a new location, and to serve as
its first President,  id. at 686, in the implied contract of the trustees to perform their assigned duties, id.
at 688-89,  in  the  implied  contract  of the  Crown  to  the  benefactors  to  protect  their  donations  by
respecting  the terms of the charter, and in the  implied contract between the  new corporation  and the
donors  to  do  the  same,  id. at 689-90.  All  of these  were  relinquishments  of established  rights  and
assumptions  of  new  duties;  if  in  a  commercial  contract payment  of  "a  pepper-corn"  was  good
consideration,  in an agreement to establish a charitable institution, these relinquishments and promises
surely constituted good consideration as well. Id.  at 684, 687.
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new charter impaired that contract. 29
As  part  of his  first  argument,  Justice  Story  explained  why  bringing
marriage  within the constitutional  oversight  of the  Contracts Clause  did
not trouble  him. A  divorce  granted  for breach of marital  obligations  did
not  impair  the  marital  contract;  instead,  it  might  be  the  only  effective
remedy for the breach:
A general  law, regulating  divorces  from the contract  of marriage,
like  a  law  regulating  remedies  in  other  cases  of  breaches  of
contracts,  is not necessarily a  law impairing the obligation of such
a  contract.  It  may  be  the  only  effectual  mode  of enforcing  the
obligations of the contract on both sides. A  law punishing a breach
of a contract, by imposing  a forfeiture of the rights acquired under
it, or dissolving  it, because the mutual  obligations  were no longer
observed, is, in no correct sense, a law impairing the obligations of
a contract. 30
The Contracts  Clause applied-marriage  was contract. But just as it was
no  impairment  of contract  for  a  state  to  grant  remedies  for  breach  of
contract  in bailments  and  sales  of goods,  it  could  be  no  impairment  to
grant similar remedies for breach of marital contracts.
Story  went  on to  give  substance  to his  vision of the marital  contract.
Contracts-Clause  control  over legislative  action  in this area might be not
only tolerable but necessary to protect marital rights-primarily, it would
appear, the marital-property rights of husbands:
But if the argument  means to assert,  that the  legislative power to
dissolve  such  a  contract,  without  such  a breach  on  either  side,
against the wishes of the parties, and without any judicial  inquiry
to ascertain  a breach,  I  certainly  am not prepared  to admit such a
power, or that its exercise would not entrench upon the prohibition
of the constitution.  If, under the  faith of existing laws,  a contract
of marriage  be duly solemnized, or a marriage  settlement be made
29.  Id.  at 706-12.
30.  Id.  at 697-98.
31.  Story here agrees with Chief Justice  Marshall  that marriage was  a contract, but differs in  his
reasons  for  seeing  no  impairment  in  fault-based  divorce.  The  latter saw  divorce  for breach  of the
marriage  contract  as  no  impairment  because  the  breach  had  already  destroyed  the  contract.  The
Contracts  Clause, he said, "never has been understood to restrict the general right of the legislature  to
legislate  on  the  subject  of divorces.  Those  acts enable  some  tribunals,  not  to  impair  a  marriage
contract,  but to liberate  one of the  parties, because  it has been  broken by the  other. When  any state
legislature  shall  pass  an  act  annulling  all  marriage  contracts,  or allowing  either  party  to  annul  it,
without  the  consent  of the  other,  it  will  be  time  enough  to  inquire,  whether  such  an  act  be
constitutional." Id.  at 629.  As Kennedy notes,  both  logics are  equally contractarian.  KENNEDY,  RISE
AND  FALL, supra  note 6, at  195.
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(and  marriage  is  always  in  law  a  valuable  consideration  for  a
contract),  it  is  not  easy  to  perceive,  why  a  dissolution  of  its
obligations, without any default or assent of the parties, may not as
well  fall within the prohibition,  as any  other contract for valuable
consideration.  A  man has  as  good  a right  to  his wife,  as  to  the
property acquired under a marriage settlement.
He has  a  legal  right to her society  and her  fortune; and to  divest
such right, without his  default,  and against  his  will,  would be  as
flagrant  a violation of the principles of justice,  as the confiscation
of his own estate.32
Marriage  is  represented  here  as  a  transaction  primarily  affecting
property rights. It is as clearly contractual as  a man's promise  to marry  in
exchange for the bride's father's marriage  settlement on his daughter. The
exchange of marriage  for property rights was a contract, and the Contracts
Clause  should bar its legal  impairment by divorce. At first Story imagines
divorces entered against the will of both spouses, but note that by the end
of my  quotation  (also  the  end  of his discussion  of this  conundrum)  he
slips to divorces imposed on a husband, depriving him of the rights under
a marriage  settlement,  against his will and  without his  fault. No wonder
that Story, considering  it in that way, was blithe about the prospect-held
out  to  him  as  a  bugaboo  by  counsel  for  New  Hampshire-that  the
Contracts Clause might limit the scope of divorce laws. The clause should
police  legislation allowing  sharp dealing  in the making of marriages just
as it would in bargains for the exchange of goods.
Another way to include  marriage  as contract was to expand contract to
include  virtually  the  entire  legal  order.  This  imperialism  of contract  is
exemplified,  for  Kennedy,  by  Theophilus  Parsons."  Writing  in  1853,
Parsons  was  ambitious  for  his  category:  "The  Law  of Contracts,  in  its
widest extent, may be regarded as including, directly or indirectly, almost
all the law administered  in our courts."34  Or even more grandly:
The  Law  of Contracts,  in  its  widest extent,  may  be  regarded  as
including nearly all the law which regulates the relations of human
life. Indeed,  it may be looked upon as the basis of human  society.
All  social  life presumes  it, and rests upon it;  for out of contracts,
express  or implied,  declared  or  understood,  grow  all  rights,  all
duties,  all obligations, and all law. Almost the whole procedure  of
32.  Dartmouth College, 17 U.S.  at 697-98.
33.  KENNEDY,  RISE AND  FALL, supra note 6, at 207.
34.  1 PARSONS, supra note  19, at vii.
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human  life  implies,  or,  rather,  is,  the  continual  fulfilment  of
contracts.
Parsons's ambitions  for contract  caused  him  to  overhaul  Blackstone's
taxonomy quite completely. Appendix 3 reproduces the Table of Contents
for his Book III, on "The Subject-Matter of Contract."3 1
Marriage  is now a contract in full earnest. It has its own  special  rules,
but  so  do all  the  contract  types. These  rules  were  voluminous:  Parsons
devotes  more  than three  hundred  pages to  the  legal  requirements  of the
various kinds of contractual  obligation. According to Parsons, the law had
a lot to say about the contents of particular contracts.
And it was entirely  possible for a contract to  arise without the parties'
knowledge or assent or their performance of initiatory formalities:
[I]n  all the  relations  of social  life,  its  good order  and prosperity
depend upon the due fulfillment  of the contracts which bind all to
all.  Sometimes these  contracts  are deliberately  expressed with all
the  precision  of law,  and  are  armed  with all  its  sanctions.  More
frequently  they  are,  though  still  expressed,  simpler  in  form  and
more  general in language,  and  leave  more to the intelligence,  the
justice,  and  honesty of the parties.  Far more  frequently  they  are
not  expressed  at all;  and  for their definition  and extent we  must
look  to  the  common  principles  which  all  are  supposed  to
understand and acknowledge.  In this  sense, contract is coordinate
and  commensurate  with duty: and  it is a familiar principle of law
that  . . . whatsoever  it is certain  that a  man ought to do, that  the
law supposes him to have promised to do."
The  ample  scope  allowed  to  implied contract  here  is  continuous  with
Story's way  of reasoning  about contract  in Dartmouth College. Implied
contracts,  Parsons  concludes,  "form  the  web  and woof of actual  life."
We are  as far from the world of laissez faire, the idea that contract  is par
excellence the domain of the will of the parties  as opposed to the will of
the  state, and the idea of freedom of contract--and as far from the world
of marriage-as-status-not-contract-as  it is possible to be.
But these classical ideas and distinctions  are aborning. Parsons's Book
III  contains  material  culled  from  Books  I,  II  and  III  of Blackstone's
35.  Id.  at 3.
36.  Id. at  xxiii-xxviii.  Parson's  Law  of Contracts is  a  two-volume  set,  which  he  further
subdivided  into "Books."
37.  Id.  at 4.
38.  Id.
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Commentaries: only Blackstone's  Book IV,  on Public  Wrongs,  was not
ransacked for the rules of contract.  In the course of this overhaul,  the law
of personal relations  evaporated. Most of the rules formerly resident there
which could not be fitted into the substantive  rules of the various contract
types  became  rules  about  capacity  to  enter  those  contracts.  These  rules
migrated to "Parties  to a Contract,"  the topic of Parsons's first Book, and
became  a catalogue  of parties  lacking general  or specific  capacity-a list
of "disabled persons."39 Capacity  to contract was the norm; the "persons"
that  had  been  intrinsic  to  a  body  of general  law  governing  everybody
became  aberrational,  problematic, exceptional.  The faceless  individual of
liberalism  is  the  rule;  Parsons's  Book  I collects  the  exceptions.40  The
chapters  in  Parsons's  Table  of  Contents  which  address  the  disabled
persons appear in Appendix 3.
Note  that  Parsons's  restructuring  of  his  Blackstonian  material
abandoned  the relations;  what we  find  are  persons.  Kennedy  notes that,
for Parsons's contract regime, "[t]he  idea of relationship was important if
not  essential  to  the  plausibility  of  the  idea  of  implication  because  it
provided a  source for the  intentions  and  duties the judge imposed  on the
parties."
4 1 But Parsons's "disabled persons" have  departed this enmeshed
and morally saturated world, to stand alone in a new singularity.
Parsons was clearly troubled that he had to classify wives cheek by jowl
with  infants,  bankrupts,  insolvents,  idiots,  aliens,  slaves,  outlaws,  and
persons  attainted  and  excommunicated.  He  described  the  "old  rules"  of
coverture  as "oppressive  and unjust"  and approved  a trend in many states
to  "improve  and  liberalize  the  marital  relation"  by  treating  the  wife  as
more  "independent  and  equal."  But  he  also  noted  that  the  shift  was
provoking controversy,  and with good reason: he doubted that it could be
desirable  to  make  husband  and  wife  "altogether,  or  in  a  great  degree
independent  and  equal.  . . . The  tendency  of this  would  seem  to  be,
necessarily,  to  make  them  bargainers  with  each  other;  and  as  watchful
against each other, as careful for good security,  as  strict in making terms,
and in compelling an exact performance of promises or conditions, and as
prompt  to  seek in  litigation  a remedy  for supposed wrong, as  seller  and
buyer,  lender  and borrower,  usually  are[.]" 42  The rules  of the  marriage
contract, therefore, justifiably enforce more altruism than do or should the
39.  Id. at 242.
40.  Id. at xix-xxii.
41.  KENNEDY,  RISE AND  FALL, supra note 6, at 168.
42.  1 PARSONS,  supra  note  19, at 284.
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rules of sales contracts, which expect and require more individualism.
This was not because marriage  is a status-indeed, nowhere  in the text
of The Law  of Contracts did  Parsons  use  the  term  status,  not  once.43
Rather,  it  was  because  "inconvenience  and  danger"  would  attend  too
expansive  an  equality  of husband  and  wife.  Parsons's  admiration  for
equality  between  husband  and  wife  registered  a  significant  advance  for
feminist  thinking  from  Story's  somewhat  masculinist  slant  on  marital
rights  in  Dartmouth  College.  But  his  hedged  endorsement  of  the
conservative  countertrend  suggests  that  he  saw  some  need  for  a
distinction between  marriage  and market  contracts. He was  a little foggy
on  what that  distinction  would  be,  and the  prominent  place  he  gave  to
social  obligations  recognized  as  implied contract  surely  worked  to blunt
any  need  for clarity on this point.  Marriage  could remain  contract  under
these logical circumstances:  Parsons did not need marriage-as-status.
Parsons devoted  a whole section of his chapter on constitutional  law to
the question whether marriage  falls within  the prohibition of impairment
of contract  in  the  Federal  Constitution.  Not  only  that:  he  segregated  it
from  his  discussion  of  the  effect  of  the  Contracts  Clause  on  other
contracts,  most  of which  he  clumped  together  for  this  purpose.  Once
again,  a difference  between  marriage  and  all other  contracts  is  inchoate
but  discernable.  And  Parsons  provided  a  very  diffident  account  of the
various  answers  to  the  question  whether  divorce  is  an  unconstitutional
impairment  of  contract,  finding  good  authority  for  three  completely
inconsistent  theses.  They  were  that  a  divorce  statute  cannot  change  the
indissolulability  of existing  marriages  (implying,  I guess,  that  it  could
provide for divorce  ex ante,  for new marriage  contracts) "; that divorces
for adultery or other breach of the marriage  contract escape  the Contracts
Clause because  there is then no contract to impair (impliedly  states have
43.  PARSONS,  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS  (4th ed.  1860).  1 was  able  to  search  only  the  fourth
edition of Parson's The Law ofContract, the first available  to me electronically  via the online  library
of  legal  treatises,  The  Making  of  Modem  Law:  Legal  Treatises  1800-1926.
http://galenet.galegroup.com.ezp-
prod l.hul.harvard.edu/servlet/MOML?af=RN&loclD=camb55135&srchtp=a&c=1&an=l  9001590201
&ste=12&stp=Author&docNum=Fl0  1177816&ae=Fl01  177816&tiPG=1.  To be sure, the term status
appears in the index, under Slavery, referring to the "effect of marriage  during slavery on  the status of
emancipated  slaves,"  2  PARSONS,  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS  890  (4th  ed.,  Boston,  Little,  Brown
1860), but the text referred  to does not use  the term. Id. at  341  n.i.  The  index of the  original edition
has no  entry  for Slavery. Clearly,  the compiler  of the  index to the  fourth edition  was subject  to the
influence  of legal  developments  that  - following  Kennedy  - I attribute  below  to  Joel  Bishop,
developments which Parsons himself could have known about but did not take into account.
44.  2 THEOPHILUS PARSONS,  THE LAW OF CONTRACTS  528 (photo.  reprint 1980) (Boston, Little,
Brownl853)  [hereinafter 2 PARSONS].
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the constitutional  authority to grant divorces for cause but not in cases of
collusion,  mutual  fault,  or  no  fault)45; and  "that  marriage  is  not  only  a
contract, but much more than a contract, and so much more that it is not to
be  considered  as  within  the  scope  or  intention  of this  clause  of the
constitution."46  Once  again,  it  did not  occur to  Parsons  to  dub  that  "so
much more" status; nor does the term appear in his case excerpts cited for
this view. And it wasn't  at all  clear to him which rationale  protecting the
trend towards  divorce,  if any, was  "right"  or would prevail. In Parsons's
view, as of 1853, the question was too close to call.
Unbeknownst  to  Parsons,  the  seeds  for  the  defeat  of marriage-as-
contract  and  the eventual  triumph  of marriage-as-status-not-contract  had
already been planted, and by none other than Joseph Story. Recall  that, in
his  Dartmouth College  opinion,  Story  had  rejected  the  defendant's
argument  that marriage  was  a  civil  institution.47  It was  a  contract,  and
legislatures  establishing  laws  allowing  divorce  had  to  heed  limitations
imposed by the Contracts  Clause. But in the course of writing the first two
editions  of his Commentaries on the Conflict of  Laws, published in  1834
and  1841,  Story changed  his mind. The first edition introduced a chapter
on  interstate  recognition  of divorce  with  an  observation justifying  rules
quite  different  from  those  described  in  the  subsequent  chapter  on
interstate enforcement of contract:
Marriage  is not treated as a mere contract between  the  parties,
subject,  as  to  its  continuance,  dissolution,  and  effects,  to  their
mere  pleasures  and  intentions.  But  it  is  treated as  a  civil
institution, the most  interesting and  important in  its nature of any
in society.  Upon it the  sound morals, the  domestic affections,  and
the delicate relations and duties of parents and children, essentially
depend.48
45.  Id.
46.  Id. at 529. Consistently with his contract imperialism,  Parsons does not note a  fourth theory,
recognizable  in some  cases cited by Kennedy,  that because marriage  is a relation,  like  master/servant
etc.,  it is not a contract at all and is thus untouched  by the Contract Clause.  Maguire  v. Maguire, 37
Ky.  (7 Dana)  181,  183-85  (1838);  In re Justices'  Opinion,  16  Me. 479, 481 (1840);  White v. White, 4
How.  Pr.  102  (N.Y.  Sup. Ct.  1849).  As we will  see below,  Maguire was  an  important  citation  for
Parsons's chief opponent on this point, Joel Prentiss Bishop.
47.  See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
48.  JOSEPH  STORY,  COMMENTARIES  ON  THE  CONFLICT OF  LAWS,  FOREIGN  AND  DOMESTIC,  IN
REGARD  TO  CONTRACTS,  RIGHTS,  AND  REMEDIES,  AND  ESPECIALLY  IN REGARD  TO  MARRIAGES,
DIVORCES,  WILLS,  SUCCESSIONS  AND  JUDGMENTS  § 200,  at  168  (Boston,  Hilliard,  Gray,  and
Company  1834)  [hereinafter  STORY,  CONFLICT  OF  LAWS (1st  ed.)]  (emphasis added).  This passage
appears  unchanged  in  the  second  edition:  JOSEPH  STORY,  COMMENTARIES  ON  THE  CONFLICT  OF
LAWS,  FOREIGN  AND  DOMESTIC,  IN  REGARD  TO  CONTRACTS,  RIGHTS,  AND  REMEDIES,  AND
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At first Story remained  loyal to his view that marriage  is contract. But it
is no  longer just that:  it  is also a civil  institution.  To be sure,  he said  in
1834  and  repeated  in  1841  that  "[m]arriage  is  treated  by  all  civilized
nations as a peculiar and favored  contract.  It is in its origin as a contract
of natural law." 4 9  But in the  1841  edition of Conflict ofLaws, he added a
footnote insisting on the peculiarity of this contract:
I have throughout  treated  marriage  as a  contract  in the  common
sense of the word, because this is the light in which it is ordinarily
viewed by  Jurists,  domestic  as well  as  foreign. But  it appears  to
me to be something more than a mere contract: it is rather to be
deemed  an  institution of society, founded  upon  the  consent  and
contract of the parties;  and in this view it has some peculiarities in
its  nature, character, operation,  and extent of obligation,  different
from what belong to ordinary contracts.s0
By now, marriage  was not a mere or ordinary contract;  it was founded
on contract, but it should "rather"  be deemed an institution of society. He
has almost come around to the view of the attorney for New Hampshire in
Dartmouth College.
Story's  Conflict Table  of Contents  segregates  the  law  of  abnormal
persons into its own place (Chapter IV), but also makes a new, categorical
distinction between  marriage,  divorce,  and contract.  An  excerpt from his
Table of Contents presenting  this division is included as Appendix 4. His
title  goes  even  further,  making  contracts  modal  and  marriage  special:
Commentaries on the Conflict of  Laws, Foreign and  Domestic, in Regard
to  Contracts,  Rights,  and Remedies,  and Especially  in  Regard to
Marriages,  Divorces, Wills, Successions and Judgments. Marriage  is not
only becoming distinctive; it is becoming exceptional.
III. RECEIVING "STATUS":  STORY AND  LORD ROBERTSON
"Family law  exceptionalism"  (FLE) will be my term for the extremely
ESPECIALLY IN REGARD  TO MARRIAGES,  DIVORCES,  WILLS, SUCCESSIONS  AND  JUDGMENTS  § 200,  at
262 (2d ed.,  London, A. Maxwell  1841)  [hereinafter  STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed.)].
49.  STORY,  CONFLICT OF  LAWS  (1st  ed.),  supra note  48, § 108,  at  100;  STORY,  CONFLICTS  (2d
ed.), supra note 48, § 108, at  170.
50.  STORY,  CONFLICT OF LAWS  (2d ed.), supra  note  48, § 108, at 170 n.3  (emphasis added). All
these passages remain unchanged  in the third, posthumous edition of Story's Conflict ofLaws. JOSEPH
STORY,  COMMENTARIES  ON  THE  CONFLICT  OF  LAWS,  FOREIGN  AND  DOMESTIC,  IN REGARD  TO
CONTRACTS,  RIGHTS,  AND  REMEDIES,  AND  ESPECIALLY  IN REGARD  TO  MARRIAGES,  DIVORCES,
wILLS,  SUCCESSIONS  AND  JUDGMENTS  § 108,  at  193;  § 200,  at  302 (3d  ed,, Boston,  Little,  Brown
1846) [hereinafter STORY,  CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed.)].
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broad  range  of  ideas  and  practices-legal,  cultural,  social,  economic,
ideological,  aesthetic-that  set  marriage,  reproduction,  the  family,
childhood,  sexuality, the home (the  list could go on) aside  from domains
of  life  deemed  to  be  more  general,  more  political,  more  international,
more  economic  (and  again the list could  go on indefinitely).
5 '  The term
"family  law"  in  this  formulation  is  completely  anachronistic  for  mid-
nineteenth  century  American  legal  thought,  as we  will  see:  classicizing
jurists  had  the  option  of  adopting  Family  Law  from  new  German
taxonomies of law, but they rejected it,  and a complex  struggle had to be
fought over the first  five  decades of the next century before  Family Law
could find its place  among  the  topics of Anglo-American  law.  So please
allow  me  to  put  "FL"  in  scare  quotes  when  I  say  that  the  specific
emergence  of "FL"E in  Story's  Conflict of Laws was  actually  marriage
exceptionalism:  marriage  was not simply  contract;  it was  something else
too, an institution of society. From this apparently  small seed grew a great
taxonomic  tree,  one  shaped  by  winds-some  highly  welcome  amongst
U.S.  legal elites, others not so much-from civilian Europe.
Story's  recharacterization  of  marriage  in  Conflict of Laws  depends
largely on Scottish legal sources, and his analysis of interstate recognition
of divorce  turns  on  a  sharp  and  unresolved  disagreement  on  this topic
between  Scottish  and  English  jurists.52  This  strong  "Scottish  turn"  in
Story's  work  is  of a  piece  with  his  will  to  be  influenced  by  civil  law
generally. 3  But it was  specifically  Scottish  legal  thought that provoked
51.  Halley & Rittich, supra note 2.
52.  STORY,  CONFLICT OF  LAWS  (I"  ed.), supra note 48,  § 113,  at  103-04.  These  are the  cases
Story  cites  at  this  point;  note  that  many  involve  conflicts  between  Scottish  and  English  law  of
marriage  and  divorce:  Dalrymple  v.  Dalrymple,  (1811)  166  Eng.  Rep.  665  (K.B.)  (upholding  the
conjugal  rights  of  a  Scottish  woman  who  was  married  to  an  Englishman  quartered  in  Scotland);
Ilderton v. Ilderton, (1793)  126  Eng. Rep. 476 (enforcing  dower rights in England for English  subjects
married  in  Scotland);  Conway  v.  Beazley,  (1831)  162  Eng.  Rep.  1292,  1296-99  (holding  that  a
divorce  in  Scotland  was  ineffective  for  two  English  subjects  married  in  England  with  English
domicile,  since  they had no  domicile in Scotland); Gordon  v. Pye  (1815)  3  Eng.  Eccl.  R. 430,  468
(holding  that Scottish courts were without power  to dissolve the marriage of English subjects married
and domiciled in England);  HENRY HOME OF KAMES,  PRINCIPLES OF EQUiTY (Edinburgh, Adam Neill
and co.  1800) (discussing Scottish equity jurisdiction over foreign contracts, marriages and legitimacy
issues).  Several of Story's  cases  involve other  national conflicts  of laws:  Ryan  v. Ryan, (1816)  161
Eng.  Rep.  1162  (affirming  the  intestate succession  of the  second wife of an Irish  man domiciled  in
Denmark); Herbert v. Herbert,  (1817)  161  Eng. Rep. 737 (upholding the validity of marriage between
two English subjects  in Sicily,  although  the  ceremonials  did not conform  to Sicilian  requirements);
Middleton  v. Janverin,  (1802)  161  Eng. Rep.  797 (invalidating  a Flanders  marriage between English
subjects  not  valid  by  Flanders  law);  Lacon  v.  Higgins,  (1823)  171  Eng.  Rep.  813  (following
Dalrymple  in a case involving a marriage between English subjects in France).
53.  Michael H. Hoeflich, Annals ofLegal Bibliography:  J.G. Marvin, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 333, 337-
38  (2004)  [hereinafter  Hoeflich,  Annals];  Michael  H.  Hoeflich,  Bibliographical Perspectives on
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his pentimento in Conflict ofLaws.
As  we  have  seen,  Story  begins  his  discussion  of  marriage  by
acknowledging the common law definition  of marriage  as contract. To be
sure,  it  is "a  peculiar  and favored  contract,"  but "[t]he  common  law  of
England  (and  the  like  law  exists  in  America)  considers  marriage  in no
other  light  than  as a civil  contract."54  For  the idea  that it  is also a civil
institution,  Story  turns  to  "some  remarks  on  this  subject  made  by  a
distinguished  Scottish judge." 5   His  source  is  Lord Robertson  in a  series
of Scottish  cases,  of which  Duntze v. Levett  is  perhaps  the  legal  high-
watermark.
Jane  Duntze  (or  Levett)  and  Philip  Stimpson  Levett  were  English
subjects;  they  married in  England;  and  in the  holdings of all the judges
who decided the question, their legal residence was England."  Mr. Levett
nevertheless  took  up  temporary  lodgings  in  Scotland  and  shared  them
with a paramour.s"  Mrs. Levett sued him in Scotland for divorce based on
his adultery-a  ground for divorce  and a procedure for divorce  that were
well  settled  in  Scottish  law but  categorically  unavailable  in  England.ss
Mr.  Levett  objected  to  the  application  of  Scottish  law  to  his  English
marriage.  The final  Court  of Sessions  opinion,  issued  in  1816,  held that
Roman  and Civil Law,  89  LAW  LIBR.  J.  41,  49  (1997)  [hereinafter  Hoeflich,  Bibliographical
Perspectives]; Michael  H.  Hoeflich,  John  Austin  and Joseph Story:  Two  Nineteenth-Century
Perspectives on the  Utility of the Civil Law for the  Common Lawyer, 29  AM.  J. LEGAL  HIST.  36
(1885)  [hereinafter  Hoeflich,  John Austin]; Michael  H.  Hoeflich,  Roman  Law  in American Legal
Culture, 66 TULANE  L.  REV.  1723,  1725  (1992);  Michael  H. Hoeflich,  Translation and  Reception of
Foreign Law in the Antebellum United States, 50  AM. J.  COMP.  L. 753,  760,  763 (2002)  [hereinafter
Hoeflich, Translation  and Reception]; Michael  H. Hoeflich,  Transatlantic  Friendships  & the German
Influence on American Law  in  the First Half of the Nineteenth Century, 35  AM.  J.  COMP.  L.  599
(1987)  [hereinafter Hoeflich, Friendships];  Gerhard Kegel, Story and  Savigny, 37  AM. J. COMP.  L. 39
(1989) (providing many parallels but no evidence that Story was directly influenced by  Savigny).
54.  STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1st  ed.), supra  note 48, §  108, at 100.
55.  Id. §  109,  at 101.
56.  JAMES FERGUSSON,  REPORTS OF  SOME RECENT  DECISIONS BY THE CONSISTORIAL COURT OF
SCOTLAND  IN  ACTIONS  OF  DIVORCE,  CONCLUDING  FOR  THE  DISSOLUTION  OF  MARRIAGES
CELEBRATED  UNDER  THE  ENGLISH  LAW 68  (Edinburgh,  Archibald  Constable  and Company  1817)
[hereinafter  FERGUSON,  REPORTS].  A few  words about this text,  which is not a regular  case reporter.
At the time Fergusson  published his Reports,  neither the Consistorial Court nor the  Court of Session
had  a settled practice  for publishing  decisions,  and Fergusson's way of presenting  the  cases  is quite
dauntingly  complex.  He  first  presents  summaries  of the cases,  with  parsimonious  quotations  but
including  the dizzying  career of each case  up  and down the  ladder  of appeal  and remand. Id. at  23-
247.  He  then  presents  an  Appendix  in which  matter from  all  four cases  is collected  with  lengthy
thematic Notes. Id. at 249-470.  He presents the name of the wife in Duntze v. Levett in the  alternative
("Jane  Duntze  or Levett"), I surmise,  because  it  was unclear  throughout  the  litigation  whether  she
would be able to obtain her divorce and revert to her maiden name. Id. at 68.
57.  Id. at 69-70.
58.  Id. at 72.
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Scottish courts had jurisdiction over the husband because of his temporary
presence in Scotland and over the wife because of her husband's presence
there and that Scottish law applied."
Lord Robertson  wrote in support of this outcome.  A choice of law rule
favoring Scottish  law was, he said, necessary to protect Scotland from the
barbarities of English marriage  law:
If a man in this country were to confine his wife in an iron cage, or
to beat her with a rod the thickness of the Judge's finger, would  it
be  a justification  in  any  court,  to allege,  that these  were  powers,
which the law of England conferred  on a husband, and that he was
entitled  to  the  exercise  of them,  because  his  marriage  had been
celebrated in that country?
60
White men saving white women from white men. It appears that, in the
federal  experience  of Edinburgh  vis  A vis  London,  no  less  than  in  the
colonial  experience  of London vis A vis Bombay, 61 civilization  could be
marked by  legally  mandated  decencies  in  the  relations  of husband  and
wife, and barbarism by legally sanctioned abuse of wives.
The claim that marriage  was  contract formed a  doctrinal impediment to
Lord  Robertson's  assertion  of Scottish  legal  independence.  If marriage
were  contract,  Lord Robertson  acknowledged,  lex  loci contractus would
be  the  rule;  English  law  would  apply;  and  benighted,  feudal  English
marriage rules could easily be imposed on Scottish courts. To fend off this
result,  he  produced  an  expansive  distinction  between  marriage  and
contract,  in which  marriage  appears-for  the first  time in  our  story-as
status-not-contract.  Story  found Lord Robertson's  arguments  in this case
"so  striking, that  they deserve  to  be  quoted  at large";62  his quotation  of
them runs  three  pages.  I have  shortened  Story's  quotation  somewhat  to
eliminate duplication:
Marriage being entirely  a personal consensual contract,  it may be
thought, that the lex loci must be resorted to in expounding  every
question,  that  arises  relative  to  it.  But  it  will  be  observed,  that
marriage  is a contract sui generis, and  differing, in some respects,
from  all  other  contracts,  so  that  the  rules  of  law,  which  are
59.  Id. at 166-67.
60.  STORY,  CONFLICTS (1st ed.),  supra  note 48,  § 111,  at 102-03 (quoting FERGUSSON,  REPORTS,
supra  note 56, at 399 app., n.G).
61.  See, e.g., Janaki  Nair,  "Social Reform"  and the Woman's Question, in WOMEN  AND  LAW IN
COLONIAL  INDIA:  A SOCIAL HISTORY 49 (2000),.
62.  STORY,  CONFLICTS (1st ed.), supra note 48, § 109, at  101.
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applicable  in expounding  and  enforcing  other  contracts,  may  not
apply to this. The contract  of marriage is  the most important of all
human  transactions.  It  is  the  very  basis  of the  whole  fabric  of
civilized society.  The status of marriage  is juris gentium, and the
foundation  of it,  like  that  of  all  other  contracts,  rests  on  the
consent of the parties.  But  it differs  from other contracts  in  this,
that the  rights, obligations,  or duties, arising  from  it, are not left
entirely to be regulated by the agreements of the parties, but are, to
a  certain  extent,  matters  of municipal  regulation,  over  which the
parties have no control,  by any declaration of their will. It confers
the status of legitimacy  on children  born in wedlock, with all the
consequential rights, duties, and privileges, thence arising;  it gives
rise  to  the  relations  of  consanguinity  and  affinity;  in  short,  it
pervades  the whole system of civil society. Unlike other contracts
it cannot,  in  general,  amongst  civilized  nations,  be  dissolved  by
mutual  consent; and it subsists in full force, even although one  of
the parties  should be for ever rendered incapable,  as  in the case  of
incurable  insanity,  or the  like,  from  performing  his  part  of the
mutual contract.
§ 110.  "No wonder that the rights, duties,  and obligations,  arising
from so important a contract, should not be left to the discretion or
caprice of the contracting parties, but should be regulated, in many
important particulars, by the  laws of every civilized country. And
such laws must be considered  as forming a most essential  part of
the  public  law  of  the  country.  As  to  the  constitution  of  the
marriage, as it is merely a personal, consensual contract, it must be
valid every where, if celebrated according  to the lex loci; but, with
regard to the rights, duties, and obligations, thence arising, the law
of the  domicil  must  be  looked  to.  It  must  be  admitted,  that,  in
every country, the laws relative  to divorce are considered as of the
utmost importance,  as public laws affecting the dearest interests of
society.
§  111.  "It  is  said,  that,  in  every  contract  the  parties  bind
themselves, not  only  to  what  is  expressly  stipulated,  but also  to
what  is  implied in  the  nature  of  the  contract;  and  that  these
stipulations,  whether  express  or implied,  are not affected  by any
subsequent  change  of domicil.  This  may  be  true  in  the  general
case, but,  as  already  noticed,  marriage  is  a  contract  sui generis,
and  the rights,  duties,  and obligations,  which  arise  out  of it,  are
matters of so much importance  to the well-being  of the State, that
they  are regulated,  not  by the private  contract,  but by the public
laws of the State, which are  imperative on all, who  are domiciled
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within its territory. . . ."
On  this  reasoning,  Scottish  courts  would  be  obliged  to recognize  the
validity of the Levett marriage, but equally obliged to apply their own law
when  Mr.  Levett  brought  the  marriage  to  Scotland  and  committed
adultery there.
Large shifts  in the position of marriage  in the legal  order are visible in
these paragraphs,  and Story  drew remarkably parsimoniously  from them.
For  Story, marriage  is "something  more than a mere contract"  because  it
is  an  institution  of society.  Whereas  contract  is  the  site  of the  parties'
"mere pleasures and intentions," marriage  is a  civil institution. These are
important shifts:  contract is mere,  and is the site of mere whim;  marriage
is an institution, is of the utmost gravity,  and belongs to society as a civil
institution. But there is much more in Lord Robertson's representation  of
the contract/marriage  distinction  than that.  Story did not  explicitly adopt
Lord Robertson's  additional  ideas that the law  of marriage  is public  law,
and distinct from the law  of contract (which  is private?);  that  marriage  is
ius gentium,  a  matter  of  the  international  law  of  nature;  that  it  has
generality  and  fundamentalness  that are  not  necessarily  captured  in  any
particular country's positive  law; and that it confers status. Note that this
new term appears in Story's block quotation in italics:  it is a foreign word.
The  legal  rules  about  the  formation,  continuance,  dissolution,  and
effects of marriage  are,  Story  acknowledged,  matters  for each  country  to
determine when it adopts laws to govern this special civil institution. Lord
Robertson made  a stronger point: marriage is fundamental to social order,
and  therefore  completely  public  and  under  the  exclusive  control  of the
territorial  state.  This  fundamental  and  foundational  posture  of marriage
explains  why it cannot be left to the  "discretion or caprice"  or the "will"
of the parties.  Lord Robertson  did not  say, but he  did imply,  that mere
contracts  can be  left  to the  caprice,  discretion,  and  will  of the  parties.
Parsons would have found this assertion incomprehensible.
The distinction  between  contract  as  private  and  marriage  as  public  is
emerging  here. Recall that  for Parsons, neither marriage  nor contract  was
"private";  implied  contract  was  the  web  and  woof of  actual  life,  and
marriage  was  just  as  saturated  with  express  and  implied  contract  as
commerce.  By  quoting  Lord  Robertson  at  length,  Story  has  set  up  the
template upon which  later jurists would  write  that contract  is  the  site of
63.  STORY,  CowucITs  (1"  ed.), supra note  48,  § 109-111,  at  101-02  (quoting  FERGUSSON,
REPORTS, supra note 56, at 397-99 app. n.G).
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individual  will, private  pleasures,  selfish intentions,  and hard bargains-
and  in  which  they  would  insist  that  marriage  is  a  public  institution
pervaded  by  public  enforcement  in  the  name  of  the  public  good.  As
Kennedy  demonstrates,  the  will  theory  would  find  a  home  in  this
template,  and the  drive to make  marriage  the opposite of contract  would
encourage  legal  thinkers to make  it the repository of mandatory altruism
and communal life."  Only some of those embellishments appear here, but
Story has introduced  into American legal thought the conceptual armature
which will house them.
Why  was Story so committed  to Scottish law as  a  source of authority?
One  possible  explanation  is  simply  that  Story  looked  to  civil  law  for
answers to international matters-and conflicts  was basically international
law;  and  that Story  apparently  did not know German,  which was  during
his  lifetime  the preeminent  civilian  legal  language"s  while  Scotland was
the only civil law jurisdiction producing treatises and other legal materials
in English. If this were  the only reason, it  is pretty  empty  of ideological
significance.
But  there  was  possibly  a  more  substantive  motive,  one  which  will
emerge  in the next stage of our story, and which I introduce here because
I think it was  already at work. By writing a treatise on the conflict of laws
at all, Story was attempting to construct legal rules that could mediate  the
interjurisdictional  resentments  of the  various  states  of the  Union.  Story
thought  that  the  English/Scottish  encounter  provided  particularly  apt
material  for his effort to bring international  law home for a federation:  "It
is to the decisions  of the  English  and  Scottish  courts,  that we  must  look
for the most thorough  and exact discussions of this subject [i.e.,  interstate
recognition  of divorce].  From the different nature of their respective  laws
on  the  subject  of divorce,  from  their  national  union,  and  from  their
constant  and  easy  intercourse,  the  courts  of both  countries  have  been
frequently  called  upon  to  pronounce  very  elaborate  judgments  on  the
jurisdiction and law of divorce in contestations before them.""
To  figure  out  what  this  might  have  meant,  we  need  to  pause  for  a
64.  See  KENNEDY,  RISE  AND  FALL,  supra note  6,  at  171,  185  for  the  conclusion  that  this
emerging distinction and strengthening opposition  between individualist and communal  orders was an
important driver in the direction of a strong contract/status distinction.
65.  Story commissioned translations of German legal materials  into English  for his personal  use,
a fact from which  Hoeflich plausibly concludes  that  he did not know  German. Hoeflich,  Translation
and  Reception, supra note  53, at 758-59; see also Hoeflich, Annals, supra note  53, at  336; Hoeflich,
Bibliographical  Perspectives,  supra note 53, at 49.
66.  STORY,  CONFLICTS (1st ed.), supra  note 48, §  215,  at  178.
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moment to  identify the  national context  of the  Scottish marriage  cases.6
Scotland  and  England  were  separate  nations,  their  intercourse  governed
by the Treaty of Northampton  of 1328.  This treaty settled thirty-two years
of war between  the  two  countries.  But  their  relations  were  continually
vexed  by the  idea of a  legal merger or  takeover.  One major  shift  in that
direction  occurred  in  1603  with  the Union of the  Crowns-the accession
of Scottish King  James  VI to the  throne  of England  as  its  James  1.68  A
decisive  shift  occurred in  1707  when,  through  Acts  of Union  passed  by
the  Scottish  and  English  Parliaments,  Scotland  and  England  formed  the
United Kingdom.
The  two  nations  purported  to  be  coequal  states  in  this Union,  but  in
several  ways  Scotland  actually  ended  up  in  a  subordinate  position.  The
Acts  of  Union  required  that  the  Scottish  Parliament  be  dissolved;
Scotland's  representation  in  the  new  Union's  Westminster-based
Parliament  would  always  be  a  minority  stake.
70  The  authority  of that
Parliament  to  change  Scottish  law  was  vast.  The  laws governing  trade,
customs  and excises  were  to  be made  uniform;  a new  Scottish  Court of
Exchequer  was required  to  apply  the  law  and  use  the  procedures  of the
parallel  English  court;  the  laws  of  "publick  right  Policy  and  Civil
Government"  were to be made uniform.  That is to say, all law governing
commerce  and  all  law  structuring  government  were  to be  converted  to
English law.  '
Important  provisions  preserved  Scottish  legal  identity,  however.
Scottish  courts-including  the  Court of Session-were  to be  preserved;
ferocious  language  forbade  English  courts  from  hearing  "Causes  in
Scotland"  or interfering with the execution of Scottish judgments.
72  Three
67.  Special thanks  to lain  Frame  for guidance on  Union and  Scottish legal nationalism  and legal
union.
68.  MICHAEL LYNCH,  SCOTLAND:  A NEW  HISTORY 244 (1991)
69.  An  Act for the Union of the  Two Kingdoms of England and Scotland, 8 STATUTES  OF  THE
REALM  566  (George  Eyre & Andrew  Strahan,  eds.,  London  1702-1707)  [hereinafter  ENGLISH UNION
ACT];  An  Act  for  the  Union  of  The  Two  Kingdoms  of  England  and  Scotland,  I  1  ACTA
PARLIAMENTORUM  ANNAE  406  (1707)  [hereinafter SCOTTISH  UNION  ACT].
70.  SCOTTISH  UNION  ACT, art.  III; see also C. Paul  Rogers  Ill, Scots Law in Post-Revolutionary
and  Nineteenth-Century  America, 8 LAW & HIST. REV.  205, 216, 234  n. 157 (1990).
71.  John  W. Cairns, Scottish Law, Scottish Lawyers and  the Status ofthe Union, in A UNION  FOR
EMPIRE:  POLITICAL  THOUGHT AND  THE BRITISH  UNION  OF 1707 at 243, 266-67 (John  Robertson,  ed.,
1995)  [hereinafter Cairns, Scottish Law].
72.  The  Act  provided  that  "no  Causes  in  Scotland  be  cognosible  by  the  Courts  of Chancery,
Queen's-Bench,  Common-Pleas, or any other Court in Westminster-hall;  and that the  said Courts, or
any  other of the  like  nature after  the Union  shall  have  no power to Cognosce,  Review or Alter the
Acts or Sentences of the Judicatures  within Scotland, or stop the Execution of the same[.]"  SCOTTISH
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domains  of  law  were  excepted  from  union  and  allocated  to  Scottish
courts:  what  we  would  now  call  property  law  (this  included  heritable
jurisdictions  and  other  offices  deemed  property  rights73),  the  law  of
defamation and libel, and the law governing marriage,  divorce, legitimacy
and  inheritance.  Thus,  Scottish  law  and  Scottish  jurisdiction  were
preserved  for "private  Right,"  which could  be  altered  from London only
"for  evident  utility  of the  subjects  within  Scotland."74  The  Consistorial
Courts of Scotland  had jurisdiction  to decide  cases  in  a narrow range  of
subject  matters,  all  of which  embodied  crisp  conflicts  between  Scottish
and  English  law."  According  to  James  Fergusson,  who  published  the
treatise  in which  Story discovered  Lord Robertson  and  who  was a judge
on the Consistorial  Court of Scotland, these were  "Marriage";  "Conjugal
Rights  and  Redress"  (including  divorce),  "Legitimacy  and  Bastardy,"
"Confirmation  of  Executors  and  Testementary  Causes";  and  "Slander,
Defamation and Libel." 7  Appeals from the Consistorial Court went to the
Court of Sessions,  on which Lord Robertson sat. Decisions of the Court of
Session were  appealable  not to a  Scottish highest court but to the British
House of Lords.77
After  Union,  Scottish  legal  minds  were  preoccupied  by  controversies
about the right amount of English  law to take  on board. Though it would
be  easy to  see this  as a process  of the forceful  merger of the weaker into
the stronger power,  apparently  that would be a  mistake. Union  had been
supported by a variety of political forces within Scotland, and  in its wake
the  Scottish  legal  intelligentsia  debated  whether  to  move  Scotland  onto
the English constitution, whether  their legal  systems  were  predominantly
alike  or  mutually  alien,  whether  to  look  to  common  law  sources  and
methods, and  indeed whether  Scottish  and  English law  shared  origins or
were  each  other's  origins.78  The  idea  of Anglicization  presides  over  a
UNION  ACT, supra  note  69, art. 19.
73.  Id. art.  20; see also Cairns,  supra note 71,  at 251.
74.  Id. art.  18.
75.  JAMES  FERGUSSON,  A  TREATISE  ON  THE  PRESENT  STATE  OF  THE  CONSISTORIAL  LAW  IN
SCOTLAND,  WITH  REPORTS  OF  DECIDED  CASES  (Edinburgh,  Bell  &  Bradfute  1829)  [hereinafter
FERGUSSON,  CONSISTORIAL  LAW].
76.  Id. at Table of Contents.
77.  Rogers, supra note 70, at 216,.
78.  Many  students  of  Scottish  legal  history  posit  entrenched  opposition  within  Scottish  legal
circles  to  English  law,  for  instance  C.  Paul  Rogers,  who  refers  to a  "long  antagonism  to  England
resulted  in  its  strong  resistance  to English  common  law."  Rogers,  supra note  70,  at 215  (1990).
Others set  out  the  terms  of a  profound  ideological  disagreement  within  a  general  consensus  that
adopting some elements  of English law was a good  idea. See Cairns,  Scottish Law, supra note 71,  at
252-67  (setting  forth  a range of Scottish opinion for and against "Anglicization"  of Scottish law and
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thoroughly  ideological  thicket  into  which  one  ventures  at  one's  peril.
Enter we  must, but it  is important  to do so forewarned  that the degree of
antagonism of the two legal  systems and the Scottishness  of Scottish law
were themselves contested in post-Union  Scotland.
Controversy  extended  to  marriage  law.  On  the  question  which
interested  Story-jurisdiction  and  choice  of  law  for  divorce-the
Consistorial  Court and the Court of Session took opposing positions. The
former  thought  that  English  spouses  should  not  be  able  to  construct
jurisdiction  in Scotland  and to trigger the choice of Scottish  law by mere
residence  there,  and  then  proceed  to  violate  the  most  basic  duties  of
marriage  on Scottish soil and to  secure what were almost surely collusive
divorces. Fergusson  was a vigorous proponent of the Consistorial Court's
position.79  He published his Reports in Scotland and in London, making  a
direct  appeal  both  to  Scottish judges  to  stop  divorcing  English  couples
and  to  Parliament  to  pass  a  statute  prohibiting  the  practice.80  But  the
Court  of  Session  took  the  opposite  view;  there,  Lord  Robertson's
contempt for the English husband's  iron cage and his  stick as thick as the
judge's  thumb  prevailed.  Appeals  to  the  House  of Lords  did not  follow
from  Court  of  Session  judgments,  moreover,  probably  because  the
divorces  were  indeed  collusive.  They  were  effectively  final.  More
broadly,  the Court of Session played a pivotal  role in anchoring  Scottish
legal nationalism  (for instance,  it made a large  symbolic point by moving
into  the  chambers  vacated  by the  dissolved  Scottish  Parliament).'  And
specifically,  it turned the law  of marriage  into a pivotal  spot for Scottish
resistance to English law.
82
The  conflicts  in  the  law  of marriage  between  England  and  Scotland
concluding  that  the  trend  to  adopt  English  law,  especially  for  commercial  matters,  was  "not
necessarily  imposed  . . . but  to  some  extent  willing  adopted  as  modernization");  NICHOLAS
PHILLIPSON, THE  SCOTTISH WHIGS  AND  THE REFORM  OF THE  COURT OF  SESSION,  1785-1830 at  178-
179  (1990)  (arguing  that,  despite  the  "apocalyptic"  tone  of Scottish  dirges  over  Scottish  legal
particularity,  all the actual  "Anglicisers"  were Scottish); Hector L. MacQueen,  "Regiam  Majestatem,"
Scots Law, and National Identity, 74 SCOTTISH  HIST.  REV.  1, 2, 20-23  (1995)  (discussing how  Whig
pressure to  modernize Scottish law "into  a law fit for a polite and commercial country"  was opposed
by Tory  nationalists, but  within  a consensus  that  preservation  of Scottish  legal  distinctiveness  was
important).
79.  FERGUSSON,  CONSISTORIAL  LAW, supra note 75,  at 18-22,  102-04.
80.  Id. at  20-21.  Fergusson  would  have  been  dismayed  to  learn  that  his  publication of Lord
Robertson's  famous quotation, far from defeating it, disseminated  it!
81.  N.T. Phillipson, Lawyers,  Landowners and the Civic Leadership of Post-Union  Scotland, 21
JURID.  REV.  97, 98 (1976);  MacQueen, supra note 78, at 24.
82.  Leah Leneman, English Marriages and Scottish Divorces  in the Early Nineteenth Century,  17
J. LEGAL HIST. 225, 234, 241  (1996).
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were  large.  The two legal  orders'  paths to  secularization of marriage  law
were  intertwined  but  strikingly  different.  Where  England  had  had
Anglicanism  as  its national  religion  since  1534, Scotland  had  remained
Catholic  until  its  Revolution  in  1560  and  then  became  Presbyterian;
83
whereas England had jealously ejected canon law and gave pride  of place
in its legal  order  to the  common law  and  its own  statutory  law,  in  1560
Scotland  excluded papal jurisdiction  and  shut down ecclesiastical  courts,
but retained canon  law.8 4  And whereas  English law imagined marriage  as
part of an order based on a constitution  and the common law,  the Scottish
Enlightenment flourished  in the legal languages of customary law, Roman
law, civil  law, and regally-sponsored  statutes.
At the time Lord Robertson  decided Duntze v. Levelt, the differences  in
the two nations'  laws  on marriage  and  divorce  were stark and  a point of
considerable  resentment  on  either  side  of the  border. Marital  formation
rules differed."  Scotland  had  a set  of prescribed  formalities  for entering
marriage,  but it also recognized  "irregular  marriage"  formed by the mere
consent  of the  two  parties.87  Partly  in  order  to  protect  English  parents'
control over their children's marriages, England had by this time adopted
Lord Hardwicke's  Act,88  which invalidated  marriages  entered  into using
the verbal formulae of canon law, required the publication of banns  and a
public church  ceremony  for the  formation of a valid marriage,  and  made
secular  courts  the  only  site  for  adjudication  of disputes  over  whether  a
legal  marriage  had  been  properly  formed.  As  we  have  amply  seen,
83.  See Charles J. Guthric, A History of Divorce in Scotland, 8  SCOTTISH  HIST.  REv.  39,  48
(1910)  ("The Established  Church was  Presbyterian  from  1560 (or  1567)  to  1610,  Episcopalian  from
1610 to  1638,  Presbyterian  again  from  1638  till  Cromwell's  'usurpation,"'  Episcopalian  again  from
the [Glorious] Restoration  in  1660 till the Revolution in  1688, and since then Presbyterian.").
84.  MacQueen, supra note 78, at 14.
85.  Rogers,  supra note  70,  at  216;  Peter  Stein,  The  Influence of Roman Law  on  the Law  of
Scotland, 8 JURID.  REV.  205  (1963)  [hereinafter  Stein, Influence].  This claim  is of course part of the
controversy about the degree  to which  Scottish and  English law converged or differed. Two provisos:
First, Roman  law deeply  influenced  English  law, though  in different ways at different times.  David J.
Scipp,  The  Reception of Canon Law and Civil Law in  the Common Law  Courts Before 1600,  13
OXFORD  J. OF  LEGAL STUD.  388  (1993);  John  W.  Cairns,  Blackstone, An  English Institutist: Legal
Literature and the Rise of the Nation State,  4  OXFORD  J. OF  LEGAL  STUD.  318  (1984);  Daniel  R.
Coquillette, Legal Ideology and Incorporation,  /: The  English Civilian Writers, 1523-1607,  61  B.U.
L.  REV.  I (1981).  And Hector L.  MacQueen makes  a brilliant  case that the degree  to which Scottish
law drew from  Roman  law  not only varied  from era to era  but was ideologically  contested  between
unifiers and Scottish  nationalists  in  highly  contingent and sometimes  contradictory ways. MacQueen,
supra  note  78, at  13-25.
86.  FERGUSSON,  REPORTS,supra  note 56, at  1, 72.
87.  FERGUSSON,  CONSISTORIAL LAW, supra note 75, at  108-12.
88.  26 Geo. II. c.  33.
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England  permitted  divorce  by  parliamentary  bill  only,  while  Scottish
spouses were entitled to judicial divorce for adultery  and "continued  non-
adherence.""  And legitimacy  rules differed: Scotland  retained the canon-
law  rule  that  parents  could  legitimate  an  otherwise  bastard  child  by
marrying  after  its  birth;  the  English  common  law  had  long  resisted
legitimation per subsequens matrimonium, and,  at the  Reformation,  had
eliminated  it.90  According  to  Fergusson,  the  "several  laws"  of England
and  Scotland,  "as  to this  most  important  relation of domestic  life,  have
been perhaps the most opposite of Christendom."'
These differences  and the social events they gave rise to were notorious
and  politically  sensitive.  "Gretna  Green"  marriages-"clandestine"
procedures joining English subjects in marriage under permissive Scottish
rules,  so  called because  the  town of Gretna  Green  was  so  accessible  to
maritally inclined English subjects-were made possible by the marriage-
entry difference  plus a strong  choice of law  rule requiring  recognition  of
marriages  valid  where  performed.92  English  parents  were  horrified:
"'Edinburgh!'  was  always the  answer-'the  very last place  in  the world
we should think of sending our son to:  he would be married in 24 hours;
there is no saying what would happen."' 93
In one  notorious  case, Sugden v. Lolly, English courts  had gone so far
as  to  convict an  English man of bigamy for remarrying  in England  after
obtaining  a  Scottish  divorce that was perfectly valid under  Scottish  law;
he  was sentenced  to transportation  and  only  escaped  this severe  penalty
by a pardon.94  In  1755 Parliament ordered the Lords of Session to prepare
a  bill  banning  clandestine  marriages  in  Scotland-a  Scottish  Lord
Hardwicke's  Act -but  it died  in the face  of Scottish claims that it would
interfere with  Scotland's religion,  which had been preserved  by the Acts
of Union.95  When  transportation  by  rail  made  elopement  to  Scotland
ridiculously  easy  and  interference  by  parents  all  but  futile,  Parliament
89.  FERGUSSON,  CONSISTORIAL LAW, supra note 75, at 102.
90.  STORY,  CONFLICT OF  LAWS (3d ed.), supra note 50, at  137; STEIN, Influence, supra note  85,
at 209.
91.  FERGUSSON,  CONSISTORIAL LAW, supra note 75, at  18.
92.  FERGUSSON,  REPORTS,  supra note  56,  at  464.  For  a  colorful  account,  see  T.  C.  Smout,
Scottish Marriage, Regular and Irregular 1500-1940, in MARRIAGE  AND  SOCIETY:  STUDIES  IN THE
SOCIAL HISTORY OF MARRIAGE 204, 207-10 (R.  B. Outhwaite  ed.,  1981).
93.  Smout,  supra note  92,  at  207  (quoting  Lord  Brougham  before  a  parliamentary  select
committee in  1849).
94.  This  is the famous  "case of Lolly."  FERGUSSON,  REPORTS, supra note  56,  at 9-10.  For an
account, see LAWRENCE  STONE,  ROAD TO DIVORCE,  1530-1987,  at 358-9  (1992).
95.  Smout, supra  note 92, at 208.
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crammed  down  a  residency  requirement  of  21  days  on  Scottish
marriages.
96
On his side, Fergusson saw the divorce holdings of the Court of Session
as  political  retaliation  against  these  English  initiatives  and  insisted  that
such a motive was an improper one for a court to adopt.97  We have to see
Lord Robertson's ruling and  logic in Duntze v. Levett as making  a strong
assertion-understood  at the time to be saturated with political meaning-
of continued  Scottish legal independence.
In the Scottish/English encounter, marriage  and divorce became  indicia
of federal union and national separation. Jurists on both sides were willing
to  sharpen  the  national character  of  marriage  law.  Meanwhile,  the
commercial  law  of  England  flooded  Scotland  without  any  similar
resistance.  No one questioned that parties to a business contract formed in
England  would be subject to English  law even in  Scottish  courts. Hector
L. MacQueen  argues,  moreover, that by the time Fergusson published his
treatise,  not even  a  Tory  nationalist would  stand  outside  the  consensus
view  that  "[a]  commercial  and  industrial  country  increasingly"  should
seek,  "not  a nationally  distinctive  law, but a  law  which  would  not put
difficulties in the way of cross-border  [commercial]  activity." 9
The bracketed addition to MacQueen's  conclusion is necessary because
marriage  was  excluded  from  the consensus for unification.  As  marriage
became  "something  more  than  a  mere  contract,"  it  became  not  only
exceptional  but  national.  And  note  that Lord  Robertson  did not  craft  a
distinction  between  contract  on  one  hand  and  marriage-legitimacy-
inheritance-property  law-and-defamation  on the other. As  we  have  seen,
all  the legal  terms  described  legal  domains  that  remained distinctively
Scottish  upon  the Union. For Lord Robertson,  however,  they reduced  to
status, and status reduced  to marriage.  Marriage  was taking up a decisive,
first-order place in the symbolic order of a modernizing capitalist world.
Back  to  Story. As we have  seen, he  very selectively  adopted elements
of Lord Robertson's  status/contract  distinction. I think that's because  the
idea of a commercial  law  that unleashed individual  will was completely
alien  to  his  thought.  Instead,  Story  praised  the  legal  world  in  which
"commerce  shall  extend  its  social  influences;  . . . justice  shall  be
96.  Id.at210.
97.  FERGUSSON,  REPORTS,  supra note  56,  at  107 ("Reprisals  and retaliation  are  extraordinary
measures, which independent  states may  sometimes find reason to adopt, but which are totally foreign
to the duties of courts of law.").
98.  MacQueen, supra  note 78, at 24.
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administered  by  enlightened  and  liberal  rules;  . . . contracts  shall  be
expounded  upon  the  eternal  principles  of right  and  wrong."99  He  was
much  closer to Parsons  than  to the  emerging  classical jurists on implied
contract  as  the  carrier  of  decent  social  norms.  But  by  quoting  Lord
Robertson at length, he unleashed  into American  legal thought the idea of
marriage-as-status-not-contract,  complete  with  its  corollary  idea  that
marriage housed the will of the state while contract gave effect to the will
of the parties.  Subsequent legal  thinkers  would take  Story's  formulation
much further than he was willing to go. Thus the classical divisions began
to  take shape in the U.S. well before one  can discern any role for the will
theory as a conscious  motive.
And a glance  forward. If Lord Robertson's view of marriage  prevailed,
states would have dominion over marriages domiciled within their borders
because  marriage  was status. At the  time  that  Story  imported  this  idea
from Scotland,  it brought with  it implications  for the  greatest  American
conflict of the nineteenth  century:  after all, master and servant were  also
status. At the time Story wrote,  it was not necessarily  clear that choosing
the  law  of domicile  for controversies  involving  slaves  would  eventually
lead to Dred  Scott and help set the terms for the Civil War.'o As we will
see,  the  rise  of  free  labor-through  the  abolition  of  slavery,  the
disappearance  of indenture,  and the  expansion  of contract labor to cover
the  field-was  going  to  require  that  the  husband  and  wife  follow  a
different legal path to modernity than the one taken by master and servant.
The  former was  headed  to  status  and  the  domestic  sphere,  the  latter  to
contract  and  the market.  The cataclysm  of the  Civil  War changed  many
things: one of them was the legal idea that marriage and labor were in any
way similar.
IV.  STATUS NOT CONTRACT: BISHOP
Joel Prentiss Bishop published  the first edition of his Commentaries on
the Law of  Marriage  and  Divorce in 1852,10'  just one year before Parsons
first  published  his  Law of Contracts. Bishop  laid  out  a  path  virtually
opposite  to  Parsons's,  and,  as  we  will  see,  the  American  legal
99.  Joseph  Story,  An  Address Delivered before  the  Members of the  Suffolk  Bar, at  Their
Anniversary, on the Fourth  of September, 1821, at Boston, I AM.  JuR. 1, 7 (1829)  [hereinafter  Story,
Address to the Suffolk Bar].
100.  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.  393 (1856).
101.  BISHOP, MARRIAGE  AND DIVORCE,  supra note 18.
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intelligentsia soon followed him down it.
Bishop was  distressed  by the  incoherence  of the  legal  rules governing
marriage  and  divorce  in  the  conflict  of laws  and  under  the  Contracts
Clause.  Marriage  was  presenting  a  crisis  for  federalism:  "Many  of the
peculiar  questions  of constitutional  law  and  conflict of laws  relating  to
divorce, . . . arising under the constitutions of the United States and of the
several States of this Union, have proved  more embarrassing than almost
any  other  to  our  courts,  and  have  led  to  irreconcilable  diversities  of
decision."
02
Bishop thought  that  the classification  of marriage  as contract  was the
cause  of  the  mischief.  He  cited  Scottish  cases  and  treatises  more
thoroughly  than  Story, 1o
3  and  relied  expressly  on,  and  quoted,  Story's
"something  more  than contract" passages.'"  But he went  further, to  say
decisively what that elusive "something more" was. It was status:
The  word marriage  is  used  to  signify the  act of entering  into the
married  condition,  or  the  condition  itself. In  the  latter  and more
frequent  legal  sense,  it is  a civil  status,  existing  in one  man  and
one  woman,  legally  united  for  life  for  those  civil  and  social
purposes  which are founded  in the distinction of sex. Its source  is
the law of nature, whence  it has flowed into the municipal  laws of
every civilized country,  and into the  general  law of nations  ....
[M]arriage  may be said to proceed  from a civil  contract between
one  man  and  one  woman  of  the  needful  physical  and  civil
capacity.  While  the  contract  remains  executory,  that  is,  an
agreement to marry, it differs in no essential particulars  from other
civil  contracts,  and  an  action  for  damages  for  breach  may  be
maintained  on  a violation  of it.  But when  the  contract  becomes
executed  in what the law recognizes  as a valid marriage, its nature
102.  Id. at 33.
103.  Id. at 27-29.  Bishop relied not only on the sections of Story's Conflict ofLaws that we have
studied, on  Fergusson's Records, and on Duntze v. Levett, Ferg. R.  38,  385,  397  (3  E.E.R.  360, 495,
502); he  also brought in  LEONARD  SHELFORD,  A PRACTICAL  TREATISE OF  THE LAW  OF MARRIAGE
AND  DIVORCE, AND  REGISTRATION;  AS ALTERED BY  THE  RECENT STATUTES: CONTAINING  ALSO  THE
MODE OF PROCEEDING ON DIVORCES  IN  THE ECCLESIASTICAL  COURTS AND IN PARLIAMENT;  AND  THE
RIGHT TO THE  CUSTODY  OF  CHILDREN;  VOLUNTARY  SEPARATION  BETWEEN  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE;
THE HUSBAND'S  LIABILITY  TO WIFE'S DEBTS; AND  THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE LAWS  OF ENGLAND
AND  SCOTLAND  RESPECTING DIVORCE AND  LEGITIMACY.  WITH AN  APPENDIX  OF  STATUTES  (London,
S.  Sweet  1841)  and PATRICK  FRASER,  A TREATISE OF  THE  LAW  OF SCOTLAND,  AS  APPLICABLE  TO
THE PERSONAL  AND  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS,  COMPRISING  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE, PARENT AND  CHILD,
GUARDIAN  AND  WARD MASTER  AND  SERVANT  AND  MASTER  AND  APPRENTICE (1st ed. Edinburgh, T.
& T. Clark  1846)  [hereinafter  FRASER,  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1st  ed.)].  BISHOP,  MARRIAGE  AND
DIVORCE, supra note 18,  at 27 n.5, 28 n. 1.
104.  BISHOP,  MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE, supra note  18, at 26, 33.
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as a contract is merged in the higher nature of the status. And,
though the new relation may retain some similitudes  to remind us
of its  origin,  the  contract does in truth no  longer exist, but  the
parties are governed by the law of husband  and  wife.'s
For  Story,  as  we  have  seen,  marriage  was  contract,  but  a  "peculiar
contract,"  involving "something  more than contract,"  and  that something
more  was the  social institution  of marriage.  For Bishop, the  contract  of
marriage dissolves upon solemnization into something new and different:
marriage is status and as such it is not contract.
This  innovation  seems  to be  Bishop's  own.  He  claimed  credit  for  it
modestly  in  1852106  and  not  so  modestly  in  1891.0'  And  he  strongly
associated it both times with self-conscious legal modernization:
Thus  to  say,  that  marriage  is  a  contract,  when  speaking  of the
marital  condition, and not of the agreement to assume it, is, as we
have  seen,  according  to  the  general  current  of  authorities,
inaccurate;  since  they  further  declare,  that  it  differs  in  many
particulars  from  other  contracts.  And  when  the  differences  are
pointed out, we perceive  that they  have  covered  every quality  of
the marriage, and left nothing of the contract. To term it, therefore,
a contract,  is as  great a practical  inconvenience  as to call a certain
well-known  engine  for propelling  railroad  cars  "horse,"  adding,
"but it differs  from other horses in  several  important particulars,"
and then to explain the particulars.  It would be more convenient to
use at once the word locomotive.108
In 1891,  near the end of his life, Bishop concluded  that this locomotive
was  headed  for the  consolidated  legal  order  described  by  Kennedy  as
105.  Id, at 25 (emphasis added).
106.  Id. at 26 ("Various  definitions have been given of marriage;  and the foregoing  is not  in the
language of any former one. It is believed  to be free from some of the objections which may well  be
urged against all former definitions,  whatever defects it may have of  its  own.") (footnote omitted).
107.  "Bishop on Marriage  and Divorce was published  in  1852.  In it the  author, it is believed for
the first time in any legal  treatise  or judicial  opinion, broke away  from  the old shackles,  and defined
marriage  as a status.  The result has  already been stated,  citing many subsequent  cases, the  forms  of
expression  from the bench have been gradually  modified, until  now those  earlier ones above  quoted
would  seem  quite  antiquated."  JOEL  PRENTISS  BISHOP,  NEW  COMMENTARIES  ON  MARRIAGE,
DIVORCE,  AND  SEPARATION  AS  TO  THE  LAW,  EVIDENCE,  PLEADING,  PRACTICE,  FORMS  AND  THE
EVIDENCE OF  MARRIAGE  IN  ALL  ISSUES  ON  A NEW SYSTEM  OF  LEGAL EXPOSITION  13-14 (Chicago,
T.H. Flood and Company  1891)  [hereinafter  BISHOP,  NEW COMMENTARIES].  As Kennedy quite aptly
put it, Bishop took the opportunity of his newly revised treatise  to "crow."  KENNEDY,  RISE AND  FALL,
supra note 6, at  198.
108.  BISHOP,  MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE,  supra note  18,  at 34.  Bishop  gives  a  more  decisive
version  of this passage  in the New Commentaries. After "left nothing of contract" he  added:  "All  is
subsumed in the status."  BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES,  supra  note  107,  at  14.
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classical legal thought.
As Bishop saw  it in  1852,  the idea that the Contracts  Clause applied to
marriage  and  divorce  was  producing  intolerable  inconsistency  in  the
American  legal system:
In England  and continental  Europe, little inconvenience can result
from making use of the word contract rather than status as  applied
to an executed marriage, for the jurists of those countries were not
troubled with many of the peculiar questions of constitutional law
and the  conflict of laws relating  to  divorce,  which,  arising  under
the constitutions of the United  States  and of the several  States  of
this union, have proved more  embarrassing than almost any  other
to  our  courts,  and  have  led  to  irreconcilable  diversities  of
decision.109
In 1891,  in a substantially overhauled  treatise entitled New Commentaries
on Marriage,  Divorce, and Separation, Bishop congratulated  himself on
bringing order to the field:
[W]ith  gratitude  to  the  Author  of  all  Light,  I  soon  began  to
discover  that  the  courts,  as  fast  as  occasions  arose,  and  they
became acquainted with the reasonings of my book, dropped  their
former  reasonings  and  substituted  those  therein  suggested.  The
result was that the decisions themselves were rendered uniform, so
that to-day the conflicts on marriage and divorce law are probably
less than on any other legal subject." 0
The  revelation that marriage  was  status-not-contract was  "General  and
Fundamental,""'  and  allowed  the  classical  ordering  of the  whole  legal
field  which  it  redefined.  Bishop  was  a  self-conscious  classicizer,  and
shifting marriage  from contract to  status was a key building  block of his
classicizing legal taxonomy.
V. WHAT DID STATUS  MEAN?:  STORY, LORD ROBERTSON AND  BISHOP
This  section  presents  a  purely  legal  genealogy  of marriage  as  status,
without suggesting that law was the only contributor to the rising ideology
of  marriage  law  exceptionalism  and  its  ideological  and  material
counterpart,  the  separate  spheres.11  Bishop  not  only  imported  heavily
109.  BISHOP,  MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE, supra note 18,  at 33.
110.  BISHOP,  NEW COMMENTARIES,  supra note  107, at v.
111.  Id. at Table of Contents.
112.  For  the  best  account  of  how  law  and  society  diverged  in  the  development  of American
marriage  law, see Martha Minow, Forming Underneath  Everything that Grows: Toward a History of
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from  Lord  Robertson  and  other  sources;  he  also  received  ideas  and
representations  from his broader culture.  The  account given here focuses
on the specifically  legal strand of the larger genealogy. What  did "status"
mean  to  Story,  Bishop,  and  other  mid-century  American  legal  minds?
What follows is a short, partial genealogy of the reception of the civil-law
term status into the  American  legal vocabulary,  and  then an  account  of
what Bishop thought marriage-as-status  was.
As  we  have  seen,  in  Lord  Robertson's  and  in  Bishop's  taxonomies,
marriage  became  diacritical with  contract.  Each  defined  the  other  by
negation  and  thus  became  more  dependent  on  that  other  for  its  own
conceptual bite. Bishop's invention  was not only categorical;  it was  also
substantive.  The very meaning of marriage  and of contract had to change
if they were to be thinkable as opposites.
Clearly,  status  was,  for  Story,  a  foreign  term,  coming  from  civilian
sources and of interest only because it helped supply an international-law
concept  useful  in  the  conflict  of laws.  He  adopted  it  very  gradually,
always in italics,  which  indicate that, to him,  it was  a foreign term. Over
time  his followers dropped  the practice  of printing it  in italics. Between
the  first edition  of Story's  Conflict of Laws in  1834  and  Bishop's  1852
Marriage and Divorce,  the  word  became  a  commonplace  term  in
American  legal  writing.  In  the  course  of  this  transition,  it  acquired
specific meanings,  some of which  survive today (transformed,  of course)
while others have become obsolete.
In  1834,  the  date  of the  first edition  of his  Conflict of Laws,  Story
silently declined to adopt the term. When it appeared in his Latin sources,
he translated it as "state."'1"  Story's word choice here seems motivated by
a  desire  to  stick  close  to  the  French  term-l'dtatl
1 4- hedged  by  an
equally strong desire to avoid "estate"-which had been good enough for
Blackstone-presumably  because  of  its  antiquated,  even  feudal
connotations.  Beyond these  associations,  it  seems that,  for Story  writing
in  1834, the term status had no English-language  signification of its own:
it was  embedded  in  the  French  Code Civil distinction  between  "les  lois
personelles"  and "matibre  rdelle"-between  the  "personal  laws"  and "all
consideration  of property"-which  forms  the great taxonomic  distinction
Family Law, 1985  WiSC. L.  REV. 919 (1985).
113.  STORY,  CONFLICT OF  LAWS (1st  ed.), supra  note 48, at 51-52,  58.
114.  Thus  Story quotes  the Code  Civil, for  instance,  for the  general  rule:  "Les  lois concernant
I'dtat et la capacitd des personnes rdgissent les Frangois  mime rdsident  en pais dtranger." Id. at 67
(quoting the Code Civil, art. 3).
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of the Napoleonic Code."'  It was thoroughly foreign.
It  seems  that  Story  started  to  use  the  word  "status"  as  an  English-
language  term  largely  because  the  English/Scottish  conflict-of-law
sources on which he depended did so. It begins to appear in English only
in  his Scottish  quotations.  We  have  already  seen Lord Robertson's  dicta
defining marriage  as  a status. Story's only  other English-language  use of
the  term  status in  1834  appears  in  a  quotation  from  an  English  case
refusing  inheritance  of landed property  in England  to  a child who-said
the  court-was  a  bastard  in  England  though  legitimate  in  Scotland." 6
Legitimation  per subsequens matrimonio  might  be  good  enough  for
inheritance of property in Scotland, but impossible in England. But again,
though  Story  quoted  at  great  length  from  this  case-Birthwistle v.
Vardell-he did not follow up by designating legitimacy as a status.
By  1846,  the  date  of the  third edition of Conflict of Laws, Story  had
decided to adopt the term as an English law term.  He always italicized  it,
but it began to appear in his  own sentences."  I think it's clear that Story
adopted  status as  an  English  law  term  in  part  because  English  and
Scottish judges were doing so, and that English  and Scottish judges were
doing so because  civil law  concepts  of international  law-what came  to
be known  as Conflict of Laws-were  acknowledged  on both sides of the
border  as  the  decisive  legal  language  for  intrafederal  disputes  over
marriage and legitimacy rules.
Story had  a second  large  influence  leading  in  the  same  direction,  but
more  explicitly  international,  indeed  imperial,  in  character.  The
Introduction to Story's third edition acknowledged William Burge's  1838
Commentaries on  Colonial and Foreign Laws  Generally, and in  their
115.  Id. at  51  ("[c]es  loix personnelles"  translated  by  Story  as  "[p]ersonal  laws");  id. at  56
("matibre rdelle" translated by Story as "subject-matter").
116.  Id. at 86 (quoting Doe dem. Birthwistle v. Vardell,  5  B. and Cresw. 438).
117.  Story's  first, fourth  and  fifth  adoptions  of status  as  an  English-language  term  appear  in
discussions  of Birthwistle, to which entire  new sections are devoted. Almost  15 pages  are  devoted to
full-page footnotes  presenting diverging  opinions  from Birthwistle,  STORY,  CONFLICT  OF LAWS  (3d
ed.), supra note 50,  at  145-59,  this despite the  fact  that the case  was still  on appeal  to the  House of
Lords. Id. at  127 n.I.  The case  clearly  had Story's attention. His  initial  adoptions of status in  these
passages  are  chary:  for instance,  "It  seems  then  generally  admitted  by  foreign jurists,  that,  as  the
validity of the marriage  must depend upon the law of the country, where it is celebrated, the status, or
state, or condition, of their offspring, as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, ought to depend upon the same
law."  Id. at  134.  See also id. at  144  (further new  material  discussing  Birthwistle  and using  status).
Another entirely new section is devoted to a famous  English case involving the  validity of a Scottish
divorce; here we find Story's second and third uses of the status as an English-language  word. Id. at
137 (discussing Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, (1811)  161 Eng. Rep. 665, 665-68  (K.B.)).
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Conflict with Each Other, and with the Law of England' 18  as one  of two
new  works  to  which  he  owed  his  most  substantial  revisions.  Story
incorporated  large-scale  references  to and  quotations  from  Burge,ll 9 and
citations to Burge accompany most of Story's uses of the term status as an
English legal term.120
Burge's  handbook,  published  in  London  in  1838,  disseminated  the
know-how  of  "the  supreme  appellate  tribunal  of the  British  Colonial
Empire" about the law  in force in the British colonies-and because  most
of them were civil law countries, Burge made the civil law generally, and
Dutch,  Spanish,  and French  law  in particular,  his  first sources  of law to
compare with  the  English  law already  known  to his readers.
12 1  In doing
so,  Burge  adopted  the  Latin  term  status as  an English  word,  explicitly
borrowed from Roman  sources, that would be crucial in settling conflicts
of laws questions. For instance:  "We now proceed  to the consideration of
the  civil  qualities  or  capacities  of  persons.  . . . They  are  frequently
expressed  by the  terms  'status,'  '1'6tat,'  . . . . "Status  est  qualitas,  cujus
ratione homines diverso jure utuntur."'
1 22  Burge went on to use the term
status not  as  a  foreign  word  but  as  an  English  one,  and  gave  a  list  of
statuses that must  be honored  in choice  of law decisions:  "the  status  of
legitimacy  and  illegitimacy, minority and majority,  marriage, alienage  by
birth, and naturalization...  .To these may be added the status of slavery,
the  incapacity  or  status  consequent  on  sentences  of interdict  against
prodigals and lunatics, of excommunication,  outlawry, and civil death."l23
By  1838,  status had arrived-explicitly  from civil law-as a crucial term
for the  legal managers of an Empire.  It carried the French legal idea that
persons  had statuses  which did not change  as they moved  from place  to
place  around  the world,  and  that required  the  application  of their  home
law  to  legal  disputes  putting  the  existence  and  consequences  of those
statuses at stake.
I don't think that  Story noted any tension between  his Scottish sources
and the French idea transplanted by Burge. Both legal federations like the
United  States  and  Great  Britain  on  one  hand,  and  colonial  rule  on the
118.  WILLIAM  BURGE,  COMMENTARIES  ON  COLONIAL  AND  FOREIGN LAWS  GENERALLY,  AND IN
THEIR  CONFLICT  WITH  EACH  OTHER,  AND  WITH  THE  LAW  OF  ENGLAND  (London,  Saunders  and
Benning  1838) (hereinafter BURGE, COLONIAL AND  FOREIGN LAWS).
119.  STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS  (3d ed.), supra note 50, at viii.
120.  Id.  at 134  n.1,  135 nn.1,  2 & 137 n.5.
121.  BURGE,  COLONIAL AND FOREIGN LAWS, supra note  118, at ii-iii  & xiv-xvi.
122.  Id., at 57 (quoting "Heinic. Elem. Juris. Civil  lib. 1, tit 3,  § 76").
123.  Id.  at 57-58.
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other, provoked conflicts  of laws; only  a body of international  law could
resolve  them;  and  the  Roman  law  heritage,  including  French  law,
provided  what the  common  law  did not by way  of concepts,  terms,  and
rules.  But  there  was  a  huge  tension  between  them:  the  Scottish  rule
insisted  on the territorial  power of the newly  assimilated weaker  state  to
choose and apply its own law, while Burge's French rule insisted on a law
of persons  that would  have  required  Scottish  courts  to  enforce  English
marriage rules.
This  was  about  as  far  as  Story  got  in  assimilating  Lord  Robertson's
understanding  of marriage  as status. A  large taxonomic problem attached
to  the term loomed,  but there is no  sign that  Story  saw  it.  The  common
law did not divide itself into the law of persons and the loi rdelle; indeed,
it did not divide itself systematically at  all. And the civil law idea that the
"states  and capacities  of persons" constitute  a "personal  law"  that travels
with  different  human  beings  wherever  they  go  contains  no  inherent
derogation of persons or their capacities.  It could happen  to  anyone.  But
in  a  legal  order  in  which  the  will  theory  and  the  law of contract  gain
increasingly  strong  purchase  and  begin  to  command  taxonomic  control
over  the  emerging  American  classical  legal  order,  the  competing
distinction  between  the  droit des personnes and  the droit r&lle would
become  an  irrelevancy,  and Burge's  list  of persons  will  begin  to  seem
problematic,  deviant,  exceptional.  The  persons  who  have  statuses  will
seem not privileged but incapacitated.
As  it became  received  into  emerging  classical  legal  thought  in  later-
nineteenth-century  Anglo-America,  status was parole shifting  into  a new
langue. My argument is that this new langue resituated  status-eventually
naturalized  as  status-in  a  contract/status  distinction  that  was  new  and
that  gave  marriage  a  distinctly  retardataire  role  to  play  in  the  grand
march of history  towards  contract.  The  very  idea that marriage  required
definition  was  new.  Blackstone,  Reeve,  and  Parsons  were  content  to
classify marriage and spell out the legal rules, but Story, Bishop, and their
sources seemed compelled to define it. As we have seen, Story's efforts in
this  direction  are  tentative,  at  least  in  retrospect.  Bishop,  on the  other
hand, has almost too much to say.
First, marriage has  become  the  important  legal  topic,  displacing  the
relation of husband and wife. Recall that for Blackstone  and Reeve,  the
relation of husband and  wife  sat with  other legal relations,  and  the  legal
rules  spelled  out  the  reciprocal  rights  and  duties  of the  paired  persons
inhabiting  the  relation.  For  Story  and  Bishop, the  topic  is  marriage, a
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condition shared by husband  and  wife. This  shift is both taxonomic  and
lexical. When Bishop cited authorities from English and American  courts
describing  the personal statuses of  husband  and  wife,  he  seamlessly
concluded  that  the  rules  applicable  to  them  were  applicable  to  marriage
because "[w]e  have seen that marriage  is a status[.]"l 2 4  We  are seeing the
partial,  to  be  sure  incomplete,  displacement  of  husband and wife  as
legally distinct persons by marriage  as an institution.
In this emerging classical understanding, marriage is fundamental to the
legal and social orders; it is necessary for civilized society.  It is "the most
important of all human  transactions"
25  and "the very  basis of the whole
fabric of civilized society[.]"l 2 6  By constituting the statuses of parent and
child  and  the  relations  of affinity  and  consanguinity,  "it  pervades  the
whole  system of civil  society."
27  Marriage  is  fundamental,  crucial,  and
elementary:  "Marriage  . . . establishes  fundamental  and  most important
domestic  relations.  . . . [E]very  well  organized  society  is  essentially
interested  in  the  existence  and  harmony  and  decorum  of all  its  social
relations,  [and]  marriage..  . [is]  the most  elementary  and useful of them
all[.]"t 21 Human civilization depends on it:
[T]his union of marriage  ...  produc[es] interests, attachments, and
feelings, partly from necessity,  but mainly  from a principle  in our
nature,  without  which,  perhaps,  it  [presumably  referring  to  "our
nature"]  could  not  exist  in  a  civilized  state[.]  So  it  has  been
deemed in all societies, civilized, and not corrupt, in all ages." 29
Marriage  "is  a  contract  coeval  with,  and  essential  to,  the  existence  of
society[.]"'o  When  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  adopted  Bishop's  view  in
Maynard v. Hill, it  put this  point  in  the  form  which  American  lawyers
know  so well:  marriage  "is  the  foundation  of the  family  and of society,
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress."'
124.  BISHOP,  MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE,  supra note  18,  at 583-84  (emphasis  added)  (footnote
omitted). The question under consideration at this point in the text is whether a state court can divorce
a married couple when its only ground for jurisdiction is the current residency of one of the parties.
125.  STORY,  CONFLICT  OF  LAWS  (1st  ed.), supra note  48,  § 109,  at  101  (quoting  FERGUSSON,
REPORTS, supra note 56, app., n.G, at 397 (Lord Robertson)).
126.  Id. § 109, at 101.
127.  Id. (quoting FERGUSSON,  REPORTS, supra note 56, app., n.G, at 397 (Lord Robertson)).
128.  BISHOP,  MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE, supra note  18,  §  34,  at 29  (quoting Maguire, 7 Dana  at
183).
129.  Id. §  35, at 30 (quoting Dickson v. Dickson's Heirs,  I Yer. 110,  112-13  (1826)).
130.  Id. § 34,  at  28  (quoting  FERGUSSON,  REPORTS,  supra note  56,  app.,  n.G,  at  401  (Lord
Bannatyne)).
131.  Maynard v. Hill,  125 U.S.  190, 210-11  (1888).
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For Blackstone,  the relations of husband  and wife  were private;  in the
emerging  classical formulation, marriage  was erased  from the private and
reinscribed  as public. Marriage  is public  and  communal,  not private  and
individual; and it is therefore governed by public law, not private law. We
can detect this  in the  lexical  shift from "the law of husband and wife"  to
"the  law  of marriage."  Lord  Robertson,  quoted  at such  length  by  Story
and requoted  by Bishop,  insisted  repeatedly  it was  governed  by  "public
law"-unlike  "mere  contract"  which  was  governed  by  private  law.' 32
Neither Story nor Bishop quite groked the civil law implications here. To
Story,  this  meant  that  marriage  was  an  "institution  of society."' 33  And
Bishop understood that "[m]arriage,  though  in one sense a contract . ..  is,
nevertheless,  sui generis, and  unlike  ordinary  commercial  contracts,  is
publicijuris[.]"l 34  The German/Roman  idea that the entire legal order was
divided  into  public  and  private  law  was  being  haltingly  adapted  to
common  law  conditions  here;  the  marriage/contract  distinction  was
clearly one conduit for its importation.
As  Story  and  Bishop  constructed  marriage-as-status,  they  also
constructed contract,  its diacritical  other. In the passage  quoted by Story,
Lord Robertson  used  the  formula  "rights,  duties,  and  obligations"  five
times to designate  the ascriptive  contents  of marriage;  whereas  marriage
was  thus  saturated  by  law,  "other  contracts"  are  "left  entirely  to  be
regulated by the agreements  of the parties"  and are  "control[led]"  by the
"declaration  of their will."l 35  Lord Robertson  even described  this will  as
nothing more than the "discretion or caprice" of the contracting  parties.' 
6
Bishop  insisted  on  it:  marriage  "can  be  violated  and  annulled  by  law,
which no  other  contract  can;  it cannot  be  determined  by  the will  of the
parties, as  any  other  contract  may  be;  and  its rights  and  obligations  are
derived rather from the law relating to it, than from the contract itself."'"
'Obligations  . . . arising  from  voluntary  engagement,  take  their rule and
substance from the will of man, and may be framed and disposed of at his
132.  STORY,  CONFLICTS  (I" ed.),  supra note 48,  § 109-111,  at  101-02  (quoting  FERGUSSON,
REPORTS, supra note 56, at 397-99 app. n.G).
133.  Id.
134.  BISHOP, MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE, supra note  18, §  34, at 29  (quoting Maguiree, 7 Dana at
184).
135.  STORY,  CONFLICT  OF  LAWS  (1st  ed.),  supra  note  48,  §§  109-12,  at  101-03  (quoting
FERGUSSON,  REPORTS, supra  note  56, app., n.G, at 397 (Lord Robertson)).
136.  Id. § 110,  at  102 (quoting  FERGUSSON,  REPORTS, supra note  56,  app.,  n.G,  at 398  (Lord
Robertson)).
137.  BISHOP,  MARRIAGE AND  DIVORCE, supra note  18, §  35,  at 30 (quoting Townsend  v. Griffin,
4 Del. 440, 442 (1846)).
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pleasure[.]"'
3 8  That  is  to  say,  the  obligations  of  contract  are  defined
entirely by the will of the parties, or their mere pleasure; once a contract is
formed  it is governed  by  its own  terms, not by  law;  the parties,  and only
the parties, can terminate  it completely.  This is the  famous "will theory"
of contract;  it was  explicitly hostile to the richly ascriptive contract order
envisioned by  Parsons. This understanding  would  eventually  morph  into
the  ideas  that contract  is by  definition free; that the  role  of the  state  in
contract is to  "let  it be"-laissez faire; and  that contract  is the paradigm
body of law for emerging modern capitalism and its market.
For Bishop, marriage  creates  not only "rights,  duties and obligations,"
but "disabilities,  and ...  privileges between husband and wife."l39  This is
a  small  lexical move,  but one  that is pregnant  with possibility. Bishop's
formulation  is  continuous  with  Parsons's segregation  of married women
into his list of "disabled persons."  For Bishop, however, it is not the wife
alone but both parties who are disabled: no one can "take the power over
the wife from the husband, and place it in her or any other; or the right of
provision  and  protection  of the  wife  from  her  husband[.]"' 40  We  are
seeing here  the inception  of the legal  idea that rights belong  to contract
and  are  general,  while  the  obligations  of  marriage  are  not  rights  but
disabilities, and are special, exceptional.
The  public,  ascriptive,  and  special  character  of marriage  finds  its
warrant  in  several  other rules  that  are  deemed  alien  to  contract.  Lord
Robertson, as we've  seen,  observed that, even though insanity rendered  a
spouse  permanently  incapable  of fulfilling  essential  marital  duties,  the
marriage  remained  indissoluble.14'  An  equally  indissoluble  marriage
could be  created  by  parties  "who  are not  capable  of forming  any  other
lawful  contract"-for  instance,  minors.'42  And  the  public  will  applies
criminal  penalties  to  violations  of the  most  important  obligations  of
marriage:_"The  breach  of  some  of  its  obligations  has  in  general  been
considered  as  a  violation  of  the  fundamental  laws  of  the  State,  and
138.  Id. §  36, at 31 (quoting  FRASER,  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS (1st ed.),supra  note  103, at 89).
139.  Id. §  35,  at 30 (quoting Dickson, 1 Yer. at  112).
140.  Id. §  36, at 31  (quoting  FRASER, DOMESTIC  RELATIONS (1st  ed.), supra note  103,  at 89); see
also id. ("it is not  in  the  power of the parties, though of common  consent, to  alter any  substantial
[element]")  (quoting  FRASER,  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1st  ed.),  supra  note  103,  at  89)  (emphasis
added).
141.  STORY,  CONFLICT OF LAWS (1st  ed.), supra note 48, §  109,  at 101-02 (quoting FERGUSSON,
REPORTS, supra note 56, app., n.G, at 397-98  (Lord Robertson)).
142.  BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note  18,  § 35, at 30  (quoting Townsend, 4 Del.  at
442).
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therefore visited with severe penalties[.]"l
43
Finally, marriage-as-status  contains  not only the  husband and  wife but
the parent and  child. As we've seen,  Lord  Robertson  saw these relations
as radiating weblike throughout  society: marriage  " . . . confers the status
of legitimacy  on  children  born  in  wedlock,  with  all  the  consequential
rights, duties, and privileges, thence arising; it gives rise to the relations of
consanguinity  and affinity;  in short,  it pervades the whole system of civil
society."'"  And these relations, too,  reflect not the will of the parties  but
the will of the state:  the statuses of parent and  child "can  never  be taken
away, or in the slightest degree infringed by the will or acts of one or both
of the parties."
1 4 5
This  understanding  of  marriage  as  fundamental  was  remarkably
sentimental, but the sentiments  are very stern. The late-nineteenth-century
cult  of  domesticity-with  its  insistence  on  mutual  affection,  mutual
succor,  and the  delights  of mutual  companionship-makes  a  very  scant
appearance  in  Story's  and Bishop's  definitions  of marriage.  Instead,  all
the  references  to  that  effect  that I have  been  able  to  gather  so  far  are
basically  about  social  control  and  moral  self-regulation.  Thus,  Story
acknowledged  the  moral and affective  dimensions of marriage  this way:
"Upon  its sound morals, the domestic affections,  and the delicate relations
and duties of parents and children, essentially depend."' 46  This is far more
tender than Story's assertion of the husband's right to the wife's property
in the Dartmouth College case, but it is not about mutual affection either:
the ordering of domestic affections and delicate relations  by sound morals
is  the new point. Bishop never  alludes  to the  emotional  life of marriage,
except  though  his  quotations  from  a  single  case,  Dickson v.  Dickson's
Heirs: there,  marriage  is  said  to  produce  "feelings"  arising  from  "a
principle  in our nature"  which require  marriage  if we  are  to  "exist  in  a
civilized  state[.]"l 47  That  is  to  say,  marriage  transforms  potentially
destructive natural appetites into well ordered civilized feelings.
143.  Id. §  36, at 31  (quoting FRASER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS  (1st  ed.), supra note  103, at 89).
144.  STORY,  CONFLICT  OF  LAWS  (1st  ed.), supra note 48,  § 109,  at  101  (quoting  FERGUSSON,
REPORTS, supra note  56,  app.,  n.G,  at  397  (Lord  Robertson)); see  also BISHOP,  MARRIAGE  AND
DIVORCE, supra note  18,  §  36,  at 30 (quoting  FRASER,  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  (1st  ed.),  supra note
103,  at 89).
145.  BISHOP,  MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE, supra note  18, § 36, at 30 (quoting  FRASER,  DOMESTIC
RELATIONS  (1st ed.), supra note  103, at 89).
146.  STORY,  CONFLICT  OF LAWS (1st ed.), supra  note 48, § 200, at 168.
147.  BISHOP,  MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE,  supra note  18,  § 35,  at 30  (quoting Dickson, I YeT.  at
112).
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To sum  up:  marriage  is  fundamental,  public, controlled  by  the will  of
the state rather than that of the parties. It is the opposite of contract, which
is variable, private, and controlled by the will of the parties not that of the
state.  One  consequence  of this  transformation  can  be  detected  through
another Reeve/Bishop comparison: whereas  for Reeve  the law of husband
and wife belonged in the same book with the law of master  and servant-
a  housing  continuous  with  Blackstone's  "private  oeconomical
relations"-for  Bishop  the  law of marriage  and  divorce  was  a  separate
legal  topic.  The  law of master  and servant  was migrating  to  contract,'
4 8
partly because it was being delinked from marriage and divorce.
Dividing  marriage  from  labor was  a fundamental  change  of immense
social  and political  importance,  in part because  it implicated slavery,  the
single most controversial  and politically decisive issue  in mid-nineteenth-
century  America.  The necessity  of this  transformation  did  not  occur  to
Bishop,  who seems  a  little  tone deaf to what  was  at stake  here.  Bishop
quotes  Chief  Judge  Taney's  decision  in  Strader  v.  Graham
49  as
consistent with  his  rule about jurisdiction and choice  of law  in interstate
divorces:  the right law to apply was the law of the domicile-the  slave's
domicile,  it seems,  in Strader, and  that of the  spouses in  divorce  cases.
Thus  as  Chief  Justice  Taney  intoned  in  Strader, "Every  State  has  an
undoubted right to determine the status, or domestic and social condition,
of the  persons  domiciled  within  its  territory."'s  In  Strader itself, this
meant that  Kentucky  courts  were  entitled  to  apply  Kentucky  law  to  the
question  of  the  status,  slave  or  free,  of  two  enslaved  musicians  who
travelled to  Ohio at their owner's behest and then  fled;  slave-state  courts
could  award damages  against those who received the  slaves  in Ohio and
let  them  escape;  nor could  the  defendants  maintain  in  their defense  that
the  musicians  had  become  free  upon  arrival  in  Ohio.  Strader was
immediately  and  intensely  controversial,  because  it implied  that private
and  legal  actors  in  free  states  were  obliged  to  respect  and  enforce  the
enslavement of sojourners  in the  North who were  held to  slavery  in  the
South.
Bishop seems not to have grasped that, though technically  the domicile
148.  For  a  gripping  exposition  of this  process  as  it  rearranged,  through  wave  after  wave  of
restructuring  and  recharacterization,  the  relations  of  master  and  slave,  master  and  servant,  and
contract for the sale of free labor, see  ROBERT J. STEINFELD,  THE INVENTION  OF  FREE LABOR:  THE
EMPLOYMENT  RELATION IN ENGLISH AND  AMERICAN  LAW AND CULTURE,  1350-1870 (1991).
149.  Strader v. Graham, 51  U.S.  82 (1850),
150.  Id. at 93, quoted in BISHOP, MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE, supra note  18, at 583.
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rule is the same for slavery and marriage, abolitionists  in the North would
see the Strader  rule as the equivalent of a rule requiring Scottish courts to
allow  English husbands sojourning  in  Scotland to cage up and  beat their
wives  because  that  was  allowed  under  the  English  law  of marriage.
Instead, he  gives a bold misreading of Strader,  making  it consistent with
his  choice  of law  rule  for marriage:  "if two  persons  in  South  Carolina
sustain  the  mutual  status  of  master  and  slave,  the  tribunals  of
Massachusetts  will take cognizance  of it while  they remain there;  but if
they remove to Massachusetts,  the relation  will not be recognized  in the
latter State, because slavery is against the policy of its laws, and because,
indeed,  they  know of no  such condition  existing within  its  borders."''
The  strongest  suggestion  that  he  senses  something  is  awry  here  comes
when he deduces  from his Strader  quotation,  plus another  from  Burge's
Colonial and Foreign Laws'52-both  of which  speak  of the  status  of
persons-a rule  about  the  status  of  marriage: "We  have  seen  that
marriage is a status; and  the  question  of divorce, therefore,  is  one  of
status." Bishop summarizes  these propositions without mentioning that he
is  also  substantially  transforming  them.  I think  we  are  seeing  here  the
beginnings of a very American resistance  to the civilian "law of persons,"
and to the  choice of law  consequences  of that legal  idea, in particular to
the  idea  that  slave  status  belonged  to  enslaved  persons  and  had  to  be
respected even in free states. Dividing marriage from the law of labor was
a  crucial  move,  as  it  allowed  them  to  develop  different  choice  of law
rules: marital status could be untethered from the emerging idea that labor
was always contractual.
For  Bishop,  the  locus  of marriage  was  complex.  Marriage  was  both
universal and  local.  On  one  hand, it was  iuris gentium and  therefore  an
inescapable  part  of every  sovereign  legal  order.'  As  Bishop  put  the
point:  "Marriage,  being founded  in nature,  is a thing of natural  law, and
under  that  law  it  is  entered  into  by  the  mutual  consent  alone  of  two
competent  persons.  From  the  law  of nature  it has  ascended  through  the
municipal  institutions  of  all  civilized  countries  into  the  general
151.  BISHOP,  MARRIAGE AND  DIVORCE,  supra note  18, §  718, at 585.
152.  Burge, Bishop reports,  "says the status of persons is 'conferred  by the laws of the domicil';
and  within  this  principle  he  expressly  includes  the  condition  of marriage,  in  respect  both  to  its
institution  and dissolution."  Id. at  582-83  (quoting  BURGE,  COLONIAL  AND  FOREIGN  LAWS,  supra
note  118, at 57-58).
153.  STORY,  CONFLICT OF  LAWS  (1st  ed.), supra note  48,  § 109,  at  101  (quoting  FERGUSSON,
REPORTS, supra note 56, app., n.G, at 397 (Lord Robertson)).
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international  code."' 54  No civilized  state could disestablish  marriage, and
every  state  must  recognize  particular  marriages  that were  entered  into
according  to the  law  in force where they were contracted.  The formation
of  marriage  was  contract,  and  contract  was  universal:  "As  to  the
constitution  of  the  marriage,  as  it  is  merely  a  personal,  consensual
contract,  it must be  valid every where,  if celebrated according  to  the lex
loci[.]"155
But unlike contract, which  must also be performed  and enforced under
the  lex loci, the  law of the ongoing marriage  could, did and should vary
significantly  according to the law of the state of domicile, and that (unlike
slave  status  for Justice  Taney) could  change  as the  parties  moved  about
the  face  of the  earth.  These  rules  were  not  universal;  they  were  local:
particular sovereigns  had exclusive power to set down the particular laws
governing  marriages within their territories. Bishop  insisted on sovereign
control again and again: "Now all courts recognize the laws both of nature
and  of nations,  and  draw  from them  rules  for decision  in  proper cases,
when  not  controlled  by  any  superior  provisions  of  the  municipal,
statutory, or common law"s.  "[m]arriage  ...  is regulated  and controlled
by  the  sovereign  power  of the  State"15 1;  the  power  over  marriage  and
divorce  "cannot  be  surrendered  or  subjected  to  political  restraint  or
foreign  control,  consistently  with  the  public  welfare.  And  therefore,
marriage,  being much more than a contract,  and depending essentially  on
the sovereign  will,  is not, as we presume,  embraced by the constitutional
interdiction of legislative acts impairing the obligation of contracts."'
58
Whereas the contracts within a given sovereign state might be governed
by  law from different foreign  states, and thus were,  in our contemporary
parlance,  legally  plural,  the marriages  resident  there were  legally  all  the
same.  And  whereas  the  terms of particular  contracts  varied  immensely
according  to  the will  of the  parties,  the  terms  of marriage  did  not:  as
Bishop  insisted, "The  obligation  is created  by the  public  law,  subject to
the public will, and  not to that of the parties."' 59  This  is a major division
of law;  its  implications  would  not  be  clear,  even  to  Bishop,  until  the
154.  BISHOP, MARRIAGE  AND DIVORCE, supra  note  18, § 144, at 113 (footnotes omitted)..
155.  STORY,  CONFLICT  OF  LAWS  (1st  ed.),  supra note  48,  § 109,  at  102 (quoting  FERGUSSON,
REPORTS, supra note 56, app.,  n.G, at 398 (Lord  Robertson)).
156.  BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra  note  18,  §  144, at 113.
157.  Id. §  34, at 29 (quoting Maguire,  7 Dana at 183).
158.  Id. (quoting Maguire,  7 Dana at  183).
159.  Id. §  34, at 30 (quoting Maguire,  7 Dana at 184).
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architecture of classical legal thought worked itself pure.
VI. THE PARADOX OF MARRIAGE AS  STATUS  NOT CONTRACT:
MA YNARD  V  HILL
The U.S.  Supreme Court's  1888  decision in Maynard  v. Hill cemented
into  our  constitutional  order  the  idea  that  marriage  is  status,  almost
verbatim as Bishop described it:
[W]hile  marriage  is  often termed by text writers  and in decisions
of courts  as  a civil contract,  generally  to indicate  that it must  be
founded upon  the  agreement  of the parties,  and does  not require
any religious ceremony for its solemnization,  it is something more
than  a  mere  contract.  The  consent  of  the  parties  is  of  course
essential  to  its  existence,  but  when  the  contract  to  marry  is
executed  by  the  marriage,  a  relationship  between  the  parties  is
created  which  they  cannot  change.  Other  contracts  may  be
modified,  restricted,  or  enlarged,  or  entirely  released  upon  the
consent of the parties. The relation  once formed,  the law  steps in
and holds the parties to  various obligations  and liabilities.  It is an
institution,  in the maintenance  of which in its public character the
public  is deeply  interested,  for  it is  the  foundation  of the  family
and  of society,  without  which there would be  neither civilization
nor progress.1
60
Despite the fact that this passage foregoes use of the term "status"-the
Supreme  Court would not define  marriage  as status until  1890161-it has
become  the  locus classicus for marriage-as-status  thinking.  What  is less
often noticed  is  the deeply  paradoxical  relationship  between  the  Court's
idea of marriage  and  the actual  attributes given to  marriage  in its  actual
holding. In order to understand  this paradox,  it will be helpful  to review
the history of the case.' 62
David  and  Lydia  Maynard  married  in  Vermont  in  1828;  soon  they
moved  to Ohio  and  had  several  children.  In  1850  David left  for what  is
160.  Maynard v. Hill,  125 U.S.  190, 210-11  (1888).
161.  United States v. Grimley,  137 U.S.  147,  151 (1890).
162.  I derive  the  following  story behind  this famous  case  from Maynard v. Hill, 125  U.S.  190
(1888);  Maynard v.  Valentine,  3  P.  195  (Wash.  1880)  ;  and  THOMAS  W.  PROSCH,  DAVID  S.
MAYNARD  & CATHERINE T. MAYNARD:  BIOGRAPHIES  OF Two OF THE OREGON IMMIGRANTS  OF  1850
(1906).  1 have tried  to make the story told above  perfectly consonant with all  these sources. This was
not  difficult,  as  - though  each  text  provides  more detail  here  or  there  - there  are  no  material
disagreements  among them. Where I rely on only one of these sources  rather than several of them, I
provide a citation.
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now  Seattle, promising to bring his wife to join him within two years and
to pay support in the interim. He did neither;  instead, in  1852 he obtained
through political means of some sortl
63  a bill of divorce  from the Oregon
Territorial  legislature.  Lydia Maynard  received no notice of, and  did not
know about, this event. There seems to be no evidence that the legislature
did, or was legally  required to,  inquire  into the  existence of any  grounds
for the divorce. (At that time  in the Oregon Territory,  as in many states,
legislative  bills were  the  only way  to  obtain  a  divorce; judicial  divorce
was still a controversial novelty.)  Very promptly after the bill was  issued,
David married another woman.
The  case  began  with  David's  effort  to  perfect  his  title  under  the
Donation Act in some land located in what was to become Seattle.  He had
applied to  the  General  Land  Office  in Oregon  Territory,  and it,  in  turn,
found Lydia Maynard  somehow  and  notified her of the proceedings.  (As
his wife  she  would have  dower rights that would travel with the  title of
any  land of which  David  was  seized  during  the  marriage.  Without  her
waiver of those rights, she would be entitled  on his death to a life interest
in  a portion of those lands,  even  if they had  been  sold to  others.)  Lydia
travelled to Seattle to assert her interests: her claim was not against David
or  against  David's  second  wife,  who  made  no  claim  to  the  land,  but
against various  other  settlers  to whom  David  had made  conveyances.  In
the  first  hearing  of the  matter Lydia  won. When  David appealed  to  the
same commissioner,  however, he prevailed.'"  Well after both David and
Lydia  died  (in  1873  and  1875,  respectively),  her  children  sued  in  the
territorial  court,  lost  at  every  level,  and  appealed  to  the  U.S.  Supreme
Court.
As  we have  amply  seen,  by that  time  a  crucial  question  had  emerged
that  posed  a  deep  challenge  to  a  well-entrenched  representation  of
163.  Prosch tells  us that  Maynard was  one of the  small  group of settlers  who formed  the then-
brand-new  legislature  for the Oregon Territory,  that he got his bill of divorce at its initial session; and
that at the  same session  he also successfully proposed the formation of new counties and secured the
location  of the King County seat on Maynard's donation claim. Prosch concludes:  "It is plain from the
results that the Doctor was looked upon at Salem as a pretty good fellow. That he could have anything
he chose  to ask for that the Legislators could give was quite evident."  PROSCH, supra note  162,  at 33.
Maynard's biographer  is clearly concerned here about the fairness of this unilateral divorce  and of the
home cooking that produced it.
164.  This  is one  of the  few  facts for which I have only one  source.  PROSCH,  supra note  162,  at
55-56.  Prosch was very sympathetic with the interests Lydia would have displaced, "the  Terry estate,
Hugh  McAleer and others who had bought of Maynard and did not want to lose their properties."  Id.
at  55. "Of course,  all  this made much commotion  in Seattle....  It was  felt that if the new claimant
from Wisconsin  [Lydia's residence  by that time]  won  her case  the people  of Seattle would have to
pay." Id. at 56.
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marriage as contract:  in issuing the divorce, had the Territorial  legislature
violated the  Contracts Clause of the  Constitution? The Contracts  Clause
stipulates  that  "No  state  shall  . . . pass  any  . . . law  . . . impairing  the
Obligation  of  Contracts."
6 1  If  the  divorce  were  an  impairment  of
contract, the Maynard divorce would be void; Lydia would be recognized
as  David's  lifelong  wife;  and  under  the  Donation  Act  she  would  have
legally  protected  dower  rights in  David's land.  For her  (actually,  by  the
time the Supreme  Court ruled on the case,  for her kids)  to get any relief,
then, the Court would  have  had to  say  that Lydia  and  David Maynard's
marriage was a contract.
It would have  been easy: there  was massive legal  authority  in place to
support  a  description  of marriage  as  contract.  Blackstone  had  described
marriage as a "civil  contract,"  and myriad courts had followed suit.1
66  But
it would have been a highly  disruptive move for the Court to make. Many
controversial questions-whether  states had the power to grant divorces at
all,  and if so,  whether courts  or  legislatures  were empowered  to  do  this
and what  grounds were  needed  to justify particular  divorces-would  be
instantaneously  federalized  and  constitutionalized if the Contracts Clause
invalidated David and Lydia Maynard's divorce.
But  here  is  the  rub:  in  the  name  of honoring  marriage-as-status,  the
Court effectively validated David Maynard's decision to walk away from
his first marriage with Lydia Maynard with fewer legal  consequences than
would have followed if he had failed to fulfill a contract to deliver a peck
of grain. Because  marriage  is a status,  completely public  in character,  an
invariable  obligation,  and  the  foundation  of family  and  society-David
was divorced from Lydia without having performed  any of the elemental
duties of his marriage to her, without her fault, without even notice to her!
Lydia lived out her life in Ohio as a wife;  if she  had sued David there  to
enforce  his  marital  obligations,  the  marriage  would  have  been  "status"
there  too;  meanwhile  her husband  was  for a brief time  single  and  then
validly married to another!'
6 1
165.  U.S.  CONST. art I, § 10, cl.  1.
166.  1 BLACKSTONE,  supra note  8, at 421.  A Westlaw search for state cases describing  marriage
as a "civil contract" before  1888 yielded 245 decisions.
167.  The  idea that domicile  produces both subject  matter jurisdiction and  choice of the  forum's
law was  behind the validity of David Maynard's  divorce:  as the Territorial  Supreme  Court reasoned,
"it is said that the wife was never domiciled  in the said territory of Oregon, and consequently  said act
can have no  effect upon her or her  rights; but with this  claim we cannot agree,  for if we  admit that
under the  facts pleaded  she was domiciled in the  state of Ohio, still,  as the husband was a resident of
said territory,  the  legislature  could  regulate  his  status  therein;  and,  having  released  him  from  the
bonds of his  marriage,  he  was, at  least while  in said  territory, absolved  from all  its duties and  thus
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David and both of his wives had a pretty clear idea of their plural status.
On  the  day  Lydia  arrived  in  Seattle to put  in her  presence  in  the  initial
litigation over the land claim, we are told by his biographer,
He  stepped into  the barber  shop, and  said:  "Dixon:  fix me  up  in
your best style."  "What's up, Doctor? What  are you going to do?"
"I am going to  give the  people here  a  sight they may never have
again. I'm going to show them a man walking up the street with  a
wife on each  arm."  Sure enough;  when  the steamer came  in from
the upper Sound  Maynard and his second wife were there  to meet
the  first wife,  and  they walked  together  to  his home  where  they
dwelt until Lydia left on her return to Wisconsin, somewhat to the
surprise of the general public.' 8
That  is  to  say,  marriage  as  status-not-contract  is  a  doctrinal  and
ideological  reality,  but  its  contents  do  not  entirely  correspond  with
marriage  as  a positive,  enforced,  lived  legal  institution:  marriage  as  its
effects.
This  paradox  may  be  even  clearer  if we  contrast  Bishop's  repeated
insistence that marriage  is not terminable  with  the cases he depended  on
for his underlying  proposition  that marriage  is  status.  As we  have  seen,
Bishop  insisted  that  "marriage  . . . is  regulated  and  controlled  by  the
sovereign  power  of  the  State,  and  cannot,  like  mere  contracts,  be
dissolved by the mutual consent  only of the contracting  parties[.]"'
69  Nor
can  spouses  "make  the  marriage  for  a  time[.]" 7 o Indeed,  "society  has
even more interest in preserving  it than the parties themselves.""'  "[I]t  is
a  civil  status,  existing  in  one  man  and  one  woman,  legally  united  for
life[.]"' 72  You would think that divorce did not exist.
Furthermore,  all  of the  cases  that  Bishop  cites  to  assert  the  central
importance  of marriage  to the stability of society,  on inspection,  turn  out
to hold particular divorces valid. Not only that: they  consistently elect  an
expansive  rather  than  a  narrow  reallocation  of rights  arising  from  the
released he occupied the status of a single and not that of a married man, and the wife could not come
here  and assert  any right as such  wife thereafter."  Maynard v. Hill, 5 P.  71  (Wash.  1884).  Note the
proviso  that  the  court's  own  ruling  probably  did not  apply  in Ohio,  and  that  David Maynard  was
probably  married  to  Lydia  Maynard  there.  The  same  idea,  adopted  in  the jurisdiction  of  Lydia
Maynard's domicile, would produce exactly the opposite, equally correct outcome.
168.  PROSCH, supra note  162, at 60.
169.  BISHOP,  MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE, supra note  18,  § 34, at 29 (quoting Maguire, 7  Dana at
184).
170.  Id. §  36, at 31  (quoting FRASER,  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS (1st  ed.), supra note 103,  at 89).
171.  Id. §  35, at 30 (quoting Dickson, I Yer.  110,  113 (1826)).
172.  Id.  9at  25.
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divorce. They all  intensify their commitment to the idea that marriage and
its  stability  were  fundamental  to  social  order,  while  simultaneously
intensifying  the  exposure  of  actual  marriages  to  divorce,  to  the
consequences  of divorce, and to the interstate effects of divorce decrees.
In one of Bishop's marriage-as-status cases, a woman who had obtained
a divorce  on the grounds of her husband's  fault sought to assert her rights
to  her  separate  property,  which  her  husband  had  encumbered  in  the
exercise  of  his  curtesy  rights.  The  court  held  that  the  divorce  had
dissolved his property rights arising  from the  marriage just as effectively
as his death would have done. 7 1  In another case, the court was faced with
a statute rendering  all  divorce  decrees  final.  Even  though the  challenged
divorce  had  been  granted  to  a  nonresident  wife  against  a  nonresident
husband in clear  legal error, the court  upheld it. The  best it could do  for
the husband was to void and remand the property decree. 174
Clearly  both  courts  had  alternatives  that  could  have  protected  the
objecting husband:  in the first case, they could have protected  his curtesy
rights; in the second they could have found a way to invalidate  his wife's
jurisdictionless  divorce.  Instead,  the judges  ratified  sovereign  power  to
terminate  marriages-and  thereby  rendered  marriage  more,  not  less,
socially  fragile. The third case makes  the point with  striking &lat.  In that
case, the  wife had abandoned her first husband, refused to return to him,
and  moved  to  Tennessee.  He  sued  for  divorce  in  the  state  of  their
domicile,  Kentucky.  Her answer  admitted  her fault and  averred  that she
"never  would again  live with  him: that in  so doing she had consulted  her
own  happiness,  which  she  supposed  it  was  her  duty  to  do."'
7 1  Under
Kentucky  law, once divorced she was not free  to remarry  and would have
been liable to a charge of bigamy if she attempted it. But she remarried  in
Tennessee.  When  her second  husband died  soon thereafter,  she  asserted
dower rights there.  In a challenge  brought  by the second  husband's other
heirs, the Tennessee  Court was unable to  find any  legal  basis  in its  own
law  for invalidating  this second marriage. Bishop quotes a paragraph that
can only be read as the Court's protracted cry of horror at this gap in local
law which left it bound to grant her dower rights in the second husband's
estate. 176
173.  Id. §  35, at 30 (quoting Townsend, 4 Del. at 442).
174.  Id. §  34, at 29-30 (quoting Maguire, 7  Dana at  184-85,  189).
175.  Id. §  35, at 30 (quoting Dickson, I Yer. at  I11).
176.  Id. These excerpts from the  original passage will  convey some of its intensity of feeling:  "I
think not too much will be asserted, when it is said, that when a community, upon every slight pretext,
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The paradox of all these cases lies at the disjuncture between the state's
control  over  marriage  and  marriages,  on  one  hand,  and  individuals'
strategies  exploiting  choice-of-law  rules  to  wrest control  into their  own
hands.  But  this  power  of  the  sovereign  to  determine  the  validity  of
marriage  and  divorce  obscured  a  profound  contradiction  between  the
jurists'  ideology that marriage-as-status-not-contract  constituted marriage
as  fundamental  to  social  order  and  the  actual  outcomes  of these  and
dozens if not hundreds of other cases. Bishop does emphasize that divorce
is  available  only  as  a  sanction  on  marital  wrongdoing:  "The  suit  for
divorce  . . . is  not an action upon contract,  but  a proceeding sui generis,
founded  upon  the  violation  of duties  which the  law  enjoins[.]" 1"  This
justification for the rise of divorce served to mediate the contradiction  that
is so patent here.
178
In at least one of Bishop's own cases, the court thought that the judicial
power reached so far as to dissolve marriages  in which both spouses were
happy,  if dissolution  served  the public  good  or justice. According  to  the
court in Maguire v. Maguire, marriage
. . . establishes  fundamental  and  most  important  domestic
relations.  And  therefore,  as  every  well  organized  society  is
essentially  interested  in  the existence  and  harmony and  decorum
of all its social relations, marriage, the most elementary and useful
of them all, is regulated  and controlled by the sovereign power  of
the  State,  and  cannot,  like  mere  contracts,  be  dissolved  by  the
mutual  consent  only  of  the  contracting  parties,  but  may  be
abrogated by  the  sovereign  will,  either with  our  without  the
consent of both parties, whenever the public good, or justice to
both or either of the parties, will be thereby subserved. Such a
remedial  and conservative  power  is inherent in every independent
grants  divorces,  to  gratify the  lust or interest  of particular  individuals,  as  a  general  rule  of polity,
corruption and political death are approaching...  .Every honest and prudent man, who wishes well to
the society  in which  he lives,  ought to shudder whenever he sees  the supreme  power of the  country
legislating upon this topic." Id.
177.  BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note  18, § 38, at 32.
178.  It was an important part of the  Supreme Court's articulation of the new doctrine in  Grimley:
"Marriage  is  a  contract;  but  it  is  one  which  creates  a status. Its contract  obligations  are  mutual
faithfulness, but a breach of those obligations does not destroy the status or change the relations of the
parties to each other. The parties remain husband and wife,  no matter what their conduct to each other
- no matter how great  their disregard  of marital  obligations. It  is true that courts have power under
the  statutes  of most  States,  to  terminate  those  contract  obligations  and  put  an  end  to  the  marital
relations. But this  is never done at the  instance  of the  wrongdoer. The  injured party, and the  injured
party alone, can obtain relief and a change of status by judicial action."  United States v. Grimley, 137
U.S. at 151-52.
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nation[.] 179
The Maguire court  saw  a smooth,  coherent  legal  order  in  which  the
sovereign  held  all  relevant  powers  and  individual  spouses  none  (aside
from the decision  to enter into the marital relation).  What made  the bond
between  individual  husbands  and  wives  more  contingent,  strengthened
sovereign  control  over  marriage.  That  is  what  intensified  its
fundamentalness.  But  it  left  individual  marriages  more  fragile  than
contract:  "it can be violated and annulled by law,  which no other contract
can[.]"so  This contradiction between  the law on the books and the  law in
action  is  a  deep  trait  of  Bishop's  invention,  marriage-as-status-not-
contract.
VII. RECEIVING "SYSTEM":  SAVIGNY
In  an  1829  address  to the  Suffolk  Bar,  Story looked with dread  at the
"mass  of the  law,  . . . accumulating  with  an almost  incredible  rapidity"
and warned of the "fearful  calamity, which  threatens  us, of being  buried
alive, not in the catacombs, but in the labyrinths of the law."' 8' Impending
chaos  could  be  averted  only  if American  lawyers  acquired  "habits  of
generalization[.]"l
82  Very  early  on,  Story  felt  the  impulse  to  classicize
which,  around  the  time of his  early  death  in  1845,  was  sweeping  the
American  legal  intelligentsia  and,  by  the  1880s,  transforming  American
law.
The classicizing  impulse  in  America  was  driven  by  envy  not  of the
Code Napoleon but of modern Roman law, which was being built mainly
in  Germany  in  the  early  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Story
counseled  the  Boston bar that their salvation  lay in foreign,  civilian,  and
especially Roman sources:
Where  shall we find  such ample  general principles  to guide us in
new and difficult cases, as in that venerable deposit of the learning
and  labors  of the jurists of the  ancient  world,  the  Institutes  and
Pandects  of Justinian.  The  whole  continental  jurisprudence  rests
upon  this  broad  foundation  of Roman  wisdom;  and  the  English
comion  law,  churlish and harsh  as was its  feudal  education,  has
condescended  silently to borrow many of its best principles  from
179.  BISHOP,  MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE, supra note  18,  §  34,  at 29  (quoting Maguire, 7 Dana at
184) (emphasis added).
I80.  Id.  § 35, at 30.
181.  Story, Address to the Suffolk Bar,  supra  note 99, at 31.
182.  Id.
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this enlightened code.'
83
Story was not alone. In  1818, Hugh  Swinton Legard,  a  South Carolina
lawyer hungry for legal enlightenment,  was foiled by political turmoil on
the  Continent  in his  original  desire  to  study  law  in  Germany,  and  went
instead  to  Scotland.184  (We  will  see  again  and  again  that  the  Scottish
connection  played  an important  role in  transmitting civilian  influence  to
America.)  Legar6  was  in the  vanguard:  as  Michael  H.  Hoeflich  relates,
over the next two  decades American lawyers joined the global trend, and
went  to  Germany  for  legal  study.'  To  Legar6,  Blackstone's
Commentaries was a throwback:  "in spite of all the pompous eulogies that
have been passed  upon"  this classic  treatise,  "'it  is a  good gentleman's
book,  clear, but  not deep."'
86  Instead,  American jurists  should  emulate
the civil law of his time:
In  comparing  what  the  Civilians  have written  upon  any  subjects
that  have  been treated of by English  text writers,  or discussed in
the English courts, it is, we think, impossible not to be struck with
the  superiority  of their  truly  elegant  and  philosophical  style  of
analysis  and exposition.  Their whole  arrangement  and method-
the division of the matter into its natural parts, the classification of
it under the proper predicaments,  the discussion of principles,  the
deduction  of consequences  and  corollaries-everything,  in  short,
is  more  luminous  and  systematic-everything  savors  more  of a
regular and exact science.1
87
In making this turn, American jurists joined what Duncan Kennedy has
called the "first globalization  of law and legal thought,"'1
8  an ascendency
of  German  legal  thought  and  a  complex  process  of  transplanting  it
through  colonization,  indirect  rule,  inspiration  of  local elites,  travel  for
legal education, political and economic  forces  seeking uniformity  of law,
and  the  sheer  fashionableness  and charisma of Roman law.  Ugo Mattei
observes  that,  by  the  early  nineteenth  century,  "German  scholarship
became  the  most  prestigious  source  of law.  . . . Everywhere,  in  the
183.  Id. at 29.
184.  Michael H.  Hoeflich, Savigny and his American Disciples, 37 AM. J. COMP. L.  17,28 (1989)
[hereinafter Hoeflich, Disciples];  Hoeflich, Friendships,  supra note 53,  at 607.
185.  Hoeflich, Friendships,  supra note 53,  at 609-11.  See also Peter Stein,  The Attraction ofthe
Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary  America, 52 VA. L. REV. 403 (1966)  [hereinafter Stein, Attraction].
186.  Stein, Attraction, supra note  185, at  429 (quoting 2 WRITINGS  OF  HUGH  SWINTON  LEGAft
110  (1845)  [quoting Home Tooke, without citation]).
187.  Id. See also Hoeflich, Friendships,  supra note  53,  at 607  (quoting  the typescript of a letter
dated April 2,  1829 in the Library of Congress).
188.  Duncan Kennedy,  Three Globalizations,  supra  note  1, at 21,  25-37.
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common law, in the civil law, and even in non western legal systems  'the
German  systematic  and dogmatic method and the concepts  defined within
it  were  spreading  triumphantly.'  . . . In  the  common  law  world,  basic
introductions  to  English  law  . . . employed  the  typical  German
terminology  to  analyze  common  law  structures."189  And  it  wasn't just
German  terminology that travelled:  German  legal ideas, legal books, legal
methods,  legal  education  and  legal  taxonomy  were  charismatic  and,  in
some colonial settings, virtually unavoidable.'90
Story  and  Legard  yearned  for  system,  and  many  of the  things  they
wanted  turned  out  to  be  highly  salient  characteristics  of classical  legal
thought.  The passages  just quoted  show that they  hungered  for general
principles,  elegance of analysis  and exposition, and  a philosophical  style
of analysis;  that they loved the  idea that deduction and  analogy, working
down from general principles, would render the law  logical and coherent.
But  the  desideratum  that  boosted  the  status/contract  distinction  to
structural  dignity was premised  on the idea  that law  divides  into natural
parts, so  that  writing about it  should imitate  its form  through the  use  of
correct classifications. In the late  1820s, Story and Legar6 already thought
that the  arrangement  of legal  topics expressed  something  essential  about
each of them individually  and about the system of which they are the part.
This is precisely the impulse which, in art and architecture,  characterizes  a
classical  style. I will call  it the classical  ideal and  will speak of a desire
for  system.  And  I  am  going  to  argue  that, as  the  yearning  for  system
emerged  in the first half of the  nineteenth  century  in America-and  not
coincidentally  all over the world-it carried the ideas that, within private
law, contract  and marriage  differed on an axis dividing  the  general  from
the particular.
Nor was legal  thought the only driving  force behind the segregation  of
family  law/domestic  relations/personal  status  law.  Again  and  again,  in
different  ways  in  different  places,  an  emerging  global market  known  as
capitalism  found  the  contract/marriage  distinction  in  legal  thought  and
189.  Mattei,  supra note  1, at 202-03  (quoting  Rodolfo  Sacco,  "Legal  Formants:  A  Dynamic
Approach  to  Comparative  Law,"  37  AM.  J. COMP.  L.  1, 240  (1991)).  The  exceptions  were  the
relatively  few  sites  primarily  attuned  to  French  influence.  Id. For  a  fascinating  account  of how
Quebeyois  lawyers  resisted  German  influence  in favor of French  sources,  and  of the  political  and
ideological  implications of this  move, see Eric  H.  Reiter, Imported Books, Imported Ideas: Reading
European  Jurisprudence  in Mid-Nineteenth-Century  Quebec, 22 L. & HIST. REV. 445  (2004).
190.  Compare Mattei, supra note  1, who  explains  the  spread  of ascendant  legal  ideas  as  a
function of desire  for them in sites of reception,  with Kennedy,  Three Globalizations, supra note  1,
who  tends to attribute it to colonialism,  the  spread of capitalism, the  role of colonial elites,  and other
forms of power.
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made  it  newly  important.  Indeed,  Story's  address  to  the  Suffolk  Bar
specified the need for modernization and uniformity of commercial  law as
a  primary  reason  to  turn  to  civilian  sources:  "The  whole  continental
jurisprudence rests upon this broad foundation of Roman wisdom; and the
English common law, churlish  and harsh as was its feudal education, has
condescended  silently  to  borrow  many  of  its  best  principles  from  this
enlightened code  . . . . The  law of contracts  and personalty,  of trusts and
legacies,  and charities,  in England, have been formed  into life by the  soft
solicitudes  and  devotion  of her  own  neglected  professors  of the  civil
law."''  Just  a few  years  later  he  wrote  to  Francis  Lieber  that  "I look
chiefly  to  the  study  of foreign  law,  and  especially  foreign  commercial
law, for the most  important improvements which are likely to be made  in
our  commercial  jurisprudence."' 92  Other  American  jurists  concurred.
David  Hoffman,  a professor  of law  at the  University  of Maryland  from
1816-36,  and  perhaps  the  first  designated professor  of law  in  America,
advised: "In  our courts  of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,  also,  and
in  our  courts  of Equity,  on various  subjects,  as  likewise  in  the  law  of
Contracts,  of  Executors,  of  Bailments,  Legacies,  Presumptions,
Accession, Confusion, Extinguishment, Set-Off, &c.  &c  we should appeal
to the Civil Law  ...  ."193  The rise of capital brought with  it the rise  of
contract,  and  as  contract  moved  into  place  as  the  general,  it  drew  its
opposite, status, into place as the particular.
Thanks  to  bibliographical  research  by  Hoeflich' 9 4  and  political
historical analysis by John W. Cairns, 95  together with the resources of the
Harvard  Law  Library,  we  can  watch  the  desire  for  system  emerge  in
American  legal  life.  I  will  pay  special  attention  to  indications  that
Americans  noticed  in  the  work  of  Gustav  Hugo,  the  founder  of the
German Historical  School, and Freidrich Carl von Savigny, the proponent
of  a  contract/family  distinction  which  was  to  infiltrate  Bishop's
contract/status  distinction  and  raise  it  to  structural  importance.  Once
again,  the  Scottish avenue  for civil-law  influence  in  America  is  crucial.
Cairns  argues  that,  as  English  initiatives  to  modify  Scottish  law-
191.  Story, Address to the Suffolk Bar, supra  note 99, at 29 (citation omitted).
192.  Letter from Joseph  Story  to Francis Lieber  (Jul.  24,  1833)  in Hoeflich, Friendships,  supra
note 53, at 604.
193.  2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF  LEGAL STUDY  508 (2d ed. 1836).
194.  In  this  research,  I  found  Hoeflich,  Disciples, supra note  184,  particularly  useful:  he
identified most of the texts that I inspected to calibrate Savigny's influence in American law.
195.  John W. Cairns, The Influence of the German Historical  School in Early Nineteenth Century
Edinburgh,  20 SYR. J. INT'L. L. & COM.  191  (1994).
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especially  the  law  of  marriage  and  divorce-accelerated  in  the  early
nineteenth  century,  Scottish  jurists  resisted  by  claiming  that  law  was
historically  contingent  and  local, not  universal  and  rational."'  This, he
plausibly  claims,  made  them  particularly  happy  to  adopt  the  German
Historical  School  as their  favorite  source  of authority  for legal  ideas.'
9 7
Both  Cairns  and  Hoeflich  focus  on two  important  figures  in  the  early
years of the Scottish Enlightenment,  David Irving  and John Reddie, both
active promoters  of the  German  Historical  School.'9  What I  add to their
work  here  is  some very  telling  detail  about  how  Irving's  and  Reddie's
books were received in America.
In  1846  the  Harvard  Law  Library  published  a  catalogue,  almost
certainly composed by law student John Gage  Marvin, showing that it not
only had Irving's  Civil Law in its 1837 edition but held two copies of it, a
rare practice perhaps  motivated  by an expectation  of heavy use. 99 It also
listed two copies of Savigny's  History of the Roman Law in the Middle
Ages in the  original  German,  two  copies  in the  1839  French  translation,
and two copies of the 1829 Edinburgh-based English translation, plus two
topical treatises by Savigny in French translation.200
In  1847,  John  Gage  Marvin  published  a massive  Legal Bibliography
constituting his then-ideal law library.201 Here Marvin listed Irving's  Civil
Law,
202  and added Reddie's  1826 Historical  Notices of the Roman Law,
and  of the  Recent Progress of its  Study  in  Germany, 203  each  with  a
paragraph  of  special  praise.  When  Story  died  in  1845,  he  owned  an
196.  Id. at 193.
197.  Id. at 194.
198.  When  Legar6  studied  in Edinburgh,  Irving  was  his teacher.  Hoeflich,  Friendships, supra
note 53, at 607.
199.  HARVARD  LAW  SCH.  LIBRARY,  A  CATALOGUE  OF  THE  LAW  LIBRARY  OF  HARVARD
UNIVERSITY  IN CAMBRIDGE,  MASSACHUSETTS  120 (4'  ed.,  Cambridge, Metcalf & Co, Printers  to the
University,  1846)  [hereinafter  HARVARD  1846  CATALOGUE].  Hoeflich  indicates  that this  list  was
compiled by John  Gage Martin. Hoeflich, Annals, supra note 53,  at 333.  For a fascinating account of
commercial  and  auction  catalogues  during this  period, see  M.H.  HOEFLICH,  LEGAL  PUBLISHING  IN
ANTEBELLUM  AMERICA  (2010),  especially  Chapter  3,  "Spreading  the  Word:  Catalogues  and
Cultivation,"  id. at 74-104, and Chapter 4, "Bidding for Law Books," id. at 105-24.
200.  HARVARD  1846 CATALOGUE, supra  note  199, at 217.
201.  J.G.  MARVIN,  LEGAL  BIBLIOGRAPHY  OR A THESAURUS  OF  AMERICAN,  ENGLISH,
IRISH  AND  SCOTCH  LAW  BOOKS:  TOGETHER  WITH  SOME  CONTINENTAL  TREATISES.
INTERSPERSED  WITH  CRITICAL  OBSERVATIONS  UPON  THEIR  VARIOUS  EDITIONS  AND
AUTHORITY.  To  WHICH  IS  PREFIXED  A  COPIOUS  LIST  OF  ABBREVIATIONS,  404,  631
(Philadelphia,  T. & J.W. Johnson,  1847)  [hereinafter J.G. MARVIN,  LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY].
202.  Id. at 415.
203.  Id. at 602.
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autographed  presentation  copy  of Reddie's  book.
204  Irving,  "an  early
exponent  of Savigny," 205 was  the  Keeper  of the  Advocates'  Library  in
Edinburgh  from  1820  to  1848.206  He  had  published  a  first  edition  of
Observations  on  the  Study  of  Civil  Law  for  his  students  in  1815,
dedicating  it  to  Gustav  Hugo  and referring  particularly  to  Hugo's  first
edition.
207  Irving's  1837  edition-the  one  listed  by  Marvin-adds
significant passages dependent on Savigny's History of the Roman Law in
the  Middle  Ages,  specifically  admiring  Savigny  for  restoring  the
continuity of Roman Law throughout the feudal er208 Marvin also added
recently published English-language  translations  of Hugo's Survey of the
Roman or Civil Law, and of Savigny's  History of the Roman Law in the
Middle  Ages  and  Of  the  Vocation  of Our Age for Legislation  and
Jurisprudence. 209
Marvin's Legal Bibliography  thus manifests  a growing appetite for and
access  to  knowledge  about  the  German  Historical  School.  The  book's
structure  is a further  innovation  among  general  booklists, as it integrates
foreign with Anglo-American sources in a single list. Hoeflich comments:
The great genius of Marvin's work lay precisely in his integration
of foreign  legal materials  with  Anglo-American  materials  and  in
treating them all in exactly the same way. The  signal to the reader
was clear:  for purposes of legal authority,  foreign materials  could
be just as useful as Anglo-American materials.  . . . Marvin's 1847
Legal Bibliography may  well  be  viewed  as  one  of the  most
important practical  tools in Story's  attempt to foster the spread of
continental legal learning in the United States.210
A  remarkable  manuscript  inscribed  The  Property  of John  Gage
Marvin[,] Librarian of Dane Law School[,] 1845 shows Marvin coming
up with his classicizing  idea. This MS  is a handwritten alphabetical list of
legal books. On the  recto of the  first leaf we  find the  following dialogue
204.  PHILLIPS  AND  SAMPSON,  CATALOGUE  OF  LAW  AND  MISCELLANEOUS  BOOKS
BELONGING  TO  THE LIBRARY  OF THE LATE MR.  JUSTICE STORY  8, entry #199  (Boston,  Alfred
Mudge,  1846).
205.  Hoeflich,  Bibliographical  Perspectives,  supra  note 53, at 52.
206.  David  Laing, Memoir of Dr Irving, in DAVID  IRVING,  THE HISTORY  OF  SCOTTISH  POETRY
xix, xxi-xxii  (Edinburgh, Edmonston  and Douglas,  1861).
207.  DAVID  IRVING,  OBSERVATIONS  ON  THE  STUDY  OF  THE  CIVIL  LAW  ded.  p.,  56  n.x
(Edinburgh, A. Balfour, 1815).
208.  DAVID  IRVING,  INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY  OF THE CIVIL LAW,  ded.  p., 83-84,  164-165
(London, A Maxwell  1837).
209.  MARVIN,  LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY,  supra note 201,  at 404,  631.
210.  Hoeflich, Annals, supra note 53, at 340-41.
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between  Marvin  and  himself.  I  use  different  typefaces  to  indicate
Marvin's shifts from pencil to pen and back;  clearly he wrote these entries
at  intervals,  not  all  at  once;  see  Appendix  5  for  a  photographic
reproduction:
I will prepare the American part and if it takes in a second edition
enlarge and incorporate the English and Continental Bibliography.
. . . In  this  way  there  will  be  a  continual  opportunity  of
improvement.
Perhaps it  will  be  best  to  omit  the
Continental  writers  for a new work.
How would it do to include the continental with the
other and make a sort of an Encyclopedia of Legal Biography?211
We  see Marvin  here in the  very act of conceiving  the encyclopedic  legal
bibliography.
And there  is  more to be gleaned, thanks to  Marvin's hopes  of a second
edition of the Legal Bibliography. 212  Marvin  inserted interleaf pages in a
copy  of his bibliographical  masterwork,  and  made  copious  handwritten
entries  on them  adding  further  citations and  commentary.213  We  can  be
sure  that  Martin  made  these  amendments  between  February  13,  1847,
when  he  signed  off on  the  printed Legal Bibliography, 2 14  and  July  3,
1849, when  he  departed  for California and  the  Gold  Rush. 215  I will call
this  the  Amended Legal Bibliography. This  interesting  volume  shows
Marvin  carrying  on  his  campaign  for  foreign  and  especially  German
Historical  School  sources.  Marvin  inscribed  several  encomia  for  the
German Historical  School derived from recently published lectures  on the
211.  J.  G. Marvin, Biographical  and Bibliographical Notes,  1845, Harvard Law School  MS  1069
(letter of permission  to quote from this MS on  file with the author).  Thanks to David Warrington  for
surfacing this remarkable item.
212.  MARVIN,  LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY,  supra note 201,  at vii.
213.  J.  G. MARVIN,  LEGAL  BIBLIOGRAPHY,  OR,  A  THESAURUS  OF  AMERICAN,  ENGLISH,  IRISH,
AND  SCOTCH LAW;  TOGETHER  WITH  SOME CONTINENTAL  TREATISES.  INTERSPERSED  WITH CRITICAL
OBSERVATIONS  UPON THEIR VARIOUS  EDITIONS AND  AUTHORITY. TO WHICH IS PREFIXED A COPIOUS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson,  1847  (letter of permission to quote  from
this MS  on file with  the author).  The Harvard Law Library's  HOLLIS entry  for this unique item is
Law  School  Rare  K 38  M37x  1847,  and it  notes:  "Copy  I ...  is  the author's  own  copy,  interleaved
and  extended to  two  volumes, with  his extensive  holographic  notes."  The  hand  is identical  to that
quoted in note 212 above, from J.G. Marvin's MS booklist of 1845 (letter of permission  to quote from
the manuscript portions of this document on file with the author).
214.  MARVIN,  LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 201,  at vii.
215.  Howard Jay  Graham, John G. Marvin and the Founding of American Legal Bibliography,
48 LAWLIBR. J. 194, 211 (1955).
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history of Roman  law, given  at the Middle  Temple by George  Long and
published for some  reason not in  London but  in Philadelphia
216-itself  a
new entry in the Amended Legal Bibliography.  I will return to the purpose
and contents  of Long's lectures  anon; here,  I want to  notice how Marvin
deployed them.
Long's Discourses declare  themselves  "indebted"  to Savigny  in  terms
that are  almost devotional.  Of the  four precursors  which Long identified
as constituting  his primary sources-Sir Matthew  Hale's Analysis of the
Civil Part of the Law, John  Austin's Outline of a Course of Lectures on
General  Jurisprudence, Savigny's  System  des  Heutigen  Rd'mischen
Rechts, and Thibaut's System  des Pandekten Rechts217 -Long  devoted  a
special tribute to Savigny:
[O]bligations  may be  so great,  and the character of him to whom
they  are due so exalted, that the receiver can only present with all
humility the tribute of his gratitude and  admiration,  and express  a
hope that he has made a worthy use of those lessons of wisdom, to
the understanding  of which he  has diligently  devoted whatever  of
218 ability he may possess . . ..
For his Amended Legal Bibliography,  Marvin added Long's Discourses
and selected not this passage but another to adorn his entries for Savigny:
'It  is nothing  extravagant  when  I say  that any praise which  could
be bestowed  on the writings of Savigny and  Thibout, by any man
the most competent to judge, would not be exaggerated. They  are
characterized  by  a  soundness  of  knowledge,  clearness  of
expression,  perspicuity  of  [argument]  and  subtlety  and  depth  of
thought,  that  seldom  have  been  equaled  by  any  writer  on  any
subject, and cannot be surpassed.'
2 19
And  he  quoted  from  another  treatise  the  following  recommendation
about  Long's  lectures  themselves:  "On  the  Civil  Law,  Mr  Long's  two
discourses  delivered  in  the  Middle  should  be  read.  In  these  discourses
Students will find whence the excellence  of the Roman Law arose, and an
interesting  historical  account  of  it."
220  Marvin  was  eager  to  guide  his
readers  to  an  English  language  source  for  Savigny  and  the  German
216.  GEORGE LONG,  Two  DISCOURSES  DELIVERED  IN THE  MIDDLE  TEMPLE HALL  BY  GEORGE
LONG WITH AN OUTLINE OF THE COURSE (Philadelphia, T. &.  J.W. Johnson,  1848).
217.  Id. at 62.
218.  Introduction  to LONG, TWO  DISCOURSES,  supra  note 216.
219.  MARVIN,  LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY,  supra note 201,  at interleaved page facing  631.
220.  Id. at interleaved page facing 474 (alteration in original).
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Historical School,  eager to endorse Savigny as a font of legal wisdom, but
careful  to  select  passages  that tone  down  Long's  introductory  rave.  He
adds praise for Thibout (whose books he never listed, perhaps because he
never  got  a  chance  to  see  any  of  them),  Savigny's  opponent  in  the
codification  debates. Compared  to Long, Marvin's attitude of reception  is
slightly cooler, more reserved.
Long  is of particular interest for the reception  of German  legal thought
in America because,  at almost exactly the same time that he published his
lectures  on Roman  law, Luther  S. Cushing  was  giving a parallel lecture
series  at  "the  Law  School  at  Cambridge"-Cambridge,  Massachusetts,
that is221-and  because  we  have direct  evidence  that Cushing  consulted
Long's Discourses while  he  was  preparing  his  lectures  for  publication.
The  premise  of the German Historical  School  that Roman  sources  were
not  to  be  imitated  slavishly  but adapted  to  the  needs  of contemporary
legal minds was important  for both Long and Cushing. Here is a passage
from  Long's  Discourses that  Cushing  wrote  onto  a  slip  of paper  and
inserted  into  his  MS  lectures,  whence  it  was  included  in  the  printed
version of his Harvard lectures:
The  merits  of the  Roman jurists  did  not  consist  in  making  a
systematic  arrangement  of the  whole  matter  of law,  though  they
have  done  much  towards  helping  us  make  it. Their merit  lay  in
their skilful application of principles  to the resolving of particular
cases in which they display a rectitude of purpose, a happy brevity
of expression, and a mastery of their matter, that have commended
the  admiration  of  all  judges  and  the  best  models  for  our
imitation.222
Cushing's  selective  admiration  of  Long's  Discourses can  help  us
identify  the  path chosen by  the Americans.  The  outtakes  are  significant.
Long had been appointed to a new position  in the Middle Temple, as  the
Reader  on Jurisprudence  and  the Civil Law,  after a Committee  on Legal
221.  LUTHER  S. CUSHING,  AN  INTRODUCTION  TO THE  STUDY  OF ROMAN  LAW (Boston,  Little,
Brown, 1854). Cushing indicates that he gave his lectures in 1848-49. Id. at v.
222.  LONG,  Two DISCOURSES,  supra note 216,  at 26 n.1.  The identical passage  can be found in
Luther Steams Cushing, Notes for Lectures on Criminal  Law, Roman  Law, and Real Property  (1848)
(unpublished  manuscript)  (on  file with  the  Harvard  Law  School  Special  Collections). Volume  2  of
this  manuscript is titled Roman Law. A torn  half-sheet of paper is inserted between pages  26 & 27  of
Volume 2 of the manuscript. On  one side  appears the  quotation  from Long in  a  hand that resembles
that of the  main text, but shakier,  surely that of an  older or ailing Cushing. On  the other side  and in
another hand appears  an account of loans, one of which is dated Oct  I to Oct  10  1853. Query whether
this  suggests  that  the quotation  from  Long  was  written  after  October  1853?  At  any rate,  Cushing
borrowed from his transatlantic  colleague sometime between  1848 and  1854.
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Education  in  the  Middle  Temple  selected  this  as  the "first  step  for  the
promotion  of Legal  Education[.]"
223  Long was responsible  for "General
Jurisprudence,"  that is,  for producing  a "'Philosophy of Positive  Law, as
being something which  comprehends  the principles  of all  systems of law.
By  virtue of its universality,  it is rightly called General;  and inasmuch  as
it is a systematic exposition of principles with their logical  consequences,
it is appropriately called a Philosophy."'224  The Committee added a focus
on Civil Law to "indicate what may be called Modem Roman Law, that is
to say, those portions of the civil law which being of a universal character
and applicable  to the relations of modem society, have formed the basis of
the jurisprudence  of many continental nations, and  entered so largely into
our own."'
225
Long's Discourses include  an  "Outline  of a  Course  of Lectures  on
General Jurisprudence and  the Roman  Law to be Delivered in the Middle
Temple,  1846-7." This is a taxonomy of all of law.  In English, the closest
exemplar  is surely  Austin's  Outline of a Course of Lectures on General
Jurisprudence, or the  Philosophy of Law,  which  he  published  as  an
addendum  to  his  Province of Jurisprudence  Determined; both  of them
seem  to  follow  Arnold  Heise's  outline  of  civil  law  published  in
Heidelberg, in German, in  1807.226 These outlines of all of law map it into
systematic  divisions.  They  culminate,  surely,  in  the  stunning  fold-out
tables  of  all  of  law  included  in  Austin's  Lectures  on  General
Jurisprudence, published  posthumously  by  his  wife  Sarah  Austin  in
1863.227  Appendix  6  reproduces  one of Austin's  stunning  tables.  They
give visual shape to the idea of law as system. True  to  his mandate,  Long
divided  his  lectures  into  a  General  Part  and  a  Special  Part:  "There  are
many general  notions which pervade  all Law  and every part of it. These
General Notions can be properly explained independently of the Particular
223.  LONG, Two DISCOURSES,  supra note 216, at 5.
224.  Id.
225.  Id. (quoting the "Report of the Committee of this Society on Legal Education").
226.  JoHN AUSTIN,  OUTLINE OF A COURSE OF  LECTURES ON  GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE,  OR THE
PHILOSOPHY OF  LAW, in AUSTIN,  PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (London,  John Murray,
1832),  aft.  391  (hereinafter  AUSTIN,  PROVINCE);  Arnold  HEISE,  GRUNDRISS  EINES  SYSTEMS  DES
GEMEINEN  CIVILRECHTS  ZUM  BEHUF  VON  PANDEKTEN-CORLESUNGEN  (Heidelberg,  Mohr  und
Zimmer,  1807).
227.  JOHN  AUSTIN,  LECTURES  ON  JURISPRUDENCE,  BEING  THE SEQUEL  TO  "THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE  DETERMINED"  TO  WHICH  ARE  ADDED  NOTES  AND  FRAGMENTS  Now  FIRST
PUBLISHED  FROM  THE ORIGINAL  MANUSCRIPTS  (London, John  Murray,  1863)  [hereinafter  AUSTIN,
LECTURES].  The  LECTURES occupy  two volumes,  labeled  Vol. 11 and Vol.  III, respectively,  on their
title pages.  Sarah Austin's republication  of Austin's 1832  The Province  ofJurisprudence  Determined
is Volume I in this series.  I will follow her numeration.
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things to which they apply, and when they are properly apprehended, they
render  the  study  of the  Special  Part  easier."
228  Austin  recommended
precisely  the  same  procedure:  "The  object  . . . is  to  distinguish  the
Universal from the Particular."
229
But here we  encounter  a distinct  difference between  Long  and Austin.
For Long, the General  Part of the Outline first defines  law and  then sets
forth its "objects,"  the Rights and Duties of Persons, divided into the Law
of Things  and the  Law  of Persons. 2 30  The  topics of the  Special  Part are
four:  "Property  of  Ownership;"  "Contracts  (Obligationes);"  "Marriage,
and the Relations which arise  from it;" and "On Testamentary  Succession,
and Succession ab Intestuto."
231  For Austin,
The  Law  of Persons  being  the  Law  of Status, and  the  Law  of
Things  being  the law minus the Law of Status, it is clear that the
distinction between  the  law of Persons  and  the  Law  of Things,
turns upon the notion of Status or Condition . . ..  And the bulk of
the  legal system, minus these status or conditions,  is distinguished
by the name of "the Law of Things" from that peculiar department
to which conditions are banished. 2 32
As  Kennedy  observed,  "The  [American]  Classics  created  . . . by
subtraction.  . ..  They  created  also  by abstraction,  by asserting  and then
trying to show that there had been  an essence  hidden at  the core  of the
pre-Classical  hodgepodge." 2 33  Heise,  Savigny, the  Pandektists,  and Long
and Austin following them, all sought a general law, abstracting in part by
subtracting  from it law  that was irretrievably  particular. As we  will  see,
the Americans  did the same, but they did not do so in the form of outlines
of all of law, in fold-out  tables,  or in top-down  establishment  of general
principles.  Nothing  of the  kind appears  in  Cushing's  contemporaneous
lectures  on  Roman  law  for  his  Harvard  students.  The  philosophical
approach  was not  for them.  Instead, as  we will  also  see, they built their
Classical order topic by topic, abstracting and subtracting  topic from topic
and  then  within  topics.  And  in  doing  so  they  hewed  more  closely  to
Savigny  and  to  Austin  than  Long did,  by deeming  Contract  the  perfect
228.  LONG, Two DISCOURSES, supra note 216, at 58.
229.  2 AUSTIN, LECTURES,  supra note 227, at 420.
230.  LONG, Two DISCOURSES, supra  note 216, at 56-57.
231.  Id. at 59-62.
232.  2  AUSTIN, LECTURES ON  JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 227, at 382-83.  For the more concise
version  to  which  Long  had  access,  in  the  Outline  included  in  PROVINCE  OF  JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED,  see PROVINCE, supra note 226, at xvii, ix, lxiv, and lxvii.
233.  KENNEDY,  RISE AND  FALL, supra note 6, at 207.
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candidate  for generality and  subtracting marriage  and  other statuses  from
it. The resemblance is far too strong to be coincidental.
In a recent  article,  Duncan Kennedy  gives a  close reading  of the  only
English-language  translation of Savigny's most explicit  reflection on this
dichotomy.234  This  text,  first  published  in  German  in  1840,235  was
translated  into English far too late to appear in any of Marvin's catalogues
or  to  influence  Bishop  directly,  but  it  almost  certainly  influenced  the
American  classicizers  through  the  ample  routes  for  German  Historical
School  influence  flowing  through  Edinburgh,  from  London,  and
increasingly  as  the  century  progressed,  directly  from  Germany.  In  it,
Savigny  divided  private  law  into  two  domains:  family  law  and
potentialities  law,  the  latter  further  subdivided  into  the  law  of property
and  of obligations,  or  contract.  (Though  patrimonial  law  is  the  more
conventional  translation  for the latter, I will follow  Kennedy  in  sticking
with the English translator's somewhat awkward  term.)
In  Savigny's  formulation,  the body  of law  that  opposed contract  was
family  law.  As  I will  show  in  Part  II  of this  Article,  this  term  was  to
become  deeply controversial  in the U.S.  context but not until the rise  of
legal  realism  in  the  twentieth  century.  In  the  latter  decades  of  the
nineteenth  century, American jurists just ignored the term.  The American
title for the field evolved under conditions  that seem entirely  indigenous.
In this they resembled legal  orders influenced  by French law: the Anglo-
Americans  liked and  stayed loyal  to their own terminology  (husband and
wife, parent and child,  then the law of marriage  and divorce,  and  finally
234.  Duncan  Kennedy,  Savigny's Family/Patrimony Distinction and Its Place in  the  Global
Genealogy of Classical Legal Thought,  56  AM.  J.  COMP.  L.  811  (2010)  [hereinafter  Kennedy,
Savigny's Distinction]; FRIEDRICH  CARL  VON  SAVIGNY,  SYSTEM  OF  THE  MODERN  ROMAN  LAW
(Hyperion Press  1979) (William  Holloway, trans.,  1867) (hereinafter  SAVIGNY,  SYSTEM  OF MODERN
ROMAN LAW)..On  Savigny's  influence  on  Austin,  see  Andreas  B.  Schwarz, John Austin and the
German Jurisprudence  offHis Time, 2 POLITICA  178,  179 (1934).  "Austin's was  first and foremost  a
systematic mind, systematic in a very wide sense of the word....  [H]e saw the task of legal science in
the  development  of a  'system  of law  considered  as  an  organic  whole.'  Austin's desire  for  system
found great satisfaction  in German jurisprudence, which at  that time  was grappling  particularly  with
the problems  of classification  and in which  the  method of deriving the  whole of law  from general
principles was in full development."  Id. at 190.  Michael Hoeflich thinks that Austin derived more than
that from his studies  in Roman  law: "In the  'main course'  of the Lectures, Austin utilized Roman and
civil law in several ways. First, Roman and civil law provided both an inspiration for and a source of
Austin's  scheme  of abstraction  and  systematization.  Second,  Roman  and  civil  law  provided  the
necessary  logical and  precise  set of legal  terminology  for exposition and  explanation of the  system
developed by  Austin. Third,  in those  areas where  Austin's  efforts transcended  systematization  and
exposition  and concerned substance,  Roman  and civil  law also provided both vocabulary and  rules."
Hoeflich, John Austin, supra note 53, at 47.
235.  FRIEDRICH CARL  VON  SAVIGNY,  SYSTEM  DES  HUTIGEN  ROMISCHEN  REcHTs (Berlin, Viet
und Comp.,  1840) [hereinafter  SAVIGNY,  SYSTEM DES HUTIGEN ROMISCHEN RECHTS].
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domestic  relations),  and  French-influenced  legal  orders  did  the  same
(personal  status  law).  But  it's  important  not  to  let the  tail  wag  the  dog
here:  nomenclature  had  far less  impact  than  structure,  and the  structure
that emerged, again and again, all over the world, through the influence  of
German  legal thought  in  the  first  globalization,  was the  construction  of
legal orders around a market/family distinction.
A key point that we can gain from examining  Savigny  is that, when  we
attribute family law to premodern legal orders, we are committing a small
sin of anachronism. Family law under its various labels-family  law as a
category-was  a nineteenth  century  invention.  And  it  was  not  an  only
child or an orphan:  it came into being as part of a system, part of the very
idea that law is and should be a system. Let us begin  a relinquishment  of
the  idea  that  family  law  had  any  existence  before  this  moment  of  its
invention by setting aside the common misunderstanding  that Family Law
is  a  Roman  law  category  dating  back  to  Justinian  or other Roman  law
sources.  As  Wolfram  Miller-Freienfels  informs  us,  "[e]ven  during  the
long reign of Roman law  in antiquity,  there  was never  a  specific  family
law  as  a  systematic  unit unto  itself." 236  It was  not  a  legal  category  in
236.  Wolfram  Mtiller-Freienfels,  The  Emergence of  Droit  de  Famille  and Familienrecht  in
Continental  Europe and the Introduction of Family Law in England, 28 J. FAM.  HIST.  31,  32 (2003)
(hereinafter MUller-Freienfels,  Emergence of  Droit  de Famille). Do not be deceived by  modem books
like  BRUCE W. FRIER & THOMAS A.J. McGINN,  A CASEBOOK  ON ROMAN  FAMILY  LAW (2004),  into
supposing  that family law comes to us from Roman  law.  As the editors  indicate in their introduction,
the Roman  term "familia" really  meant household,  id. at 3, and clearly this  is a  legal, not a social
household.  Their Case 4, defining the Roman  law term  familia, comes from Ulpianus's Ad Edictum,
dated  approximately  200  A.D.  In  the  part  of Ulpinius'  definition  that they  include  and  translate,
familia is,  "[b]y  a  particular  rule,  ...  a  number  of persons  who,  either  by  nature  or by  law,  are
subjected to the power (potestas) of one person: for example, a paterfamilias  . . . ."; it is also, "[b]y a
common  rule, . . . all agnates.  . . . [even  if]  they each  have their own familiae . . . , since they  stem
from the  same home and lineage";  in addition, "[w]e  also customarily describe slaves asfamiliae."  Id.
at  18-19.  The  family  of Roman  law  is thus defined  by the  power of its head over  its members;  the
members  include only one marital pair, that of the head, all agnates even if they also legally belong to
other  familiae,  and the slaves under power of the head-and all of this without any reference  to where
anyone  lives.
Frier and  Thomas  make an  indicative  omission from  Ulpinius.  They  delete  his first definition  of
familia  and  thus project the modem  concept of family law back onto their Roman source. Here  is the
omitted passage:  "nam  et  in  res et in personas  deducitur.  in res,  ut puta  in  lege duodecim tabularum
his verbis 'adgnatus  proximus  familiam habeto'.  ad  personas autem refertur familiae  significatio  ita,
cum  de  patrono  et  liberto  loquitur  lex:  'ex  ea  familia',  inquit,  "in  eam  familiam":  et  hic  de
singularibus personis legem loqui constat."  DIG.  50.16.195.1-4  (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 46). This passage
can be translated  to say that  the term  familia "relates  both to things and to  persons: to things, as,  for
instance,  in the  Law of the Twelve  Tables in the  words  'let  the  nearest  agnate have  the  household.'
The  designation  of  household,  however,  refers  to  persons  when  the  law  speaks  of  patron  and
freedman:  'from  that household'  or  'to that household'; and  here it is agreed that the law is talking of
individual  persons." Id. (Alan  Watson trans.). Frier and Thomas omitted this  first definition,  I would
suggest,  because they simply  could not imagine  inheritance and  master/servant as "family  law."  As
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Justinian's Institutes, where the great division was between personae, res,
and  actiones.
23  Nor  did  the  early  rationalist  synthesizer  Samuel
Pufendorf acknowledge  it  as  a  legal topic.238  The makers  of the  French
Code Napoleon were  explicitly hostile to the idea of family  law, probably
pursuing  an  anti-corporatist  idea:  they  incorporated  instead  the  law  of
marriage  in  the  first  book  of the  Code,  Des Personnes. According  to
Mtiller-Freienfels,  Family  Law  as  a distinct  legal  domain  made  its  first
appearance  in  Gustav  Hugo's  Institutionen des  heutigen  Romischen
Rechts, published in  1789.239 Hugo, the founder of the German Historical
School,  divided  all  of private  law  into five  topics:  real rights,  personal
obligations,  family  laws,  inheritance  laws,  and  legal  procedure.  He
retracted  this  innovation  in  the  second  edition  of  his  Institutionen,
reverting  to  the  more  widely  known  and  familiar  tripartite  division  of
Justinian's Institutes.
2 40  But the idea had legs: Muiller-Freienfels  next sees
it in the Prussian General Laws  of the Land (the Preussische  Allgemeine
Landrecht) of 1794, widely acknowledged as the first legal code produced
by natural law rationalizers.2 41 There, the second part, devoted  to the  law
of the community (as opposed to the law of the individual person, in part
one),  begins  with  sections  titled  "Of Marriage,"  "Of the  Rights  and
Obligations of Parents  and  Children,"  "Of the Rights  and Obligations  of
the  Remaining  Members  of  the  Family,"  and  "Of Common  Family
Rights."  Here  is  how  Mfiller-Freienfels  tells  the  rest  of the  German
Historical  School story:
Hugo's  ...  five-part division with the separate part "Family Law"
became  widely  known  due  to  the  fact  that  Hugo's  younger
we will see later in this Genealogy,  it is highly characteristic  of modem conceptions of family law to
exclude  these  topics:  that  is  what  the  classicizers  did  in  creating  the  domain.,  Note  that  Watson
translates familia as "household":  perhaps the  better English term for this body of Roman  Law rules
would be "household  law"!
237.  JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES  (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod, trans.,  1987).
238.  SAMUEL  FREIHERR  VON  PUFENDORF,  DE JuRE NATURAE  ET  GENTIUM  LIBRI OCTo (Londini
Scanorum,  1672).  The first  English translation of this important treatise  is PUFENDORF,  OF  THE LAW
OF  NATURE  AND  NATIONS:  EIGHT  BOOKS (Basil  Kennett, et  al.,  trans., Oxford,  L.  Lichfield,  1710).
Book  VI  of the  English  translation  includes  only  three chapters:  "Of Matrimony,"  "Of Paternal
Power,"  and  "Of Despotical  Power,  or the  Authority of the  Master over  the Servant."  Pufendorfs
taxonomy may well have influenced Blackstone's;  it shows no trace of Family Law.
239.  Muiller-Freienfels,  supra note  236,  at 37  (referring  to GUSTAV  HUGO,  INSTITUTIONEN  DES
HEUTIGEN  ROMISHEN RECHTS (1789)).
240.  GUSTAV  HUGO,  LEHRBUCH  DER GESCHICHTE DES  ROMISCHEN RECHTS  (Berlin, A.  Mylius,
1799).
241.  Millier-Freienfels,  Emergence of Droit de  Famille, supra note  236,  at 33-34  (referring  to
ALLGEMEINES  LANDRECHT  FOR DIE PREUSSISCHEN  STAATEN  (Berlin, Georg Jacob Decker und Sohn,
1794)).
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colleague  in Gottingen, (Georg) Arnold Heise, adopted this system
for his Outline of  a System of the General Civil Law for Pandectist
Lectures, which  was  tremendously  successful.  . . . His  Outline
became hugely popular as an aid to students.  Savigny, who knew
Heise from his student days, treasured the outline a great  deal  and
even used this  scheme  himself as  a basis  for his chief work,  The
System  of Today's Roman Law  (1st  volume  1840).  . . . [T]his
scheme  gained  a  great  reputation  and exerted  a  strong  influence
since  Savigny's  "system"  dominated  from  then  on  as  no  other
manual  in  "codification-free"  German  private  law  in  the
nineteenth century would....
Throughout his entire life, Savigny  was to remain true to his basic
view that  family law  ought to  exist as an  independent part of the
law....
This division set the basis for the Pandektensystem, which was to
characterize  German  law in the second half of the eighteenth  [sic;
he must mean nineteenth]  century.2 42
Miller-Freienfels  thus  posits  that  Savigny  was  the  great propounder  of
family law, not simply as the right way to classify the field but as the right
way to situate it in a complete legal order:
In his [The System of  Modern Roman Law, Savigny]  . . . upgraded
the  scheme,  and  with  it, the  independent  "Family  Law"  from  a
simple  "external  systematization"  to  a  truly  "intrinsic
systematization."  In  doing  so,  Savigny  idealistically  understood
the  "inner  order  of the  Law"  as  an  order  of existing  leading
principles.  He  also  believed  . . . that  legal  materials  should  be
compiled  in  such  a way  that  each  legal  subject would  "have  its
own  place,  from  which  the  answer  to  every  legal  question,  the
solution to every judicial problem, could be derived."243
What  did  family  law  mean  to  Savigny  when  he  crafted  it  into  his
System ofModern Roman Law in 1840? According  to  Kennedy,
Savigny's  family  law  and  contract  law  address  diametrically  different
aspects of human nature:
Man  is  an  "incomplete  being,"  because  men need  women  to  be
complete  and  vice  versa,  and  because  men  and  women  need
children,  and  children  need paternal  care,  in  order  to  overcome
242.  Id. at  37-38  (referring  to  HEISE,  supra note  226,  and  SAVIGNY,  SYSTEM  DES  HUTIGEN
ROMISCHEN RECHTS, supra note 235).
243.  Id.  at 38. It is not clear whence Milller-Freienfels  derives his quotations.
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mortality  and  live  forward  in  time..  . . Family  law  governs  the
relations of husband and wife  and parent and  child (plus guardian
and  ward).  By  contrast,  potentialities  law  governs  the  relations
between  independent  individuals  exercising  their  wills  vis-A-vis
one  another:  property  deals with an individual  will controlling  an
object (to the  exclusion of other wills),  obligations  with one  will
controlling another.2"
This  division  of private  law into  one  domain  dedicated  to the human
need  to find completion  through the  marital  and parental/child  relations,
and  a  second domain dedicated to humans  as  sole  individuals  free in the
exercise  of  their  wills,  elaborates  Hugo's  community/individual
distinction  and  should  be  extremely  familiar  by  now:  it  came  into
American  legal thought through the  conjoint efforts of Story and  Bishop
and  was,  by  1852,  encapsulated  in  the  notorious  status/contract
distinction. As we have seen, Story was innocent of any idea that contract
protected  an arbitrary,  self-serving  individual will;  we  will have  to  wait
until  Bishop's Non-Contract law  was published in  1889  for that  idea to
emerge  as  an explicit  tenet in our story;  and Story  and Bishop,  following
Lord Robertson,  saw the law of marriage not as private but as public  law.
But the basic distinction is otherwise the same.
In Savigny's thought, family law and potentialities  law have not merely
opposite  but  chiasmatically  opposite  relations  to  the  general  and  the
particular. As Kennedy puts it:
Savigny  is  asserting  that the  abstract  conceptual  definition of the
nature of legal relations  [in potentialities  law, that is, property and
obligations],  as  establishing  co-existing  provinces  of  absolute
mastery  for  the  individual  will,  provides  a  single,  necessary
content  for  the  actual  rules  of property  and obligations.  (In  the
actual  unfolding  of  potentialities  law  he  consistently
acknowledges,  as  we  will  see,  a  large  space  for  the  merely
positive.)
By contrast, with  regard to the rules of family  law it appears that
"doubt"  can "arise in  what their  real legal  contents  consist."  The
reason  for this seems to  be that family law is not merely natural,
but  also cultural,  because  it is intrinsically  "moral,"  and morality
is an aspect of the Volksgeist, i.e.,  of the spirit of each particular
people.  I have already quoted Savigny mentioning that in  spite of
its naturalness  and necessity, "the  special  shape,  in which [family
244.  Kennedy, Savigny's Distinction,  supra  note 234, at 814 (citations omitted).
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relations]  are recognized is very manifold according  to the positive
law of different peoples."  True to the anti-natural-law  program of
the  historical  school,  Savigny  recognizes  that  different  peoples
with different  spirits produce  different norms  fully deserving  the
name of law[.]245
Elsewhere, Kerry Rittich and I have called this the Savignian pattern.246
Schematized, it looks more or less like this:
Family Law  Contract Law
Family  Law  as  the  Domain  of  Contract  Law  as  the  Domain  of
Status  Will
Family  Law  as  Universal  in  the  Contract  Law  as  Particular  in  the
Sense  that  it  is  Fundamental  Sense  that  Every  Contract  is
Everywhere  Unique
Family  Law  as  Particular  in  the  Contract  Law  as  Universal  in  the
Sense  that  Each  Nation's  Family  Sense  that  it  is  the  Same
Law  Expresses  the  Spirit  of  the  Everywhere
People
For Savigny,  potentialities  law  had to be  transnationally  smooth (with
the proviso  that positive  law  may  vary),  whereas  actual  lived  contracts
were  infinitely particular.  At the  same time, though  the family  itself was
natural  and universal, family  law must differ from one nation to the next.
We  have  already  encountered  this  concept,  in  Story's  and  Bishop's
master-rule  for  conflict  of  laws:  international  contracts  cases  would
choose their law by a single rule ensuring the uninterrupted  transnational
enforceability  of the contract consistent with the will of the parties at the
time it was made  (lex  loci contractus); whereas  marriage,  that  universal
institution  of ius gentium, would be  enforced  under the  highly  variable
law  of the  parties'  residence.  And we  know  that  Story  sought  civilian
influence  particularly  in  order  to bring American  commercial  law  up to
date and out of international isolation.
The  remainder  of this article  tells  how the  idea  of system  moved this
pattem up  from  the level of choice  of law rules  to structural  dignity. As
245.  Id. at 816.
246.  Halley & Rittich, supra note 2, at 757.
[Vol. 23:1 70
70
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 23 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol23/iss1/1Halley
American jurists understood  the  classicizing  impulse  and  incorporated  it
into  their  intellectual  practice,  they  rendered  contract  general  and
subtracted  from  it bodies  of law  that  could  not be  left  to the  caprice  of
individual  will.  Contract  governed  the  faceless  individual  of liberalism;
status housed the particularized,  increasingly  deviant  persons who  could
not  be  entrusted  with  will-saturated  freedom.24 7  Marriage  joined  other
statuses. such asinfancy and insanity, as the opposite of contract.
VIII. STATUS  LAGS: MAINE
In Sir  Henry  Sumner Maine's  version  of our story,  marriage  was  not
merely exceptional, and it was no longer fundamental:  it was retardataire,
a throwback.  This  is the  implication  of his  famous  formulation  of legal
modernity as a progress from status to contract:
The  movement  of the  progressive  societies  has  been  uniform  in
one respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by the
gradual  dissolution  of  family  dependency  and  the  growth  of
individual  obligation  in  its  place.  The  Individual  is  steadily
substituted for the Family,  as the unit of which civil  society takes
account..  . .Nor is it difficult to  see what is the tie between  man
and man which replaces  by degrees  those forms  of reciprocity  in
rights  and  duties  which  have  their  origin  in  the  Family.  It  is
Contract. 248
Maine  clearly  thought  that  progress  affected  even  the  Family,
introducing elements of individualism and contract to relations which had
been  intensely  reciprocal  and  fixed-subtracting  people  and  activities
from the Family and transporting them to Contract:
In Western Europe the progress achieved in this direction has been
considerable. Thus the status of the Slave has disappeared-it has
been superseded  by the  contractual  relation of the  servant  to  his
master. The  status of the Female under Tutelage, if the tutelage be
understood  of persons other than her husband,  has  also ceased to
exist; from her coming of age to her marriage  all the relations  she
may  form  are  relations  of contract.  So  too the  status  of the  Son
under  Power  has  no  true  place  in  law  of  modern  European
247.  As we  have also  already seen,  Bishop has started the process  of winnowing  the  individual
activated by will from the abnormal  persons.
248.  HENRY  SUMNER  MAINE,  ANCIENT  LAW:  ITS  CONNECTION  WITH THE  EARLY  HISTORY  OF
SOCtETY,  AND  ITS  RELATION  TO  MODERN  IDEAS  168-69  (Frederick  Pollock  ed.,  London,  John
Murray,  1912)  (1861).
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societies.  If any  civil obligation binds together the Parent and the
child  of full  age,  it  is  one  to  which  only  contract  gives  its  legal
validity.249
Thus  Maine  explains the  residual  relations-the personal  statuses  that
could  not  be  restructured  as  contract-as  a  coherent  class  of persons
lacking the capacity to contract:
The apparent exceptions  are of that stamp which illustrate the rule.
The  child  before  years  of  discretion,  the  orphan  under
guardianship,  the  adjudged  lunatic,  have  all  their  capacities  and
incapacities  regulated by the Law of Persons.  But why?  . . . [T]he
classes of persons just  mentioned  are  subject to  extrinsic  control
on  the  single  ground  that  they  do  not  possess  the  faculty  of
forming  a judgment  on their  own  interests;  in  other  words,  that
they  are  wanting  in  the  first  essential  of  an  engagement  by
Contract. 250
As  we  have  seen,  Parsons  didn't  like  putting  wives  on  the  list  of
disabled persons, but he was willing to do it.25 1 Maine, by contrast,  elides
wives altogether. Why?  He has just told us that adult women, if they were
not  married,  had been emancipated  from the  Family  and  could deal  for
themselves in Contract. Moreover,  he's not just describing  the rules; he's
justifying  them.  It made  sense  to  exclude  infants,  orphans,  and  lunatics
from contract  because  they lacked not only the  legal but also  the mental
capacity to form their own agreements. To include married women in this
list would have made them not merely the legal but the cognitive equals of
children,  orphans,  and  lunatics.  The  law  making  the  wife  a  disabled
person is being subjected here to a highly motivated forgetting.
The final peroration gives us a new definition of status:
The word Status may be usefully employed to construct a formula
expressing the law of progress thus indicated, which, whatever be
its  value,  seems  to  be  sufficiently  ascertained.  All  the  forms  of
Status  taken  notice  of in  the  Law  of persons  were  derived  from,
and to some  extent are still coloured by, the powers and privileges
anciently  residing  in  the  Family.  If  we  then  employ  Status,
agreeably  with  the  usage  of the  best  writers,  to  signify  these
personal  conditions  only,  and  avoid  applying  the  term  to  such
conditions as  are the immediate  or remote result of agreement,  we
249.  Id. at 169-70.
250.  Id. at 170.
251.  See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 23:1 72
72
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 23 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol23/iss1/1Halley
may  say  that  the  movement  of  the  progressive  societies  has
hitherto beenfrom Status to Contract. 2 52
In Maine's retrospective view, status reigned in an era of thoroughgoing
legal  and  cultural  ascription.  At  that  time,  all  legal  relations  were
mediated in some way through the patriarchal  Family, quintessentially  an
ascriptive  social  form.  Status  survives  as  a  residual  legal  category
reserved  from the wreck of a bygone  legal order because  of the  sad fact
that  not  all  individuals  can  make  themselves  independent  and  walk
through the door that separates the family from the market and status from
contract.  The  patriarchal  Family  has  disappeared,  but  that  "Family,  as
held together by the  Patria Potestas,  is the nidus out of which the  entire
Law of Persons has germinated."2 53  Status remains, in the law of persons:
now as  then  it is ascriptive;  now  as then  it is amenable  to complete state
control-but  now it is  marginal,  the  legal  and cultural  domain for those
who cannot progress.
Once again, this closing paragraph does nothing to clear up the place of
then-contemporary  marriage  at  the  Status/Contract  threshold.  It  is  the
"immediate  or remote  result of agreement"-everyone  was  still insisting
that marriage  was a civil contract and that the agreement  of husband  and
wife to enter the relation was essential to its formation-but it also houses
the femme couverte and the infant, the legal equivalents  of lunatics. Maine
relinquished the executed marriage to status, but he did so silently.
Understandably perhaps, these passages have been read to state Maine's
own  aspiration  for status-to-contract  progress  for  wives.  Clearly  Maine
celebrated  the  emancipation  of married  women  from  tutelage  and  their
progress  to  contractual  capacity;  by  implication we  can imagine  that  he
would have  cheered the passage  of the Married  Women's  Property Acts
with their partial emancipation of wives from their traditional contractual
disabilities.  But there was  a deeper problem  evaded  by Maine's  oblivion
about marriage as he worked his way to the climax of this chapter. No one
was  suggesting  that  marriage itself-the portfolio  of  rules  governing
entry into, duties during, and exit from marriage-be exempted from state
monopoly control and remitted to individuals and their agreements.
Sir Frederick Pollock noted this problem in his  1912 edition of Ancient
Law.  Defending  Maine  from  the  implication  that  he  thought  marriage
could undergo  such progress,  he wrote:  "Assimilation  of marriage,  as  a
252.  MAINE,  supra note 248, at 170.
253.  Id. at 152.
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personal  relation,  to  partnership  is  not  within  the  scope  of  practical
jurisprudence  . . .. Status may yield ground  to  Contract, but cannot  itself
be reduced  to Contract."
254  He attempted to save Maine's  formulation by
attributing  to  it  a proviso  excepting  marriage  from  "the  head  of Status"
(then there would be no claim that it had been merged  into contract):  "if
the  term  is  thus  restricted,  the  gravest  apparent  objection  to  Maine's
dictum is removed."
255  (One marvels at the  labor Pollock was  willing  to
undertake  to  save  the  classificatory  scheme  by  seemingly  heroic  but
actually merely lexical revision.)
But  Maine  never  said  that  marriage itself was  shifting  to  contract:
rather,  he  ignored  marriage  altogether,  arguing  instead  that  the
replacement of the patriarchal family  as the basic unit of social  life and of
economic production by contract was definitive of modernity.  For Maine,
marriage  didn't  even  warrant  a  mention;  it  could  remain  a  residual
institution producing individuals fit for modernity outside its bounds.
IX. THE NEWLY "DOMESTIC"  RELATIONS:  SCHOULER
In  1870,  something  new  arrived  into  the  Bishop-dominated  legal
landscape I have drawn: A Treatise on the Law of the Domestic Relations
Embracing Husband and Wife, Parent and Child, Guardian and Ward,
Infancy, and Master and Servant, by James  Schouler. 256  As  far as I can
tell,  this  is the  first  domestic relations treatise  published  in  the  U.S.  It
marks a big  shift  in  the place  of marriage  in the  legal order, pushing  it
deeper into the exceptional  recess  which it will occupy  in classical  legal
thought. It will be worth our while to examine Schouler's  intervention  in
some detail.
Schouler  admitted  that  he  was  substituting  "domestic  relations"  for
Blackstone's  "oeconomical  relations."257  Why  ditch  "oeconomical"?  By
254.  MAINE, supra note 248, at  184.
255.  Id. What really puzzled  Pollock,  interestingly,  was whether the term "status"  was  now, as
some had  apparently claimed, coterminous with  social legislation, particularly public regulation of the
market.  He  asked:  are  modem  company  law  (recognizing  the  corporate  "person"),  tax  law,  laws
governing worker's accidents, and the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 (exempting workers and employers
from  some aspects  of contract law)-are these all new contributions to the law of persons, new forms
of status? Id. at 184-85.  He presages here the  next solution  to the  anomalous place of marriage  in a
legal  order  dominated  by the  will  theory:  de-exceptionalize  marriage  by  making  it just  one,  or the
paradigm,  instance of the state's obligation to adjust social interests-of "the  social."
256.  JAMES  SCHOULER,  A TREATISE  ON  THE  LAW OF  THE  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  EMBRACING
HUSBAND  AND  WIFE,  PARENT  AND  CHILD,  GUARDIAN  AND  WARD,  INFANCY,  AND  MASTER  AND
SERVANT  (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.,  1870).
257.  Id. at 4.
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the  time  Schouler  wrote,  "economic"  had completely  ceased  to refer  to
the  household  and  was  primarily  a  term  for  monetary,  financial,  and
commercial relations,  with a  smattering of meanings  tying it to thrift and
good  management  of  those  relations.
2 58   That  is  to  say,  the  word
"economic"  had been completely  captured  for the market  For  Reeve,  in
1812, deleting it made  sense, because it avoided the ambiguity latent in a
word that referred both to the well-managed household and to its not-yet-
opposite,  the market. But by  1870  it would have made  no sense  at all to
carry forward Blackstone's term. It had to go.
The  word  "domestic,"  by  contrast,  had  carried  the  meaning  "[o]f  or
belonging  to the home, house, or household;  pertaining  to one's place  of
residence or family affairs[,]"  since Shakespeare's  time, and still did (and
does).259  It  seems  a  pretty  anodyne choice,  but  some  close  reading  may
reveal more content than is immediately visible.
Schouler  not only  claimed  that  the  term  "domestic  relations"  is  "the
modem  legal  usage";  he  claimed  to  derive  it  from  none  other  than
Blackstone  and  Reeve!  In fact, Reeve never used this  term in his title. It
does  appear  in the Preface  to  Reeve's  second  edition,2 60  and this must
have  been because,  as  we  have  seen,
261  "domestic  relations"  had come
into common use as the everyday shorthand for Reeve's treatise. The term
did have  respectable  vintage  through the lawyers,  not the treatise-writers.
Among  them,  it was  on the rise in  the middle  decades  of the nineteenth
century  as  the "go  to"  heading. 262 And  by  mid-century,  books  began  to
258.  In  addition to the senses  quoted supra notes  12  & 15-16,  see  OED,  Economic, supra note
12,  at  B.3.a (meaning  "[e]sp.  of a person:  characterized  by thrift (sometimes  parsimony);  careful  in
the  management  of  financial  resources,"  first  example  dated  1755);  id.  at  B.3.b  (meaning
"[c]haracterized  by  or  tending  to  economy  in  the  use  of resources;  efficient,  not  wasteful,"  first
example dated  1794); id. at B.4.c (meaning  "[rlelating to the generation of income; maintained for the
sake of profit,"  first example dated 1854).
259.  Domestic  Definition  A.2.a,  OXFORD  ENGLISH  DICTIONARY  ONLINE,.
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/56663?redirectedFrom=domestic#  (last  visited  December  20,  2010)
[hereinafter OED, Domestic].
260.  TAPPING  REEVE,  THE LAW  OF  BARON  AND  FEMME,  OF  PARENT  AND  CHILD, OF GUARDIAN
AND  WARD,  OF  MASTER  AND  SERVANT,  AND  OF THE  POWERS  OF COURTS  OF CHANCERY,  WITH AN
ESSAY ON THE TERMS,  HEIR,  HEIRS, AND  HEIRS  OF THE BODY, at iii (Lucius  E. Crittenden ed., 2d ed.,
Burlington, Chauncey Goodrich,  1846).
261.  See supra note 20.
262.  A  Westlaw  search for "domestic  relations"  in  all  U.S.  cases  of the  19t'  century  reveals the
following  general  trends. First,  the term  was simply  not in  use  between  1800 and  1810.  The search
revealed no cases  in that interval.  Between  1810 and  1840,  several cases  referred to Reeve's treatise
as Domestic Relations, and several used the  term to describe his topics;  in  each case the numbers are
low, fewer than  10. Between  1840  and  1850, the rate of both of these uses tripled - the numbers are
still  low,  but  both  ideas  (that  Reeve's  treatise  is  about  domestic  relations,  and  that  "domestic
relations"  is  the  right  term  for  husband/wife,  parent/child,  master/servant  and  guardian/ward)  are
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appear  giving  "domestic  relations"  a  distinctly  social-descriptive
meaning:  they  were  the relations  that  actually,  physically  resided  in  the
home.263
Nevertheless,  no  book  in  the  Harvard  Law  Library  uses  the  title
Domestic Relations to describe anything close to our topic until a Scottish
treatise  which  Schouler  explicitly  relied  on:  Lord  Patrick  Fraser's  A
Treatise of the  Law  of Scotland, as Applicable  to  the  Personal and
Domestic Relations, Comprising Husband and Wife,  Parent and Child,
Guardian and Ward Master and Servant and  Master and  Apprentice. This
treatise had been published  in  1846;  Bishop had relied  on it.
21  Schouler
noted that Fraser  was expounding  civil  law,  and  that  it  would  make  no
sense  for  a  common  lawyer  to  follow  him  in  including  master  and
apprentice  as a separate topic.
265  For this reason also Schouler concluded
that it made no sense for him to speak of the "personal  relations."266  But
Schouler's title page otherwise tracks Fraser's with typographical fidelity.
Where  then  did Schouler  get his new title? I think it's clear that Fraser
was his textual model, but that the term had been established  in common
usage. It replaced the now-unsuitable term "oeconomical"  in Blackstone's
"private oeconomical  relations";  but its  colloquial connotation  resonated
with the new separate  sphere of home life. And why Domestic Relations
instead?  From  the  1820s  forward  it  was  in  common  use  to  describe
Reeve's  topic,  by  the bench  and  the  bar,  and  that was probably  reason
enough.
What  were  the  contents  of  The  Domestic  Relations?  Schouler
acknowledged that "marriage  and divorce constitute an important topic by
becoming  more commonplace. An  explosion in both usages occurs in the 1850s and continues in the
1860s.  This is  pretty  good  evidence  that  the  practicing  bar  and  bench  adopted  the  term  domestic
relations well before Schouler  implanted it in the treatise landscape.
263.  See, e.g.,  THE  FAMILY  AND  SLAVERY,  SHOWING  THE  INFLUENCE  OF  SLAVERY  ON  THE
DOMESTIC  RELATIONS,  BY A NATIVE  OF THE  SOUTHWEST (Boston,  American  Tract  Soc.  185?)  (date
does not appear on the original  text and is ascribed by the  Harvard Hollis  Library Catalog);  THOMAS
T. HENRY BAYLIS,  THE  RIGHTS,  DUTIES,  AND  RELATIONS  OF DOMESTIC SERVANTS,  THEIR MASTERS
AND  MISTRESSES:  WITH  A SHORT ACCOUNT  OF  SERVANTS'  INSTITUTIONS  AND  THEIR  ADVANTAGES
(London,  Sampson.  Low,  & Son  & Co.,  1857);  JOHN  THOMSON,  THE  DOMESTIC  CIRCLE,  OR  THE
RELATIONS,  RESPONSIBILITIES,  AND  DUTIES  OF  HOME  LIFE  (Edinburgh:  Johnstone,  Hunter  &, and
Co., [1867]).
264.  FRASER,  DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed.), supra note 103.  Schouler explicitly acknowledged
that Fraser's Domestic Relations was his immediate  model.  SCHOULER, supra note  256, at 4-5.  Story
had  died the  year before  Fraser's book was  published;  as  we have  seen,  Bishop cited  it, along with
Fergusson's Reports, as his source  for Lord Robertson's  canonical  statement. Thus Schouler was  the
first American  to note Fraser as the authority for a new name for the field.
265.  SCHOULER, supra note 256, at 4.
266.  Id.  at 4-5.
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themselves;  and  we  find  treatises  which  profess  to  deal  with  these
alone." 2 67  This oblique  and skeptical  reference to  Bishop was as close  as
Schouler  came  to  acknowledging  the  treatise  which  had  redefined  and
come to  dominate  the field.  But in  his view,  Bishop's title and  his topic
made  the  wrong  generalizations.  Under  Bishop's  influence,  Schouler
complained,  "the  term  husband  and  wife  is  acquiring  at  law  a  more
limited  and  technical  sense  than  formerly."268  Schouler  objected to  this
trend,  especially  in  the  face  of dramatic  legislative  changes  in  the  law
governing married women's property rights:
The many  and rapid changes  to  which the  entire law of husband
and wife  has  latterly  subjected;  the  growth  of divorce  legislation
on the one hand, and of property legislation for married women on
the  other,  fully  justifies  a  subdivision  so  important.  We  shall
subordinate, then,  the topic of marriage  and divorce  to that of the
marriage  status, following  in this respect the modern legal  usage;
at the same time noting that if some  special term  could be coined
to distinguish the subdivision husband  and wife  from that  general
division which bears the  same name, our analysis would be more
exact.  269
This  is  a  little compressed, but  here  is  what I think  it means.  "Marriage
and divorce"  is the  name for the rules about  how parties get into and  out
of marriage  (and  all the  interstate  and  federal problems  of marriage  and
divorce  recognition  that these  legal  processes  involved).  That cannot  be
the lead topic. The  "marriage  status" is  the general  topic,  and  Schouler
used  the  time-honored  term  "husband  and wife"  to designate  it. But he
was  little sorry about that, because  the general topic "husband and  wife"
includes both the rules of entry and exit ("marriage and divorce") and the
rules  governing  the  legal  relations  of  husband  wife  during  marriage
("husband and  wife"),  thus  setting up a  lexical repetition  that makes  his
scheme  less than perfectly  exact. But it was worth making the taxonomic
change,  because  recent  legislative  changes  both  to  divorce  and  to  the
property rights of the wife warrant ample, and separate, space for the rules
governing  the  relations  of husband  and  wife  in  the  ongoing  marriage
within the structure.
This  is  a  significant  innovation.  Bishop  thought  he  had  covered  the
beach  when  he  added  to  his  Law of Marriage and Divorce a separate
267.  Id. at 5-6.
268.  Id. at 5.
269.  Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
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treatise on Commentaries on the Law of Married  Women.
270  But Schouler
notes,  correctly,  that  this  framing  of  the  marital  domain  omitted  the
specific,  reciprocal rights and duties of husband and wife to each other-
rights  and  duties  which  were,  thanks  to  Bishop  himself, not contract.
Schouler's  scheme  would  become  the  template  for  a  new  legal  field,
travelling  not  under  the  retro  term  he  invoked  in  his  Introduction-
husband  and wife-but the old/new one he supplies in his title: Domestic
Relations.
Schouler  proceeded  to  criticize  his  own  classification  for  not hewing
faithfully to the core meaning  of the law of the domestic relations, which
was-and  here we  encounter  something  entirely  new-"the law of the
family."2 71 I will return  in a moment to the  idea that the social  subject  is
no  longer the  household  but the  family  and the  extremely  slow  Anglo-
American uptake of the term "family  law."  First, let's focus on Schouler's
unhappiness with Reeve's  legal relations as a categorical  housing for this
social form and its law.272  They will help us to see what Schouler thought
the "law  of the family" really was.
Schouler's first objection to his own title is that the law of guardian and
ward  extends  well  beyond  "the  private  or  domestic  relations."
273  He
declined  "to  trace with distinctness that shadowy  line which separates  the
temporary  parent from the  town officer"  and  wryly observed that, in his
chapter  on  guardian  and  ward,  "one  frequently  finds  himself  gliding
unconsciously  from  the  law  of the  family  to  the  law  of trusts." 2 74  He
wished he could limit his treatise strictly to the domestic relations, to "the
family"-but  he  was  not  ready  to  draw  the  necessary  distinctions  and
relinquish guardian and ward to the new, general topic of trusts.
270.  JOEL PRENTISS  BISHOP,  COMMENTARIES  ON  THE  LAW  OF  MARRIED  WOMEN:  UNDER  THE
STATUTES  OF  THE SEVERAL  STATES,  AND  AT  COMMON  LAW AND  IN EQUITY  (Boston,  Little, Brown
1873-75)  [hereinafter  BISHOP, COMMENTARIES  ON THE LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN].
271.  SCHOULER, supra note 256, at 7 (emphasis added).
272.  There  may  be  an  influence  from  Scotland  here  again:  the  so-called  Second  Edition  of
Fraser's  treatise,  now  titled A  Treatise on the  Law of Scotland Relative to Parent and Child and
Guardian  and Ward (Hugh  Cowan  ed.,  2d ed.,  Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark,  1866). This topical idea is
entirely new:  delete  husband and  wife and master and servant,  and concentrate  on the bodies of law
relating to children and wards and their various protectors.  A Preface signed P.F. (presumably  Patrick
Fraser) states that  "[t]here  is no necessary  connection  between the various  subjects  in"  Fraser's First
Edition,  indicating  a loss of faith very similar to Schouler's  in  the idea that there  was any remaining
coherence  in the Blackstone/Reeve  list of legal relations. Id. at Preface,  n.p. Fraser's so-called Second
Edition may  have promoted  Schouler to  criticize that list as now-outdated.  Still,  Schouler  makes no
reference  to this text, and, as we will see, proposes  a new coherence  quite independent of its terms.
273.  SCHOULER, supra note 256, at 7.
274.  Id.
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We  see  the  same  temptation-to  generalize  public  and  market-based
relations, subtracting  out the family to stand in solitary splendor-and the
same  disinclination  to  carry  through  on  it, when  Schouler  turns  to  the
relation of master and  servant.  Here,  "the  rule  of classification  becomes
even more uncertain" 275:
If servants connected to the household were alone to be considered
in a treatise on the domestic relations, the modern cases  would be
few  and  simple; but  no  writer  has presumed  to limit  himself to
such  narrow  bounds.  In  former  centuries,  this  relation  had  a
marked significance.276
The domestic  servant still existed, but was numerically unimportant 277;
by implication the law of master and servant had increasingly little to say
about  the household and  thus was  increasingly  irrelevant  in  a treatise  on
the  law  of domestic  relations.  It  should,  Schouler  thought,  migrate  to
some other legal  topic. Schouler  here marked the defacto transition  from
the household (both familial and oeconomic  in Blackstone's  sense)  to the
family/market  distinction, and regretted  that his legal classifications were
not up to speed with social changes.  The recent emancipation of the slaves
had wrought, moreover, a change  in attitude:  "In these days, we dislike to
call  any  man  master."
278  The  very  title  of this  heading  was  a  dismal
reminder  of  "the  common  barbarian  accompaniment  of  barbarian
triumphs."279
In  disparaging  the  terms  master  and  servant  as  out  of  tune  with
republican  sentiment,  Schouler  acknowledged  attitudes  that had become
widespread  almost  one  hundred  years  before.  As  Robert  J.  Steinfeld
demonstrates,  by  the  late  eighteenth  century  American  workers  were
shocking  European  travelers  by  refusing  point  blank  to  be  called
servants.
2 o Here  is  one  of his  examples,a European  visitor  reporting  in
the early nineteenth century that:
[t]he arrogance of domestics  in this land of republican  liberty and
equality,  is  particularly  calculated  to  excite  the  astonishment  of
strangers. To call persons of this description, servants, or to speak
275.  Id.
276.  Id.
277.  Id.; see also id. at  8 ("[lI]t  cannot be denied that ..  .as one of the purely domestic relations . .
[that of master and servant] rarely attracts attention.").
278.  Id. at 7.
279.  Id.
280.  STEINFELD, THE INVENTION  OF FREE LABOR, supra note  148, at 126-27.
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of their master or mistress, is a grievous affront. Having called one
day at the house of a gentleman of my acquaintance, on knocking
at  the  door, it was opened  by  a servant-maid,  whom  I had  never
before seen,  as she had not been long in his  family. The following
is  the  dialogue,  word  for  word,  which  took  place  on  this
occasion:-"is  your  master  at  home."  - "I have  no  master."  -
"don't you  live here?" - "I stay here"-"And who are you then?"
=  Why,  I am Mr. -'s  help, and I'd have you know, man, that
I am no sarvant; none but negers are sarvants.281
Schouler is the first text in my genealogy to take note of this strong social
trend,  and he  did so more  than  100  years  after it emerged,  a remarkable
lag  and  an  index  of how  successfully  the  classical  legal  order  repelled
social inputs.
Increasingly, the law of master and servant was useful only in analogies
to  legal  relations  that,  Schouler  implies,  have  nothing  to  do  with  the
family and everything to do with wage labor:
Apprentices  are,  without  much  violation  of principle,  included
under this head;  they are generally bound out during minority  and
brought up in  families.  Clerks  are not so  readily  confined  within
the circle of domestic relations  as formerly;  and the  same is to be
said  of  factors,  bailiffs,  and  stewards.  The  employds  of  a
corporation  are frequently  designated  as  servants;  so  are laborers
generally. But it cannot be denied that master and servant is rather
a repulsive title, and fast losing favor in this republican country;  . .
. and that in sounding  its legal  depths one  often loses sight of his
landmarks,  and  finds himself  drifting  out  into  the  more  general
subject of principal and agent.282
We can see here  the work of generalization, begun but not completed.
Apprentices  over  the  age  of minority,  apprentices  boarding  out,  clerks,
factors,  bailiffs, stewards:  these  relations, cut free of the household, were
in  search  of a  generalization.  And  what  about  the  employees  of  big
corporations  and "laborers  generally"? Perhaps these  are all, at their most
abstract, really just relations  of principal and agent. If someone would just
write  the  treatises  on  trusts,  on  public  responsibility  for  orphans  and
truants,  and  on  principal/agency  relations,  the  residue-the  law  of the
family,  under the  heading  "domestic  relations"-could  achieve  classical
281.  Id.  (quoting ALBERT  MATTHEWS,  THE TERMS  HIRED MAN  AND  HELP 28 (Cambridge,  John
Wilson  & Son, 1900)).
282.  SCHOULER, supra note 256, at 7-8.
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coherence.
Clearly Schouler had read his Maine. But, as we have seen, Maine only
tacitly admitted that  the family would  lag behind the general progress of
civilization  from status to contract.  By  contrast,  Schouler avidly  asserted
that the domestic relations  were  and  should hang back, and that attempts
at progress  in  this  domain  were perverse.  On the  aboriginal  antiquity  of
this domain, he had this to say:
[T]he  family  may  justly  be  pronounced  the  earliest  of  social
institutions.  . . . Natural  law,  or  the  teachings  of  a  divine
providence,  supplied these regulations. Families preceded nations.
...  But the law of the domestic relations is nevertheless  older than
that  of civil  society.  . . . The  supremacy  of the  law  of family
should not be forgotten.
We  have  seen  this  original,  essential,  mystical,  transtemporal  and
transpatial family before,  in Bishop's representation of marriage  as status.
By  contrast with Bishop's "not  contract"  moves, however, Schouler's  are
much  more  closely  attuned  to  market  ideology  as  the  differand giving
conceptual and normative bite to the family as a separate sphere:
To  an unusual  extent,  therefore,  is the  law of family  above  and
independent  of the  individual.  Society  provides  the  home;  public
policy  fashions  the system:  and  it remains  for  each  one of us  to
place himself under rules which are, and must be, arbitrary.
So is the law of family universal  in its adaptation. It deals directly
with the individual.  Its provisions are for man and woman; not for
corporations or business firms.284
Family law exceptionalism  has arrived. It  is precisely  on this template
that,  almost  100 years  later, Justice  Douglas  wrote that "[m]arriage  is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully  enduring,  and intimate
to the degree of being  sacred. It  is an association  that promotes  a way of
life,  not  causes;  a  harmony  in  living,  not  political  faiths;  a  bilateral
loyalty,  not commercial  or social  projects. Yet it is an  association  for as
noble a purpose  as any  involved in our prior decisions."285  This uncanny
echo  of  Schouler's  formulation,  transposed  into  a  vocabulary  of
constitutional  rights that was  not ascendant  until the  third globalization,
signals  the  deep  integration  of  the  family/market  distinction  into
283.  Id.  at 8-9.
284.  Id.  at 9.
285.  Griswold v. Connecticut,  381  U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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American  legal thought.
As  the  family  emerged  from  the  household  and  differentiated  itself
from the market, the word "family"  made  an etymological  transition, one
which Schouler wished to track in his  halting,  intuitive,  incomplete  new
map  of his  field.  The word  derives  from  the  Latin  term  for  servant  or
slave (famulus), and  its  first  English  meaning  was  "[t]he  servants  of a
house or  establishment;  the household."2 86  Not husband  and wife/parent
and  child/master  and  servant:  just  the  servants.  The  Oxford English
Dictionary (OED)  indicates  that  this  sense  is  quite  old  (the  earliest
example dates  from 1400) and that it is obsolete; it provides no examples
after  1794. But we could  add an  example  from  1839,  a  rare item  in the
Harvard Law Library, its first book titled "Family Law":  The Family Law
Advisor: Containing  Plain  Advice to Landlord  and Tenant. . .Master and
Servant ...  Executors and Administrators ...  To  Make a Will. 28 7  This
title  shows  that  it  still  made  sense  then  to  think  of the  family  as  a
managerial  network  rather  than  a  domestic  space.  The  next  sense  to
emerge  was  "[t]he  body  of persons  who live  in  one  house  or under one
head,  including  parents,  children,  servants,  etc." 2 88  In  1631,  the  Star
Chamber heard a case involving a man of whom  it was said, "[h]is  family
were himself and his wife and daughters, two mayds, and a man." 28 9  This
sense  emerges  in the  mid-sixteenth  century;  the  OED  doesn't  say  it  is
obsolete but gives no examples  after  1859,  eleven years before  Schouler
was to complain that master and  servant no longer belonged in Domestic
Relations. And surely  it is obsolete: when we now read about antebellum
Southern  slaveowners  expressing  concern  for  "[m]y  family,  black  and
white,"290  the  expression  strikes  us as  the  absolute  height  of hypocrisy,
but I think we have to face  it: to them it was merely descriptive.
Thus, before the Civil War "family"  still meant the household, with its
286.  Family  Definition  1.1La,  OXFORD  ENGLISH  DICTIONARY
ONLINE,http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/67975?redirectedFrom=family#  (last visited  Dec.  20, 2010)
[hereinafter OED, Family].
287.  THE FAMILY LAW  ADVISOR:  CONTAINING  PLAIN  ADVICE  TO  LANDLORD AND  TENANT  ...
MASTER  AND  SERVANT  ...  EXECUTORS  AND  ADMINISTRATORS  . ..  To MAKE A WILL (London:  Henry
Washbourne,  1839).  This  book has  no  author;  the  ellipses  in  the  title  do  not  reflect omissions  but
rather  appear  on  the  title  page  and  in  the  official  entry  in  the  Harvard  Hollis  catalogue.  Hollis
describes  this  entry as  "[a]  publisher's  collection  of four of his own  separately  issued  popular  law
manuals, here  bound up (without original  title leaves) with a general title."  Clearly someone thought
that this collection of topics made sense to the law-book-buying public.
288.  OED, Family, supra  note 286, at 1.2.a.
289.  Id.
290.  See  ELIZABETH  FOX-GENOVESE,  WITHIN  THE  PLANTATION  HOUSEHOLD:  BLACK  AND
WHITE WOMEN OF THE OLD  SOUTH, 32,  100-01,  133, 204  (1988).
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relations  of husband and  wife, parent  and  child, and master  and servant.
So far, the "family"  cohered well with Blackstone's "private  oeconomical
relations."  But after the Civil War, servants were decidedly  dropped from
the  referent  of "family":  the  standard  sense  of the  word  became  "[t]he
group  of persons  consisting  of the  parents  and  their  children,  whether
actually  living together or not;  in wider sense, the  unity formed by those
who are nearly connected by blood or affinity." 291  The OED quotes James
Mill referring in 1869, just one year before Schouler's Domestic Relations
was  published,  to  the  still  smaller  unit  sometimes  called  the
companionate, nuclear, or bourgeois family: "The group which consists of
a Father, Mother and Children, is called a Family."292
This  modernized,  nuclearized,  and  privatized  group  is  Schouler's
family.  And his  new  legal idea  is  that  the  law  governing  it  should  be
distinct  from  the  law  of the  market  and  the  law  of the  state.  This  is
something  new.  It  transforms  Robertson's  and Bishop's  status/contract
distinction,  reframes  Bishop's  marriage/contract  distinction,  and
transposes  them into  a series of continguous distinctions:  family/contract,
family/market, and family/state.
Why was  Schouler willing to  publish a confessedly  defective treatise?
He was clearly  aware of the classical project  and knew how to modernize
Reeve's  legal  categories.  His  introduction  is  a  virtual  manual  for
classicizing  reform.  But he  didn't  bother to  do that work,  mustering  his
energies  instead  for  a  conservative  attack  on  recent  changes  to  the
substantive  law  governing  the  ongoing  marriage.  This  was  something
new:  up until  now,  the  treatises  regretted  coverture  while  conceding  its
necessity. Schouler  cemented a new conservatism  for his field. It will be
worth our while, I think, to learn the contents of this new commitment.
Schouler's  special  targets  were  the  Married  Women's  Property  Acts
(the MWPAs), the earnings statutes, and readily available divorce:
The  danger to  be  apprehended  from all  legislation  of this sort  is
that  it will weaken the ties of marriage  by forcing both sexes  into
an  unnatural  antagonism;  teaching them to be independent  of one
291.  OED, Family, supra note 286, at I.3.a.  From the earliest to the latest dates comprised by this
story, an additional,  always  less salient  meaning also  existed: "Those  descended or claiming  descent
from a common ancestor, a house, kindred, lineage," id. at 1.4.a.  Almost all the examples  tip the term
in the direction of aristocratic lineage: "People  of no  'family,"'  id. at  I.4.b. This is the sense in which
Savigny  used  the  term.  But  there  was  no  useable  sense  of "family"  at this  time,  in  America,  to
correspond with the affinal patriarchal family which was Savigny's actual object of attention.
292.  Id. at I.3.a  (quoting 2 JAMES  MILL, ANALYSIS  OF THE  PHENOMENA  OF THE HUMAN  MIND,
xxii, 218 (London,  Longmans Green  1869)).
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another,  and  to earn  their  own  living  apart;  whereas  God's  law
points to family and the mutual  intercourse of man and woman  as
among the  strongest  safeguards  of human happiness.  . . . Add  to
this  loose  divorce  laws,  loosely administered,  and  can  it be  said
that the marriage  relation is encouraged and fostered by the State?
That it should be admits of no question. 293
Schouler's  is the  first  treatise  we  have  examined  which  offered  open
resistance  to  increased  equality  for  wives.  On  this  question  he  was
explicitly  conservative.  Schouler  protested  that the  MWPAs  gave  wives
equality  and  freedom  while  preserving  their  paternalistic  protections.
Male legislators were being pussy-whipped:
Either  the  ultimate  object  should  be  to  place  the  wife  on  an
independent footing and enable her to maintain herself against the
world,  or  else  providing  honorably,  faithfully,  and  generously
against  all possible misfortune,  to teach  her still to  lean upon the
stronger arm of her husband,  and to look to man for guidance.  But
our legislators  sometimes appear to attempt both systems together,
as if goaded on by the gadfly of feminine persistency. Laws which
invite married women to  embark in separate  trade, tend plainly to
the  wife's  independence.  Laws,  on  the  other  hand,  which  class
widows  and  orphans  together  as  subjects  for  special  protection,
preserve  homestead exemptions, permit of settlements  against the
husband's  creditors,  are  founded  on  the  policy  of  the  wife's
dependence.  . . . Certain  it  is  that  woman  cannot  claim  the
privileges of the two  sexes: if she would grasp  at civil honors  she
must surrender her time-honored tribute of chivalrous homage.294
Indeed,  the MWPAs  installed  an unfair  bias  in  favor  of wives  at the
expense  of husbands.  Wives  could  be  individualists,  but  husbands  were
required to carry on as altruists:
Equality  and  freedom  are  precious  words;  but  if the  respective
spheres of man and woman are equally honorable,  equally useful,
equally  free,  need  they  be  precisely  identical?  As  a  logical
proposition,  if woman  in her  pursuits  has  the  right to  become  a
man, man has no less the right to become a woman....
A  calm  and  dispassionate  investigation  of many  acts  shows  that
the common-law  disabilities  of the wife have  been more carefully
pruned  than  those  of the  husband.  Some  legislative  changes  in
293.  SCHOULER, supra note 256, at  17-18.
294.  Id.  at 18-19.
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favor of the latter are desirable. Thus the common law obliged the
husband  to  pay  his  wife's  antenuptial  debts,  because  he  might
have  received  a  fortune  by her;  if then  she  retains  her property,
notwithstanding  the  marriage, this  liability  on his part  should not
continue.  Again, it is possible that the husband, in some  States, has
lost his tenancy  by the curtesy  in  his  wife's  lands;  if so,  is there
any  reason why  the  wife  should  retain  a  dower  interest  in  her
husband's lands.  . . . Nor  is  it clear that where  a married woman
being  of ample  means  retains  her  property  independent  of her
husband, while his  income  continues  slender,  he ought to be held
as  strictly  liable  for  her  necessaries  as  in  the  days  when  the
beneficial enjoyment of her property would have vested in him.295
This  was  all  terrible,  but  the  worst  effect  of the  MWPAs,  Schouler
concluded,  was  "the  constant  temptation  they  hold  out  to  fraud  and
perjury."296  By inviting debtor husbands to convey their property to wives
to protect  it from creditors,  the MWPAs  forewent the protections against
frauds of this kind that were intrinsic to the common law, the community-
property and the civil law marital property systems. "Let us not forget that
the marriage  relation  is a close one,  and in pecuniary  matters places two
persons  before  the  world  somewhat  in  the  light  of partners."297  Here
indeed the  man  becomes  a woman-a  perverse  travesty on  natural  and
divinely  ordained sex  differences.  And "it  is  supreme  folly  to chafe  and
fret and struggle continually against the fetters of sex."
298
Finally,  Schouler  resisted  the  trend  towards  readily  available  divorce.
He  defined  marriage  "in  the first  instance,  [as]  that act by which  a man
and woman unite for life . "299  And he insisted that, once the "status  or
relation" of marriage  is thus formed, "[b]eing  once bound they are bound
for ever. . . . Death alone dissolves the tie[.]" 3 00
All of these conservative  interventions  lead me to suggest that Schouler
not only tolerated but actually  liked the antique  vibe sent by Reeve's table
of contents. It asserted  the  past purity  of the  common  law  rules  against
new legislation. 301 And it asserted a new relation of domestic  relations to
295.  Id. at 19-20.
296.  Id. at 20.
297.  Id.
298.  Id. at 17.
299.  Id. at 22.
300.  Id.
301.  The  conservative  politics  of  Schouler's  treatise  were,  if  anything,  intensified  by  his
posthumous editor Arthur W.  Blackmore.  See Joseph Warren,  Book Review, 22  COLUM.  L.  REV. 88
(1922)  (reviewing  SCHOULER,  A TREATISE  ON  THE LAW  OF MARRIAGE,  DIVORCE,  SEPARATION  AND
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progress:  it  was  no  longer the  locomotive  speeding  to  modernity but  a
defensive,  almost  reactionary,  redoubt-a  haven  of  dependency  in  the
heartless  world of the modem market.
Kennedy  argues  that  the  characterization  of  marriage  as  status-not-
contract  both relieved  contract  of the  values of "regulation,  paternalism,
community  and informality"  and  cabined  them  in  marriage.3 02  Schouler
proposed  that  domestic  relations  should  be  the  principal  new  legal
housing for these values. He wanted to limit that domain, moreover, to the
"law  of the family"  and to the special  setting of the  household. This is a
newly separated  domestic  sphere.  He  did not  want  to  set  up  a Law  of
Altruistic  Relations:  rules  governing  non-family  members  with  express
obligations to act paternalistically on behalf of others-whether guardians
of wards or town officers-should  go elsewhere.  Master and servant was
no longer, realistically speaking,  a domestic relation;  it should migrate to
a new  domain, principal  and  agent,  where  it would  be  governed  by the
values  of "facilitation,  self-determination,  autonomy  and  formality"3 03
appropriate to the contracts of employees and laborers generally.
When all those changes had taken place-and more or less exactly, they
did-Domestic Relations would be residual, the remainder left in the field
defined  and animated  by Reeve  after the law  of work in the marketplace
and  the  law  of  wardship  for  incapacitated  persons  had  departed  for
elsewhere  in the  clarifying  classical  order. It would progress-as  Maine
had suggested it would-by staying put.
X. THE RISE OF CONTRACT: KEENER AND  BISHOP
Domestic  Relations  became  residual  because  something  else  was
becoming  general. Not surprisingly, given our story so far, that something
was  contract. In  this  section,  I retell  Kennedy's  story  of  the  rise  of
contract  not  merely  as  a  category  opposed  to  marriage  and  Domestic
Relations,  but  as the  default  legal  topic,  the  general  one,  the  one  from
which  Domestic  Relations  became  a  structural,  not  merely  lexical,
exception.
Kennedy  argues  that  the  rise  of the  will  theory-the  theory  that  the
primary  legitimate  purpose  of  law  is  to  give  effect  to  the  will  of
individuals  exerted as  self-actualizing  individuals  or, if legally bound to
DOMESTIc  RELATIONS (Arthur W. Blackmore ed.,  6th ed.,  Albany, Matthew Bender  1921)  (1870)).
302.  KENNEDY,  RISE AND FALL, supra note 6, at  185.
303.  Id.
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each  other,  by  willed  agreement-caused  legal  thinkers  of  the  late
nineteenth century to rename  and reorder the basic topics of private law:
The  adoption  of  the  will  theory  was  manifested  in  (a)  the
dismantling  of  contracts  by  spinning  off of Quasi-Contract  and
Tort;  (b)  the rise  in jurisprudence  of an  ordering  of private  law
based  on  two  distinctions:  rights  against  the  world versus  rights
against  individuals;  and  rights  arising  from  private  agreement
versus those created by the state; (c)  the emergence of the concept
of status  to  deal  with  legal  relationships  inconsistent  with  this
scheme;  (d)  the  reordering  of the  residuum  of pure  contract  in
terms  of the will of the parties and the will of the sovereign;  and
(e)  the  organization  of  the  brand  new  field  of  tort  law  into
intentional tort, negligence and absolute liability.30
Implicit  in  these  shifts  is  a desire  to make  the  system  make  sense  as a
system: a classically classical impulse.
Kennedy's account of this classicizing rise of contract identifies two big
shifts affecting the "status"  element:
1.The undermining  and eventual rejection of the ideas of "status,"
"relation,"  and "condition"  as  the  operative  sources  of the  great
mass of contract rules.
2.  The  emergence  of a specialized  law  of persons,  and of a  new
category  of  status,  that  grouped  together  and  explained  the
peculiar character of rules incompatible with the new vision of the
nature of 'real'  contracts.305
Contract  was  increasingly  the  domain  of  "facilitation,  self-
determination,  autonomy  and  formality";  rules  formerly  thought  to  be
about  contract,  but  actually  implicating  "regulation,  paternalism,
community  and  informality"  had  to  go  elsewhere.3 0 6  The  former  was
abstracted in part by the piecemeal but relentless subtraction of the latter:
The Classics created  . ..  by subtraction.  It was these authors of the
1870's  [Leake,  Langdell,  Pollock,  Anson,  Holmes,  Markby  and
Holland]  who  purged  quasi-contract,  status  and  tort  from  the
subject.  In the  place  of the  imperialistic  claims of Parsons,  they
began with elaborate  descriptions  of all the things "contract"  was
not. They created  also by abstraction, by  asserting and then trying
to  show that there had  been  an  essence hidden  at the  core of the
304.  Id. at 171.
305.  Id. at 185.
306.  Id.
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pre-Classical  hodgepodge.307
To  the  extent  that  contract  was  modern,  quasi-contract,  tort  and  status
were  residual.  They progressed  along with everything  else, but by being
segregated.
As  Kennedy indicates, Domestic  Relations  was not the only domain  to
emerge  in this  way. The  Classics recruited  the old term quasi-contract  to
house legal  obligations  that were  formerly  "implied,"  leaving "contract"
for assented-to  obligations.308  Torts, too, broke off from  the great glacier
of Blackstone's  Law of Wrongs  and  gained  its  independence  as a  legal
topic-a new iceberg on its own trajectory.309 As we have seen, marriage,
now  status-not-contract,  eventually  docked  in  Domestic  Relations,
understood  as the  "law  of family"--the  law of the people  who,  with the
rise of bourgeois companionate  marriage and its nuclear family, share life
in the home.
The  resulting order was not born  in a day.  Instead, the treatise  writers
seem to be staggering to revise  a large, recalcitrant body of legal material
to conform  to a system whose principles  were  only glimmeringly visible
and  whose  shape  emerged  only  through  intensely  competitive  sallies  of
publication.  The  relationship  between  ideology  and  taxonomy  would
become  clear  only  in  retrospect.  Consider,  for  instance,  James  Kent's
immensely  influential  Commentaries on American Law, first published  in
1826-30  and  remaining  in  print  almost  to  the  end  of the  century.  This
super-authoritative  treatise  followed  precisely  Blackstone's  Table  of
Contents,  and thus included a section on the "rights of persons"  complete
with  corporations. 31 0  Holmes  produced  a  new  edition  of  Kent's
Commentaries in  1872,  adding  a  footnote  updating  the  text  to  conform
with  Bishop's  status-not-contract  conception  of  marriage. 
3 1   But
Holmes's  edition,  like  all  the  others,  followed  Kent's  original  plan.
Indeed,  throughout  its publication  history  Kent's  Commentaries retained
307.  Id.  at  207.  See  STEPHEN  MARTIN  LEAKE,  THE  ELEMENTS  OF  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS
(London,  Stevens & Sons  1867) and THERON METCALF,  PRINCIPLES OF  THE LAW  OF CONTRACTS  AS
APPLIED  BY  COURTS  OF  LAW  (New  York,  Hurd  & Houghton  1867),  for  early  examples  of  the
contracts-only treatise.
308.  KENNEDY,  RISE AND  FALL, supra note 6, at  173-75.
309.  For what  may  be  the  first  effort  in  this  direction,  see  FRANCIS  HILLIARD,  THE  LAW OF
TORTS, OR PRIVATE WRONGS (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.  1859).
310.  2  JAMES  KENT,  COMMENTARIES  ON  AMERICAN  LAW  at  Table of Contents  (New  York, 0.
Halstead  1827).
311.  2  JAMES KENT,  COMMENTARIES  ON  AMERICAN  LAW  129  n.1  (0.  W. Holmes ed.,  12th ed.,
Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1873)  (1826).  Thanks to KENNEDY,  RISE AND  FALL, supra note 6, at  198
for calling this edition and amendment to my attention.
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their original  outline  in toto; revised  editions  added and  modified  lower-
level  headings  without  redrawing  the  basic  structure.  We  can  imagine
some date after 1896, the date of Kent's last published edition (again with
Holmes  on  the  masthead),312  as  the  moment  when  the  classical  order
finally  shed  earlier  taxonomies,  merged  into  legal  common  sense,  and
rendered Kent's Commentaries a relic.
Meanwhile,  Bishop struggled mightily  to get  his  oeuvre right, and his
changes  of heart show us how  lurching and  exploratory the process  was.
In  1871-73,  almost  20  years  after  the  first  edition  of  Marriage and
Divorce, he  published  his  two-volume  Commentaries on  the  Law  of
Married Women. 
3 13  This  book  was,  basically,  the  law  of coverture.  He
thus  persisted  until  the  end  of  his  career  in  missing  Schouler's
generalizing  point  that the  central  core  of husband-and-wife  as  a  legal
topic was the full panoply of legal relations between them.
But Bishop made several substantial efforts to get the contradisguished
field, contracts, right. His  first effort was a  little handbook, Doctrines of
Contract,  published  in  1878,314  which  he  effectively  withdrew  as
mistaken  in  1887.  That year he published his  Commentaries on the Law
of Contracts  upon a New and Condensed Method,  noting on the title page
that  it is "A New Work, Superseding  the Author's Smaller One.""'s  This
pentimento illuminates the  coevolution of our topic and is worth spelling
out.
Bishop's  first  contract  treatise  offered  a  new  ordering  for  this  legal
topic:  contracts  were  general  as  to  subject  matter  but  distinguished
primarily  as  to form,  so that the first chapters  addressed Contracts Under
Seal,  Contracts of Record,  Oral  Contracts,  Simple  Contracts in  Writing,
Contracts Implied  as of Fact, Contracts  Implied  as of Law, and Contracts
312.  The  last  edition  of which  I  am  aware  appeared  in  1896.  KENT,  COMMENTARIES  ON
AMERICAN  LAW  (John  M. Gould  ed.,  14th ed.,  Boston,  Little Brown & Co.  1896)  (claiming  on the
title page Holme's 12th edition as its own pedigree).
313.  BISHOP,  COMMENTARIES  ON THE LAW OF MARRIED  WOMEN, supra note 270.
314.  JOEL PRENTISS  BISHOP, THE DOCTRINES  OF THE LAW  OF  CONTRACTS,  IN  THEIR PRINCIPAL
OUTLINES,  STATED,  ILLUSTRATED,  AND  CONDENSED  (St. Louis,  Soule,  Thomas & Wentworth  1878)
[hereinafter BISHOP,  CONTRACTS  IN THEIR PRINCIPAL OUTLINES].
315.  JOEL PRENTISS  BISHOP,  COMMENTARIES  ON  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS:  UPON  A NEW AND
CONDENSED  METHOD  (Chicago, T.H.  Flood  & Co.  1887)  [herinafter  BISHOP,  CONTRACTS  UPON  A
NEW  AND  CONDENSED  METHOD].  For  the  retraction,  see  BISHOP,  CONTRACTS  UPON  A  NEW  AND
CONDENSED  METHOD, at  iv ("In  most respects,  [the  earlier] work  satisfied me, as far as it went. But,
on reflection, I deemed that its sphere might be most profitably enlarged. So I have extended its  scope
...  have  changed  in  a  measure  the  arrangement;  and  above  all,  have  made more  prominent  the
reasons of the  law,  constituting  as  they do  the  law itself. And  otherwise  I have rendered  the  book
new.").
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Implied  from  Express  Ones." 6  It  was  no  easy  task  deducing  this  new
taxonomy:
This  book  is  the  outgrowth  of a  plan  to  collect,  in  simple  and
compact  language,  and  arrange in  an  order of my  own,  the
essential  doctrines  of the law of contracts;  referring  mainly  to the
larger books, which  the reader was  expected  to consult  as he  had
occasion,  for  illustrations  and  the  adjudged  cases.  But  on
proceeding  to  do  what  I had  thus  undertaken,  I found  the  plan
impossible  . . . . When  I  felt,  in those  books,  for the  ribs  in  the
body of the law of contracts, and for the spinal column, I could not
distinguish rib or backbone from muscle."'
Only  in  his  second  contracts  treatise  did Bishop  find  the  armature  of
classical  contract.  Here  we  find  an  introduction  to  "The  More  General
Doctrines"  divided  into  two  parts:  "Elements  of a  Contract"  and  "The
Consideration."  Only  then did Bishop list off the various special contract
forms. The struggle to generalize,  and the impediments offered by the old
legal  forms,  could  hardly be  more  patent.  It's  almost  as  though  Bishop
knew, but could not himself say,  that  even his reformed  taxonomy  was
"not  only  unscientific,  and  therefore  theoretically  wrong,  but  is  also
destructive of clear thinking, and therefore  vicious  in practice.""  It was
left to  William A.  Keener,  from whom  I take  this  scornful judgment, to
make the break.
Keener's 1893 Treatise on the Law of Quasi-Contracts  insisted that:
A  true  contract,  whether  it  be  a  simple  contract,  a  specialty,  a
contract in the nature of a specialty, or a contract of record,  exists
as  an  obligation,  because  the  contracting  party  has  willed, in
circumstances  to  which  the  law  attaches  the  sanction  of  an
obligation, that he shall be bound.319
That  is,  contract law  was the  law of the will  of the parties; nothing  else
belonged  there.  Keener's  exceptionalizing  treatise  rejected  any  idea that
express  contracts  and  those  implied  in  fact  were  categorically  different:
only a  willed  contract  was  a contract,  and  if the  parties  had  willed  an
obligation,  the  distinction  between  express  and  implied-in-fact
316.  BISHOP,  CONTRACTS  IN  THEIR PRINCIPAL OUTLINES,  supra note 314, at vii.
317.  Id.  at iii  (emphasis added).
318.  WILLIAM  A.  KEENER,  A  TREATISE  ON  THE  LAW  OF  QUASI-CONTRACTS  3  (New  York,
Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1893).
319.  Id. at 4.
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agreements  was  merely  evidentiary.
320  Abstracted,  contract  is  willed
obligation.  The  subtracting  move?  Contracts  implied  in  law  weren't
contracts  at all,  and  should be  restyled "quasi-contract."  The will  of the
state  had  to  migrate  out  of contract  proper  into  quasi-contract.  Here
Keener  parked  obligations  to  act  arising  by  record  and  by  positive  or
customary  law,  and  also  obligations  imposed  by  judicial  doctrine  to
prevent unjust enrichment.321 That is to  say, where  official stipulation  of
some  kind  was wanting,  quasi-contract was the  law of ethical obligation
to  make  restitution  of unjustly  acquired  benefits.  It was the  will  of the
state, not that of the parties. It did not belong in contract at all.
Keener  also subtracted  some rules  which  Schouler would  have housed
in Domestic  Relations  from that  domain, and made  them  rules  of quasi-
contract. For instance, the duty of husbands to reimburse third parties who
supply necessaries  to  their wives  was more  properly understood  to arise
from  the  doctrine  of  unjust  enrichment  than  from  marriage  itself. 322
Where  the  doctrine  of unjust  enrichment  has  nothing  to  say,  however,
Keener laid off of the  law of husband  and  wife and of parent  and  child:
the  duties  of husband  and  wife  and of parent  and  child  to  each other
simply  don't  appear.  Those  could  stay  where  their  specializers  had  put
them-in the new  legal categories,  marriage  and divorce  and the  special
rules of coverture  (Bishop),  or, more  classically,  in  Domestic  Relations
(Schouler).  We  are seeing  the residualization  of Domestic Relations  not
only  from  contract  but  now  from contract's  other new  opposite,  quasi-
contract.
The emerging map  was divided  into  four parts:  contract was the modal
law;  quasi-contract,  tort,  and  domestic  relations  all  stood  together  in
opposition  to  it.  Bishop  then  took  this  process  one  step  further,
constructing a high legal barrier between his Marriage and Divorce and
all  the  other  domains  of  "regulation,  paternalism,  community  and
informality."  In  Bishop's  last  classicizing  effort,  he  redivided  the  legal
field in partes tres: contract, non-contract  law, and marriage and  divorce.
Non-Contract Law  required  a  treatise  of  its  own.
3 2 3  This  "follows  a
natural  division  in  the  legal  field,  instead  of  driving  a  mere  artificial
320.  Id. at 5.
321.  Id. at  16.  How is quasi-contract  distinct from tort?  The former brings  an  obligation to act;
the latter an obligation to refrain. Id. at  15.
322.  Id. at 15,  22.
323.  JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP,  COMMENTARIES  ON THE NON-CONTRACT  LAW  AND ESPECIALLY AS
TO  COMMON  AFFAIRS  NOT  OF  CONTRACT OR  THE EVERY-DAY  RIGHTS  AND  TORTS (Chicago,  T.  H.
Flood,  1889) [hereinafter BISHOP,  NON-CONTRACT  LAW].
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furrow."324  Prior  treatise-writers  who had  tried  to  make  torts  a  topic325
labored  in hopeless  conceptual  error; tort was to noncontractual duties as
breach was to contractual ones.  It was not a general  topic at all but merely
the  "civil  wrong"  housed within  it.
326  The general topic  was  "common
affairs not of contract."
327
The  newly-fundamental  will  theory  provides  the  principle  against
which  these  noncontractual  duties  could  arise.  Bishop  now  understood
freedom  of individual  will  in  ferocious  Darwinian  terms.  The  two  chief
principles  from which the non-contract law arises are these:
§ 10.  The Right to Exist. Every person  is entitled to  live as long
as,  without feeding  on his fellows  or otherwise  injuring  them,  he
can. This is a self-evident truth. Hence,-
§ 11.  Active-Do  as  Will. As  no  man can  live by simply  sitting
down  and  breathing,  every  one  has  the  right  to  be  constantly
active. And as necessarily each one is moved by impulses from his
own  mind, not another's,  all are permitted  to  obey,  because  they
must,  their  several  wills.  The  consequence  is  that,  while  one
abstains  from  the  purpose  to injure  another  and, beyond  this,  is
careful to avoid such injury, he cannot be called to account though
an unintended harm results to the other.328
Where  intentional injury or a failure  to take legally required care  could
be  assigned,  then  a  noncontractual  duty  arose  and  the  law  required  a
remedy.  But this  was the  special  case;  the  right  to  obey one's own will
was  general.  Vast  swaths  of  uncompensated  injury  were  a  necessary
consequence  of the will theory, but Bishop did not blink: "Better  is it for
all that the law should keep  the other vigilant by  stimulating him to look
out  for  himself." 3 29  We  may  well  now  have  travelled  as  far  as  it  is
possible  to  go  from  Parsons's  idea  that  contract,  express  and  implied,
324.  Id. at iii.
325.  Bishop  indignantly claimed that he had  foreseen the  need for a treatise  on torts long before
anyone else, but that demented  law-book  publishers  had refused his proposal to publish one. Id. at 2
n.1.  Instead,  in Non-Contract Law, he  found  himself obliged  to  recognize  the  first  wave  of torts
treatises: C.G.  ADDISON, WRONGS  AND  THEIR REMEDIES,  BEING A TREATISE ON  THE LAW OF  TORTS
(V.  and R.  Stevens  & Sons,  1860);  HILLIARD,  supra note  309;  FREDRICK  POLLOCK,  THE  LAW OF
TORTS:  A  TREATISE  ON  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  OBLIGATIONS  ARISING  FROM  CIVIL  WRONGS  IN  THE
COMMON LAW (London,  Stevens & Sons,  1887). Bishop, NON-CONTRACT  LAW, supra note 323,  at 2,
2 n.l.
326.  BISHOP, NON-CONTRACT  LAW, supra note 323, at 3.
327.  Id. at title page, 3.
328.  Id. at 5-6.
329.  Id. at 6.
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permeated all of social  life, forming the very  "web  and woof'  of human
interaction.
What  of  the  relations  among the  deviant  legal  fields?  Bishop  did
include  a summary of the duties of husbands for their wives'  torts and the
duties  of parents,  masters,  and  guardians  for those  of legal  infants.  He
made  a weaker  distinction between  the  law of family  and  his  own  topic
than Keener  did: while for Keener, the  law of marriage  ended where  the
law of quasi-contract began, Bishop thought that marriage  and parentage
might be the site of non-contractual  duties and provide rules conditioning
their legal extent. Of the two, Keener was the stricter classicizer. But even
for  Bishop,  despite  its appearance  as  a "tangle"  of canon  law, common
law, and equitable sources, the law of marriage  was "a whole";  it could be
"made luminous" to legal minds if they were willing to "understand the  . .
parts and the combined whole." 330
Bishop's  topic  "non-contract  law"  was  not  to  survive,  but the  larger
divisions  he  respected  and  helped  to  construct  were  intrinsic  to  the
classical order. Contract was general;  it housed the will of the parties;  the
domains  of law  assigned  to  "regulation,  paternalism,  community  and
informality"-quasi-contract,  tort,  and the  law  of family-were  special.
Bit by bit they were subtracted from the classical center of the legal  field.
As  we  have  seen,  marriage  was  the  first to  go:  even  before this  process
had  really  discernably  begun,  it was  already status-not-contract.  Again
this parole  is settling into a new langue. This time, given the exalted place
accorded  contract  and  the  will theory  in  classicizing  thought,  given the
idea of progress which Maine's  authority injected  into the work, we now
see the  sheer deviance of domains  of law dedicated not to the will of the
parties but to the will of the state. And with this came a  felt need to keep
them narrow so as to enlarge the scope of freedom of contract.
Nor  was  marriage-or  Domestic  Relations  or  the  law  of  family-
continuous  with  its  co-deviant  fields, quasi-contract  and  tort.  The  latter
were  general,  just  as  contract  was  general,  in  that  they  governed  all
persons  equally.  But  Domestic  Relations  retained  a  commitment  to  its
highly  specific  legal persons and to the idea that they were differentiated
from the faceless liberal individual by status.
Finally,  we  can  see  in  Bishop's  struggle  signs  that  the retardataire,
special,  state-pervaded  domain  of  marriage  and  divorce  (or,  in  the
increasingly  common  usage, domestic  relations) was  losing prestige  as a
330.  Id. at 241-42 n.1.
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legal field. Recall that, in  1891,  Bishop crowed that he had made marriage
and divorce coherent. The  introduction to the  1891  edition of his Law of
Marriage and Divorce, Bishop  celebrated himself not  only for  replacing
the incoherent, contradictory,  and fragmented body of case law described
in his first edition  on this topic by  a (supposedly)  consolidated, coherent,
and fully rational  legal order, but for convincing his colleagues  to see the
field his way."'  That's not how his achievements  looked to him in  1898,
when he published Non-Contract  Law:
The  profession  has never  looked  upon  the  subject  [of the  law  of
married  women]  as  one  susceptible  of being  made  luminous,  or
even  as  proper  for any  thorough  instruction  to  students.  I do not
think there ever was a practitioner,  a judge, or a law student who
even  so  much entertained  the  suggestion  of reading this work of
mine  [Married Women].  Simply  it  was  used  as  a  digest  is,
therefore  with  little  more  profit.  And  the  thought  that  it  or  any
other book  on the subject can be  made  more useful has  probably
never  entered  a  half  dozen  minds  in  the  entire  country.  I will
illustrate  this  by  saying,  that  a  very  eminent  lawyer  of  my
acquaintance  who,  I  know,  reads  and  appreciates  my  works
generally,  instead  of reading  this,  wrote  me,-"You  may  have
removed the difficulties of the subject, but I do not believe it."  If I
could have begun to untangle  things  in the right place,-namely,
in the  professional  mind of the country,-I  should  have made  a
great success of this Married Women book. 332
What  a  poignant  testimony  to  the  degradation  of marriage  law  in  the
emerging classical order!
CONCLUSION
This  Part  tells  how  the  law  of husband  and  wife,  parent  and  child,
master  and  servant,  and  guardian  and  ward  evolved  into  the  law  of
status-also designated the  law of marriage-and became the opposite  of
contract. It tells how the law of marriage  underwent further evolution into
the law of Domestic Relations,  became public  law, became conservative,
and  became  deviant;  and  how  the  law  of  contract  shed  its  public
normativity  and  became  the  archetypical  domain  of  the  will  theory,
became  private  law,  became  emblematic  of  progress,  and  became
331.  See supra notes  107,  108 and accompanying  text.
332.  BISHOP, NON-CONTRACT  LAW, supra note 323, at 241-2  nA.
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fundamental  to the legal order.  It tells how the law of master and  servant
migrated to contract;  and how contract shed its will-of-the-state  elements
for  reconstruction  as  quasi-contract  and  tort.  At  the  time  that  the
status/contract  distinction  took  hold in  America,  marriage-as-status-not-
contract was deemed both exceptional and fundamental to the legal order.
By  the  time  all the  categorical  changes  I've  described in  this  Part were
completed, it was  exceptional  but no longer really fundamental:  it lost  is
diacritical  command,  shed  its  epistemic  and  professional  prestige,  and
became a backwater in the law.
To  this  day,  our  law  curriculum  and  legal  ideology  retain  this  basic
structural  template  dividing  the  law  of the  family  from  the  law  of the
market.  This  family/market,  status/contract,  law-of-intimacy/law-of-
business distinction is not ideologically  innocent. It carries with it the idea
of marriage  as  status, the  idea that it is either status  or contract,  and the
idea that it is exceptional.  Thus  it carries  the idea that the market is free,
while the family is entrenched in moral or natural command; it carries  the
idea that the market is the  site of progress,  while the family  is or should
be slow to  change. It  is a linchpin of liberal  legal thought-so large  and
pervasive that it is almost hidden in plain sight. My  goal in this genealogy
is  to  make  its  historicity  and  its  varying  ideological  investments
discernable and available for resistance.
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